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23-3211•United States of America v. Keyonn Connors
23-3211Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitAug 30, 2024
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-3427
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Keyonn Connors
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: May 6, 2024
Filed: August 12, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Keyonn Connors rode as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Zavion Davis. A
police officer in North Little Rock, Arkansas, saw the vehicle traveling in the wrong
direction on a one-way street. She initiated a traffic stop. As the officer approached
the vehicle, she smelled a strong marijuana odor. She asked Davis whether he or his
passengers had anything illegal. Davis replied, “[J]ust a little weed.” R. Doc. 1, at 5.
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Having probable cause, the officer searched the vehicle.1 Inside, she found a
large backpack that belonged to Connors. The backpack contained an AM-15 rifle
loaded with 20 rounds of ammunition. The rifle had been illegally modified for fully
automatic fire.
Three days later, Connors agreed to a police interview. He disclosed that he
was a felon on probation, acknowledged that the backpack belonged to him, and
admitted that he knew the backpack held a firearm. However, Connors insisted that
the firearm was not his. He claimed that a friend owned the firearm and that he was
temporarily holding onto the firearm for the friend. When police asked Connors to
name the friend, Connors refused to do so. He denied knowing that the firearm was
capable of fully automatic fire, and he denied his status as a prohibited person.
The federal government obtained a two-count indictment against Connors for
unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and
unlawfully possessing a machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1). The
parties reached a plea agreement. Connors pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession
count, and the government dismissed the machine-gun count. Connors also signed
an appeal waiver, reserving his right to appeal (1) jurisdiction, (2) prosecutorial
misconduct, and (3) a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines’ range.
Applying the Guidelines, the district court2 calculated an advisory sentencing
range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. The court asked the parties for sentencing
recommendations. Connors requested lenience because of deprivations suffered in
1See United States v. Williams, 955 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We have
repeatedly held that the odor of marijuana provides probable cause for a warrantless
search of a vehicle under the automobile exception.”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 302 (1999) (“When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a
car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to examine packages and containers [found
within the car].”).
2 The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.
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his upbringing, obligations toward his minor daughter, and physical and mental
hardship stemming from the deformity of his hand.3 The government said that it
would defer to the court’s judgment.
The court varied upward from the Guidelines and imposed a sentence of 80
months’ imprisonment. It reasoned that 80 months was appropriate and no greater
than necessary to deter Connors from committing future crimes and to protect the
public from him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (sentencing factors). Specifically, the
court expressed concern about Connors’s criminal history. Two years before the
instant offense, Connors went to his ex-girlfriend’s (his daughter’s mother’s) home
with a firearm. While there, he fired 10 to 12 rounds into the unoccupied family
vehicle. The court said that Connors’s past and present crimes involving firearms
show that he is “a danger to the community.” R. Doc. 39, at 15. Connors’s counsel
objected to the sentence, arguing that Connors has “a good relationship with” his ex-
girlfriend and that 80 months’ imprisonment will put him “out of his child’s life.”
Id. at 16–17.
On appeal, Connors argues that his sentence is procedurally unsound and
substantively unreasonable. The government argues that Connors waived his right
to bring a procedural challenge, and it defends the sentence as reasonable.
“We review de novo issues concerning the interpretation and enforcement of
a plea agreement and the application of appeal waivers.” United States v. Dallman,
886 F.3d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 2018). “An appeal waiver requires dismissal of an
appeal if the plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and
voluntarily, if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, and if dismissal of the
appeal would not result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d
702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, Connors does not assert that he unknowingly or
involuntarily waived his right to appeal, and he does not dispute that his procedural
3 As a child, Connors was injured when a firework exploded in his hand.
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challenge falls within the scope of his waiver. Therefore, his procedural challenge
can succeed only if dismissal would result in a miscarriage of justice.
“The miscarriage-of-justice exception is a narrow one that arises in only
limited contexts. We have recognized it for challenges to an illegal sentence, to a
sentence that violates the terms of an agreement, and where ineffective assistance of
counsel rendered the appeal waiver itself unknowing and involuntary.” United States
v. Williams, 81 F.4th 835, 840 (8th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Connors’s sentence is
not illegal, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) (authorizing up to 15 years’ imprisonment for
a felon-in-possession offense); it does not violate his plea agreement; and he makes
no showing that his counsel ineffectively assisted him, see United States v. Dennis,
81 F.4th 764, 770 n.2 (8th Cir. 2023) (declining to address an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim on direct appeal). Accordingly, we dismiss Connors’s challenge to
his sentence’s procedural soundness as waived. See Scott, 627 F.3d at 704.
Turning to the sentence’s substantive reasonableness, we review for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Merrett, 8 F.4th 743, 751 (8th Cir. 2021). We will find
an abuse of discretion “when the district court (1) fails to consider a relevant factor
that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in
weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. May, 70
F.4th 1064, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Connors argues that the district court committed “an error in judgment
in weighing the sentencing factors.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. He primarily contends
that the district court gave too much weight to his criminal history. He repeats his
claim that he has “a good relationship with the mother of his child,” and he notes
that his prior crime of firing upon the family vehicle “was already accounted for
within the criminal history guideline calculations.” Id. at 16.
“[A] sentencing court may vary upward based on criminal history already
accounted for by the Guidelines.” United States v. Haskins, 101 F.4th 997, 1000 (8th
Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Manuel, 73 F.4th 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2023)). We
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conclude that the district court did not clearly err when it gave significant weight to
Connors’s prior crime against his daughter’s mother. Although the family vehicle
was unoccupied, Connors’s past choice to discharge a firearm during a domestic
dispute, together with his instant choice to possess a firearm illegally, sufficiently
supports the district court’s judgment. The imposition of an above-Guidelines
sentence was not an abuse of discretion. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C);
United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 1012–13 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming an
upward variance to 80 months’ imprisonment based on the defendant’s “frequent
firearm convictions and his high likelihood of recidivism,” notwithstanding his
“unstable and tragic childhood” and obligations toward his minor daughter).
For these reasons, we dismiss Connors’s procedural challenge as waived, and
we affirm his sentence as substantively reasonable.
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