United States of America v. Anthony Fisher

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2738
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Anthony Fisher
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: May 10, 2024
Filed: September 4, 2024
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
While burglarizing a home, Anthony Fisher encountered a homeowner and
shot him eight times. Because Fisher was a felon at the time, the federal government
charged him with unlawful possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The case went to trial, and the jury found Fisher guilty. On appeal,
Fisher challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Relying
on Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), he argues that he lacked knowledge

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of his prohibited status when he possessed ammunition. The record sufficiently
supports the jury’s finding that Fisher had knowledge of his prohibited status.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1
I. Background
On February 16, 2021, Fisher, De’andrew Berry, Elisha Brooks, and Phoenix
Sims-McGlothlin2 plotted to burglarize Sage Miller’s home. Fisher and his
associates knew that Miller dealt marijuana, so they believed the home contained
large sums of cash. The group traveled in Sims-McGlothlin’s vehicle from Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, to nearby Marion, Iowa. Sims-McGlothlin stayed inside the vehicle
while Fisher, Berry, and Brooks entered the home. Miller was present. When Fisher
saw Miller, Fisher pulled a firearm and shot Miller about eight times.3 Miller lost
consciousness.
When Miller regained consciousness, he called 911. First responders rushed
him to a hospital in Cedar Rapids. Among other injuries, Miller was suffering from
respiratory failure, liver failure, a kidney laceration, and fractured vertebrae. Miller
survived. On subsequent days, investigators tried to interview Miller, but he was
unconscious or intubated and unable to communicate.
1 The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, then Chief Judge, now United States
District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
2 In the record materials and the appellate briefs, Phoenix’s surname is
alternatively spelled “Sims-McGlothlin” and “Sims-McGlothin.” See, e.g., R. Doc.
93, at 1 (district court order using both spellings); Appellant’s Br. at 2 (using both
spellings). Here, we will use the spelling “Sims-McGlothlin.”
3 The exact number is unclear. Fisher bragged that he shot Miller five times,
Berry recalled eight or nine shots, and law enforcement recovered eight shell
casings. The hospital could not determine how many times Miller was shot because
“multiple bullets” lodged together inside a single wound. R. Doc. 104, at 5.

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When Miller regained his ability to speak, he described the shooter’s race,
sex, and clothing but could not provide additional identifying information. Fisher,
meanwhile, boasted to friends on social media that he was the perpetrator. Officers
learned of Fisher’s boasting and arrested him. Based on Fisher’s criminal history,
the federal government charged him with illegally possessing ammunition after a
felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At trial, Fisher argued that he lacked knowledge of his status as a felon when
he possessed the ammunition used in the shooting. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
The Sentencing Guidelines advised the district court to sentence Fisher to 235 to 293
months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Fisher to 120 months, which was the
applicable statutory maximum. Fisher appeals.
II. Discussion
In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that, to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g) and 924(a), the government must prove that the defendant knew of his
prohibited status when he possessed ammunition or a firearm. 588 U.S. at 227; see
also United States v. Parsons, 946 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2020) (listing all four
elements of the offense). Here, the government had to prove that Fisher knew of his
status as a felon when he possessed ammunition on February 16, 2021.
Fisher admits that he pleaded guilty to an Iowa felony in 2020. See Iowa Code
§ 719.1(1)(f) (“interference with official acts”). He also admits that the state court
accepted his guilty plea, granted him a deferred judgment, and imposed a term of
three years’ probation. In this appeal, Fisher does not contest the legal basis of his
felon-in-possession conviction. The legal basis is clear.4 Instead, Fisher contests the
4See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (“What constitutes a conviction of [a felony] shall
be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the
proceedings were held.”); State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A]
deferred judgment constitutes a [felony] conviction . . . where the defendant (as here)
has not completed his term of probation.”); United States v. Reth, 258 F. App’x 68,
69 (8th Cir. 2007) (unpublished per curiam) (same interpretation of Iowa law).

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factual basis. He argues that he did not understand the legal implications of his 2020
Iowa proceedings when he possessed ammunition on February 16, 2021. He claims
that, at the time, he did not know that he was a felon.
When a defendant brings a Rehaif claim, arguing that the knowledge-of-status
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, we review the claim de novo.
United States v. Marin, 31 F.4th 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2022). We examine the
knowledge-of-status evidence “in its totality.” United States v. Atilano, 101 F.4th
977, 983 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Spencer, 50 F.4th 685, 686 (8th
Cir. 2022)). And we consider this evidence “in the light most favorable to the
verdict.” United States v. Sholley-Gonzalez, 996 F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir. 2021)
(quoting United States v. Sainz Navarrete, 955 F.3d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 2020)). A
Rehaif claim will succeed—and we will reverse the district court—only if “no
reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Burning Breast, 8 F.4th 808, 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.
Mabery, 686 F.3d 591, 598 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Based on the record, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that
Fisher knew that he was a felon on February 16, 2021. First, when Fisher pleaded
guilty to an Iowa felony in 2020, he signed a plea document that identified his crime
as a felony. Second, Fisher made a remote appearance in an Iowa state court. The
court accepted Fisher’s guilty plea, granted him a deferred judgment, and imposed a
three-year term of probation. Third, Fisher signed an Iowa probation agreement. The
agreement again informed Fisher that his crime was a felony. It also stated: “If I am
on probation for a felony, . . . I will not own, possess, use or transport a firearm or
other dangerous weapon until that right is restored to me.” R. Doc. 77-41, at 2.
Fourth, Fisher’s Iowa probation officer appeared as a witness at trial and testified
that Fisher’s 2020 Iowa deferred judgment hindered Fisher’s efforts to obtain and
maintain employment. At least twice, Fisher failed criminal background checks and
was denied work. Whether or not any one of these four pieces of evidence would
have been enough, collectively they sufficed. See Atilano, 101 F.4th at 983

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(explaining that we examine the totality of the evidence rather than individual pieces
of evidence in isolation).
Resisting this conclusion, Fisher points to our decision in United States v.
Davies, 942 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2019). However, the facts of Davies were unique. In
subsequent cases, we have repeatedly distinguished Davies and cabined that decision
to its specific facts. See, e.g., United States v. Bull, 8 F.4th 762, 770 (8th Cir. 2021);
Sholley-Gonzalez, 996 F.3d at 896–97; United States v. Brooks-Davis, 984 F.3d 695,
699 (8th Cir. 2021). In Davies, a district court in our circuit found the defendant,
Christopher Davies, guilty of a felon-in-possession offense. 942 F.3d at 872. When
Davies was tried, our circuit precedent held that the firearm-possession statute did
not require the government to prove a defendant’s knowledge of his prohibited
status. See Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 256 & n.6 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing United States
v. Kind, 194 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir. 1999)); United States v. Davies, No. 17-CR-26-
LRR, 2018 WL 839388, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 12, 2018) (omitting a knowledge-of-
status element). While Davies appealed his felon-in-possession conviction to our
court, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif and held that proof of knowledge of
prohibited status is necessary. 588 U.S. at 227. Davies submitted a Rule 28(j) letter
that cited Rehaif and asked us to reverse his conviction. Davies, 942 F.3d at 872–73;
see Fed. R. App. P. 28(j). We vacated Davies’s conviction and remanded for a new
trial. Davies, 942 F.3d at 874. We reasoned (1) that the government had not proved
Davies’s knowledge of his prohibited status at his pre-Rehaif trial and (2) that there
was “a reasonable probability” that a new trial could result in a different verdict. Id.
at 873–74. Specifically, when Davies possessed a firearm, he had pleaded guilty to
two state felonies, but the state court had not sentenced him yet. Id. at 872. Presented
with evidence of what Davies knew about his then-ongoing state proceedings, a jury
could find that Davies lacked knowledge that he had recently become a convicted
felon. Id. at 874.
For post-Rehaif cases, in which the government has produced knowledge-of-
status evidence at trial, Davies has limited relevance. When the factfinder has found
knowledge of status, as the jury did here, we need not engage in the same sort of

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analysis that we carried out in Davies. As Davies made clear, Rehaif does not require
the government to prove that the defendant “knew the ins and outs of [state] law.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he knowledge requisite to [a] knowing
violation of [the firearm-possession] statute is factual knowledge as distinguished
from knowledge of the law.” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998)
(emphasis added) (quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
345 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). To satisfy the knowledge-of-status element,
the government simply must prove that, when the defendant possessed a firearm or
ammunition, he knew the fact of his own prohibited status. Davies, 942 F.3d at 874.
This burden is not difficult to meet in most cases. See Atilano, 101 F.4th at 982;
Sholley-Gonzalez, 996 F.3d at 895; see also Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503,
509 (2021) (“[A]bsent a reason to conclude otherwise, a jury will usually find that a
defendant knew he was a felon based on the fact that he was a felon.”). And the
government met its burden here. The evidence against Fisher “adequately supports
the [jury’s] guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge.” United
States v. Jawher, 85 F.4th 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2023) (affirming a firearm-possession
conviction based on a defendant’s unlawful immigration status).
III. Conclusion
We reject Fisher’s Rehaif claim. Taken together, the four pieces of evidence
described above sufficiently support the jury’s finding that Fisher knew that he was
a felon. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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