United States of America v. John Christian Richmond

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1752
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
John Christian Richmond
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
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Submitted: August 22, 2024
Filed: August 29, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After pleading guilty to conspiring to distribute a mixture or substance
containing fentanyl, John Richmond received an 87-month sentence. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vi), 846. An Anders brief suggests the sentence is
procedurally and substantively flawed. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). A pro se supplemental brief makes some of the same arguments and adds

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one more: counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an upward departure. See
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a).
We conclude that the challenges are waived, meritless, or premature.
Richmond “intentional[ly] relinquish[ed]” any challenge to the departure by
informing the district court1 that he was “not going to object to it.” United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Eagle Pipe,
911 F.3d 1245, 1247 (8th Cir. 2019). The court then calculated the new range,
selected a sentence, and explained its reasoning. See United States v. Brown, 992
F.3d 665, 672 (8th Cir. 2021) (reviewing the court’s explanation for plain error when
the defendant did not object). In doing so, it sufficiently considered the statutory
sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or
commit a clear error of judgment. See Brown, 992 F.3d at 673–74 (reviewing for an
abuse of discretion and explaining that “giv[ing] some factors [more or] less weight
than a defendant prefers . . . does not justify reversal” (citation omitted)). And as
for the argument that counsel provided ineffective assistance, it will have to await
collateral review. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 827 (8th
Cir. 2006) (explaining that ineffective-assistance claims are “more properly raised
in a separate motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”).
Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no
other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988).
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
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1 The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the
District of North Dakota.

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