Eugenio Chacon-Ruiz v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 21-3694
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Eugenio Chacon-Ruiz
Petitioner
v.
Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States
Respondent
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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Submitted: September 27, 2024
Filed: December 24, 2024
[Published]
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, Eugenio Chacon-Ruiz, a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) order dated October 25, 2021. Having
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), we deny the petition.

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I.
Chacon-Ruiz entered the United States without documentation in January
2001. In March 2011, the Department of Homeland Security sent Chacon-Ruiz a
Notice to Appear and initiated removal proceedings. Through counsel, Chacon-Ruiz
conceded removability but argued he was eligible for cancellation of removal
because his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to
his two sons, M and C. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Chacon-Ruiz did not have
custody of the boys due in part to his immigration status. By the time of the hearing
before the Immigration Judge (IJ) in September 2016, M and C lived with a foster
parent and were healthy and doing well in school. Chacon-Ruiz had made some
effort to reconnect with his sons, who had only recently learned Chacon-Ruiz was
their father.
In November 2017, the IJ found that Chacon-Ruiz failed to establish
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as required under § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Chacon-Ruiz appealed the decision to the BIA. To bolster his hardship argument, he
also filed a motion to remand to present evidence that, in October 2017, his then-
partner had given birth to their child, a United States citizen. In November 2018, the
BIA denied Chacon-Ruiz’s appeal and motion, but remanded the case for the limited
purpose of issuing a new voluntary departure period. Chacon-Ruiz then petitioned
this court for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. Chacon-Ruiz v.
Barr, 790 F. App’x 52 (8th Cir. 2020). We dismissed this part of his appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. Id. at *53 (citing Caballero-Martinez v. Barr, 920 F.3d 543, 548 n.1
(8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a challenge is unreviewable when “the BIA’s
underlying determination” that additional hardship evidence submitted in support of
a motion to remand “likely would not change the result of the case”)).
On remand in December 2018, the IJ issued a new voluntary departure date.
Chacon-Ruiz appealed to the BIA. Meanwhile, he also filed a second motion to
remand with the BIA based on new evidence that he had a new wife and two
stepchildren, all United States citizens. In October 2021, the BIA rejected Chacon-

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Ruiz’s appeal and denied his second motion to remand. The BIA acknowledged
Chacon-Ruiz’s “concerns about his family’s well-being” but determined that the
new evidence “[wa]s insufficient to demonstrate the decision in this case would
likely change” if his case were remanded.
Chacon-Ruiz timely filed a petition to review the BIA’s October 2021 order.
II.
We first address Chacon-Ruiz’s argument that the BIA erred in denying his
motion to remand, which was based on newly available evidence he asserts
supported a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Chacon-Ruiz
frames his motion as one for remand, but we treat it as a motion to reopen because
he requested additional proceedings in which to present newly available evidence.
See Clifton v. Holder, 598 F.3d 486, 492–93 (8th Cir. 2010). Thus, Chacon-Ruiz’s
motion “must comply with the substantive requirements for . . . motions [to reopen].”
Sharif v. Barr, 965 F.3d 612, 623 (8th Cir. 2020). We review the denial of Chacon-
Ruiz’s motion under “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Trejo-Gamez v.
Garland, 81 F.4th 817, 818 (8th Cir. 2023).
Under § 1229b(b)(1), a non-citizen subject to removal may be eligible for
cancellation of removal by meeting four statutory criteria. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1). One of these is that the non-citizen must “establish[] that removal
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent,
or child, who is a citizen of the United States or a[] [non-citizen] lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). “The material question on the issue
of hardship in a motion to reopen is whether the new evidence, if proven, would
show an ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to [Chacon-Ruiz]’s United
States citizen [family members].” Llanas-Trejo v. Garland, 53 F.4th 458, 463 (8th
Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)). The BIA will grant a motion to
reopen based on new evidence only if that evidence “would likely change the result

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in the case.” Arroyo-Sosa v. Garland, 74 F.4th 533, 541 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Xiu
Ling Chen v. Holder, 751 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2014)).
We discern no abuse of discretion. The BIA recognized that, since his October
2017 motion to remand, Chacon-Ruiz’s family had grown, and the BIA also
“acknowledge[d] [Chacon-Ruiz]’s concerns about his family’s well-being.”
Nevertheless, the BIA concluded that this new evidence was “insufficient to
demonstrate that the decision in [his] case would likely change” in additional
proceedings. Ultimately, Chacon-Ruiz’s arguments “amount[] only to a
disagreement with the outcome of the BIA’s weighing of [the new evidence].”
Vargas v. Holder, 567 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 2009). Such disagreement, alone, does
not make the BIA’s decision an abuse of discretion. See id.1
Next, we address Chacon-Ruiz’s challenge to the BIA’s refusal to reconsider
the denial of his application for cancellation of removal.2 We review the BIA’s
decision for abuse of discretion. See Camacho v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 378, 381 (8th
Cir. 2018). In doing so, “we may consider the validity of the underlying [] decision
without exercising jurisdiction over that decision or considering it on the merits.”
Rodriguez de Henrequez v. Barr, 942 F.3d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sukhov
1 Chacon-Ruiz also argues the BIA violated his due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment by denying him the ability to present his new evidence. We reject
this argument. See Arroyo-Sosa, 74 F.4th at 541 (recognizing that non-citizens are
entitled to due process in immigration proceedings, but finding no violation when
the BIA expressly considered the arguments raised in motion to remand).
2 Because the BIA construed Chacon-Ruiz’s appeal as a motion to reconsider
its November 2018 order, stating it was “not persuaded to revisit the Immigration
Judge’s denial of cancellation of removal,” we construe Chacon-Ruiz’s argument as
seeking review of the denial of that motion. See Yang v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 793,
796 (8th Cir. 2007) (accepting BIA’s classification of petitioner’s motion for
purposes of appellate review); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (noting that “[t]he [BIA]
may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has
rendered a decision”).

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v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 568, 571 (8th Cir. 2005)). “The BIA abuses its discretion
where it gives no rational explanation for its decision, departs from its established
policies without explanation, relies on impermissible factors or legal error, or
ignores or distorts the record evidence.” Martinez v. Lynch, 785 F.3d 1262, 1265
(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Guled v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 872, 882 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Here, both the BIA and IJ expressly considered the emotional hardship that M
and C may experience due to being separated from Chacon-Ruiz. The BIA and IJ
also noted that M and C had only recently learned that Chacon-Ruiz was their father,
that their relationship was relatively new and intermittent, and that the boys were
healthy and succeeding in school while living with their foster family. On this
record, we conclude the BIA acted rationally, applied the correct legal standard, and
did not ignore or distort the record. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
denying Chacon-Ruiz’s motion to reconsider.
III.
The petition is denied.
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