United States of America v. Ian Jarell Dolphin

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2040
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Ian Jarell Dolphin
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas
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Submitted: November 12, 2024
Filed: November 15, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Ian Dolphin appeals the conviction and sentence imposed by the district court
after he pled guilty to possessing a machinegun. His counsel has moved for leave to
withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
challenging the constitutionality of the conviction, the denial of an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction at sentencing, and the substantive reasonableness of the

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sentence. Counsel also notes a conflict between the oral sentencing pronouncement
and the written judgment related to the special conditions of supervised release.
Upon careful review, we conclude that there was no plain error with respect to
the Second Amendment and the constitutionality of the conviction. See United States
v. Cameron, 99 F.4th 432, 435 (8th Cir. 2024) (no plain error as to firearm conviction
given reach of recent Supreme Court cases and relevant circuit authority); see also
United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008) (defendant’s possession
of machineguns “not protected by the Second Amendment”). We further determine
that the district court did not clearly err when it denied an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction. See Peters v. United States, 464 F.3d 811, 812–13 (8th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) (denial of acceptance-of-responsibility reduction reviewed for
clear error; continued criminal conduct “alone could support” denial of reduction);
see also United States v. Binkholder, 832 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[C]onduct
need not be criminal to be inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”). We also
conclude that Dolphin’s sentence was substantively reasonable, as there is no
indication the district court overlooked a relevant factor, gave significant weight to
an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the factors and arriving at a below-Guidelines sentence. See United States v.
Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (district court abuses
sentencing discretion if it fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight to
improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error in weighing sentencing factors);
see also United States v. Torres-Ojeda, 829 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2016) (where
defendant was sentenced below Guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable district
court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further).
As to the special conditions of supervised release, counsel seeks amendment
of the judgment as it pertains to Special Conditions 1 and 2 to conform the district
court’s written judgment with its oral sentencing pronouncement. In the written
judgment, Special Condition 1 states that Dolphin “must participate in a substance
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abuse treatment program” and “must disclose [his] substance abuse history to
prescribing physicians and allow the probation office to verify disclosure.”
Additionally, Special Condition 2 states that Dolphin “must participate in a mental
health treatment program[.]” However, at the sentencing hearing, the district court
did not refer to a substance-abuse-related disclosure requirement when discussing the
general requirement to “participate in [a] substance abuse treatment program,” and
also stated that Dolphin had to “have a mental health assessment and, if you need
treatment, that you receive those treatments.” In light of these differences, the district
court is obligated to revise these conditions in the written judgment so that they
conform with the oral sentencing pronouncement. See United States v. James, 792
F.3d 962, 971–73 (8th Cir. 2015) (where oral sentence and written judgment conflict,
oral sentence controls; vacating language of special condition and remanding to
district court to “harmonize” written condition with oral sentence).
Having reviewed the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988),
we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal other than the discrepancy between the
oral pronouncement and written judgment. We therefore vacate Special Conditions
1 and 2 and remand to the district court for the narrow purpose of amending the
written judgment as it relates to those conditions, but affirm in all other respects.
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.
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