United States of America v. Johnathon Lawrence Rose

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3560
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Johnathon Lawrence Rose
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa
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Submitted: September 26, 2024
Filed: January 3, 2025
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
Johnathon Lawrence Rose entered a conditional plea of guilty to possessing
five grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). After determining Rose was a
career offender, the district court sentenced him to a total of 210 months of

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imprisonment. He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence and his sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Background
In January 2020, Detective Josh Winter of the Clinton, Iowa, Police
Department spotted a car with heavily-tinted windows. After following the car and
watching it abruptly turn into a parking lot, Detective Winter initiated a traffic stop,
believing the dark windows violated Iowa law. The driver of the car, Rose,
immediately got out, but Winter directed Rose to get back in the car. This occurred
at approximately 1:48 p.m. Although Rose complied, his behavior made Winter
nervous. Winter requested a patrol unit to bring a tint meter. He also requested a
canine unit because he had information that Rose was involved with trafficking guns
and drugs.
While Detective Winter collected and checked the validity of Rose’s driver’s
license, proof of insurance, and registration, another police officer arrived and tested
the tint of the car window. The tint meter revealed that only 14% of light passed
through the front passenger window, well below the 70% Iowa law required. While
he was preparing a citation for the improper tint, dispatch informed Winter that Rose
did not have a valid Iowa driver’s license. So Winter also prepared a citation for
driving without a valid driver’s license.
Meanwhile, canine handler Officer Brennen Roling arrived with his drug-
detection dog and directed the dog to sniff around the outside of the car. At roughly
1:58 p.m., the dog sniffed louder and sat at the front of the car — its alert for drugs.
About ten seconds later, the dog alerted near the passenger door by again changing
its behavior and sitting. Officer Roling took the dog back to his vehicle and then
informed Winter, who was completing the citation process in his police car, of the
alerts.

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Based on the dog’s alerts, officers searched Rose’s car and found suspected
drug residue and drug paraphernalia. After handcuffing Rose, Detective Winter also
found pills on Rose, which Winter suspected were ecstasy and THC wax. While in
the police car, Winter advised Rose of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), and drove Rose to the police department. While at the
department, Rose made incriminating statements. Winter then applied for a search
warrant for Rose’s residence. At Rose’s residence, officers found ammunition, drug
paraphernalia, and an incomplete AR-15 rifle. Later at the county jail, officers again
searched Rose and his clothing and found a loaded pistol and a baggie of drugs which
included methamphetamine.
A grand jury indicted Rose for possessing five grams or more of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B), and unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(g)(2). The district court held an evidentiary hearing after he
moved to suppress evidence. The court denied the motion, and Rose entered a
conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The court determined Rose was a career
offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines)
§ 4B1.1, applied a career offender enhancement, and sentenced him to concurrent
terms of 210 months of imprisonment on count one and 120 months on count two.
Rose appealed to this court arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable,
and we affirmed. United States v. Rose, No. 21-2023, 2022 WL 2965998 (8th Cir.
July 27, 2022) (unpublished).
Rose then filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, among other claims. The district court agreed counsel was
ineffective in failing to raise the suppression ruling on appeal, so the court vacated
his sentence and reimposed it. See United States v. Prado, 204 F.3d 843, 845 (8th
Cir. 2000) (“When a defendant has been unconstitutionally deprived of appellate
review due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the prescribed procedure is for the

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district court to vacate the sentence and then reimpose it, allowing the defendant ten
days to appeal from the imposition of the new sentence.”). Rose now appeals.
II. Analysis
Rose first asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. He seeks to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, searches, and
incriminating statements by arguing officers violated his constitutional rights.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we
review the court’s factual findings for clear error and questions of constitutional law
de novo. United States v. Douglas, 744 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2014). We will
“affirm unless the denial of the motion is unsupported by substantial evidence, based
on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear
that a mistake was made.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Payne, 534 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2008)).
To start, Rose argues law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by
unreasonably stopping him and searching his vehicle. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure, so it must be supported by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” United States v. Maurstad, 35 F.4th 1139,
1143 (8th Cir. 2022). “But ‘[a]ny traffic violation, however minor, provides
probable cause for a traffic stop.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2012)). An officer’s “motivation for the stop
is irrelevant.” United States v. Rederick, 65 F.4th 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2023), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 241 (2023).
Rose argues Detective Winter violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment because there was no reasonable, objective reason for the stop. We
disagree. Winter stopped Rose because he believed the tint on Rose’s windows

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violated state law. See Iowa Code § 321.438(2). Rose’s window tint allowed only
14% light transmittance, well below the 70% transmittance for front-seat windows
required under Iowa law. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-450.7(321). The district
court thus did not err in determining that Winter had probable cause to stop Rose.
See Maurstad, 35 F.4th at 1143.
Rose also argues Detective Winter’s testimony at the suppression hearing was
inconsistent with his testimony at Rose’s grand jury hearing regarding his location
and that of Rose when he first saw Rose’s car. Rose challenges Winter’s ability to
have seen the front windows. Winter testified at the suppression hearing that he saw
Rose’s car with tinted windows, followed it, watched it turn, and saw it pull into a
parking lot. Even if there was some inconsistency as to the location of Rose and
Winter when Winter first spotted the car, it is reasonable to believe Winter observed
one of the front windows at some point while he followed Rose and watched him
turn. The district court found Winter was credible, and “as we have stated many
times, ‘[a] credibility determination made by a district court after a hearing on the
merits of a motion to suppress is virtually unassailable on appeal.’” United States v.
Guzman, 926 F.3d 991, 998 (8th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.
2007)). The district court did not clearly err.
Next, Rose challenges the drug dog sniff by arguing there was no valid reason
for calling the canine unit. However, “as long as a traffic stop is not extended in
order for officers to conduct a dog sniff, the dog sniff is lawful.” United States v.
Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2016). What matters is whether officers
prolonged the stop “beyond the time needed to complete the purpose of the stop.”
United States v. Rutledge, 61 F.4th 597, 602 (8th Cir. 2023).
Here, the stop was not unreasonably prolonged by the dog sniff. Detective
Winter’s body camera video starts at 1:48:41 p.m. when he began directing Rose to
get back in his vehicle. Within approximately ten minutes of the initial stop, the
drug dog arrived and alerted. During this time, Winter was communicating with

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dispatch about issues regarding Rose’s driving eligibility, running his information,
and typing up citations. When Officer Roling informed him that the dog had alerted
for drugs, Winter had not yet printed out Rose’s citations and there is no evidence
Winter delayed printing the citations to facilitate the dog sniff. Rose’s stop was not,
therefore, unreasonably prolonged because Winter was still carrying out the traffic-
related purposes of the stop when the dog alerted. See Rutledge, 61 F.4th at 602–
03.
Rose also challenges the dog sniff’s reliability as a basis to challenge probable
cause to search his car. The district court considered Rose’s arguments and
determined the dog was reliable enough to support probable cause. We agree.
Our review of a district court’s legal determination of probable cause is de
novo. United States v. Collier, 116 F.4th 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2024). “A police officer
has probable cause to conduct a search when ‘the facts available to him would
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief’ that contraband or evidence of
a crime is present.” United States v. Gonzalez, 781 F.3d 422, 429 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013)). “A dog is presumptively
reliable at detecting illicit drugs—and its alert establishes probable cause for a
search—if the dog has satisfactorily completed a bona fide certification or training
program.” Collier, 116 F.4th at 761. “This presumption may be overcome if a
defendant can show, either through cross-examination or introducing his own fact
or expert witness, the inadequacy of a certification or training program or that the
circumstances surrounding a canine alert undermined the case for probable cause.”
Gonzalez, 781 F.3d at 429.
The record shows, and Rose does not dispute, that the dog and Officer Roling
satisfactorily completed bona fide certification programs for narcotics detection.
Although Rose questions the reliability of the dog and Officer Roling, in part
because they were new to the canine unit, we have upheld probable cause
determinations with much newer canine units, including a dog’s first field operation.
See United States v. Jackson, 811 F.3d 1049, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2016). The dog and

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Officer Roling received their certifications six months before Rose’s arrest. In the
months leading up to Rose’s arrest, they trained monthly for detecting drugs, and the
dog deployed in the field without any evidence of a false alert. Rose’s expert opined
that Officer Roling did not spend enough time each month training the dog, but the
district court still found the dog reliable considering the dog’s satisfactory
performance in a nationally known certification and training program and the lack
of evidence showing it had ever falsely alerted. We agree. See Collier, 116 F.4th at
761 (explaining that “absent contradictory circumstances, a trained dog’s alert will
establish probable cause when the dog’s previous in-field accuracy rate exceeds 50
percent”).
Likewise, the circumstances of the alerts, including the behavior of the dog
and handler, do not cause us to doubt that the dog’s alerts provided probable cause.
“The reliability of a dog’s alert, not its manner, is what matters.” Id. at 761–62.
Although it was an excitable dog and Officer Roling shortened his leash before the
second alert, Officer Roling testified that the dog alerted twice during the search by
sitting. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Rose did not overcome the
presumption of probable cause that attaches when a certified and trained dog alerts.
See Gonzalez, 781 F.3d at 430. Accordingly, considering all the facts surrounding
the dog’s alerts, we affirm the district court’s determination that the officers had
probable cause to search the car.
Rose also seeks to suppress statements he made after officers took him into
custody. He argues there was no valid Miranda waiver because he did not sign
anything and a single colloquy in a police car is insufficient. We disagree.
We consider two dimensions when inquiring whether a suspect voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. United States v. Vinton,
631 F.3d 476, 483 (8th Cir. 2011). “First, the waiver ‘must have been voluntary in
the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.’” Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421 (1986)). “Second, the suspect must have waived his rights ‘with a full

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awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of
the decision to abandon it.’” Id. (quoting same). This waiver determination is “an
extremely fact sensitive analysis.” United States v. Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 374 (8th
Cir. 2010). “Circumstances to be considered include the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused.” Id. We review the district court’s legal conclusion that
the accused “validly waived his Miranda rights de novo and its factual findings
underlying that conclusion for clear error.” Vinton, 631 F.3d at 483.
Waiver of Miranda rights “can be clearly inferred from the actions and words
of the person interrogated.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). “A
voluntary waiver need not assume any particular form; it may be made in writing on
a printed format or it may be made orally by replying to questions[.]” United States
v. Zamarripa, 544 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1976). Here, Rose began speaking to
Detective Winter once in the police car. Winter interrupted Rose, read his Miranda
rights, and asked if he understood them. Rose then conversed with Winter on the
way to the police department. About thirty minutes later at the police department
Winter asked Rose if he wanted to talk to him, and Rose made incriminating
statements. The district court determined Rose “was provided with his Miranda
warnings” and that he “knowingly and voluntarily talk[ed] with the officers.” The
court also found there was nothing “that would indicate his will [was] being
overborne or that [he was] being threatened in any way.” The district court did not
clearly err in making these findings. We have upheld valid waivers despite delays
longer than thirty minutes between Miranda warnings and later questioning,
Nguyen, 608 F.3d at 374–75, and Rose fails to point to any evidence suggesting that
his statements were involuntary. Further, Rose was thirty-one years old at the time,
a high school graduate, and, as his extensive criminal history shows, was
experienced with the criminal justice system. See United States v. Smith, 21 F.4th
510, 517–18 (8th Cir. 2021) (concluding there was a knowing and intelligent waiver
when considering the totality of the circumstances, which included arrestee’s
background). Rose does not explain how he could have misunderstood or misheard
Winter when he was advised of his rights and asked if he understood them. Cf.
United States v. Osorio, 110 F.4th 1089, 1098–99 (8th Cir. 2024) (noting defendant

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“points to nothing in the record demonstrating that the district court clearly erred
when concluding that he understood the warnings”). We therefore conclude Rose
validly waived his Miranda rights. See United States v. Morgan, 729 F.3d 1086,
1092 (8th Cir. 2013).
In sum, because the government did not commit any constitutional violations
in dealing with Rose, the district court did not err in denying Rose’s motion to
suppress evidence arising from the traffic stop. Therefore, we need not address
Rose’s claim that the evidence from the later searches at the jail and his residence
should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search. See United States v. Finley,
56 F.4th 1159, 1166 (8th Cir. 2023) (“Of course, for there to be ‘fruit,’ there must
first be a ‘poisonous tree,’ that is, ‘an illegal search or seizure’ or ‘an illegality.’”
(quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016))).
The final issue for us to decide is whether the district court erred when
calculating Rose’s Guidelines range by concluding Rose is a career offender, based
in part on Rose’s prior conviction under Iowa Code § 708.2A(4). The government
concedes this issue and agrees the case must be remanded for resentencing because
of our decision in United States v. Daye, 90 F.4th 941 (8th Cir. 2024).
In Daye, we analyzed the career offender enhancement of the Guidelines as
applied to a defendant who had two convictions for Domestic Abuse Assault,
Enhanced (DAAE) under Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b). Id. at 943. We declined to
decide whether DAAE is divisible for purposes of determining whether it is a crime
of violence because the government waived the argument. Id. at 944. We then
applied the categorical approach to DAAE and determined it was not categorically
a crime of violence. Id. at 945–46.

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At issue here is the nearby subsection, Iowa Code § 708.2A(4), but without
adversarial briefing, we decline to determine Rose’s career offender classification.1
See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 148 n.10 (2011)
(explaining that in our adversarial system it is “undesirable” to decide a matter
without briefing by the parties). We thus remand to the district court to address
Rose’s career offender status and his sentence in light of Daye.2
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion
to suppress evidence, reverse as to Rose’s sentence, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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1 Though we decline to address this issue, at oral argument the government
represented that on resentencing it would not seek to apply the career offender
enhancement.
2 Rose also asks us to analyze his plea proceedings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
However, we need not address the issue because we conclude he failed to identify
any specific error or argument for reversal regarding the proceedings. See United
States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (8th Cir. 1996).

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