Association for Government Accountability v. Steve Simon, individually

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1410
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Association for Government Accountability; Mark Koran, Senator; Calvin Bahr,
Senator; James Roschen; Debra Roschen; Megan Nelson; Andrew Nelson; Dawn
Appel; Daniel Appel; Cindy Kohn; David Kohn; Tammi Johnson; Larry Johnson;
Meghan Hewitt; A.H., by her next friend and parent Meghan Hewitt; Sarah
Johnson; A.J., by his next friend and parent Sarah Johnson
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Steve Simon, individually and in his official capacity as Minnesota Secretary of
State, or his successor; David Maeda, individually and in his official capacity as
Director of Elections for State of Minnesota, or his successor
Defendants - Appellees
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Wisconsin Voter Alliance
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: October 23, 2024
Filed: February 18, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
The Association for Government Accountability, some of its members, and
two children of members (AGA) sued Minnesota’s Secretary of State Steve Simon
and Director of Elections David Maeda (together, the Secretary), in their official and
individual capacities. AGA alleged that the Secretary violates the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq., when he shares personal
information from individual motor vehicle records with the Electronic Registration
Information Center (ERIC), an “organization governed exclusively by a group of
states to improve the accuracy of the voter registration records in the [statewide voter
registration system].” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 41 (quoting the interagency agreement
between the Department of Public Safety and the Office of the Secretary of State).
The DPPA provides a cause of action against “[a] person who knowingly
obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a
purpose not permitted under this chapter.” § 2724(a). “Person” is defined as “an
individual, organization or entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof.”
§ 2725(2). And the DPPA allows the disclosure of personal information “[f]or use
by any government agency . . . in carrying out its functions.” § 2721(b)(1). The
district court1 denied AGA’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the
Secretary’s motion to dismiss. We review de novo the order granting the motion to
dismiss. McDonough v. Anoka Cnty., 799 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2015).
We agree with the district court that AGA failed to state a DPPA claim against
the Secretary in his official capacity. Although state officials “literally are persons,”
a suit against a state official in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against
the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). This
principle was established when the DPPA became law in 1994. See Orduno v.
1 The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.

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Pietrzak, 932 F.3d 710, 718 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is what
background principles were well established when the DPPA became law in 1994.”).
Because the Secretary in his official capacity is “a State or agency thereof,” he is not
a “person” who can be sued under the DPPA. See § 2725(2).
AGA argues that Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), saves its official-
capacity claim for injunctive relief. “Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a private
party can sue a state officer in his official capacity to enjoin a prospective action that
would violate federal law.” 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th
Cir. 2011). Ex parte Young ordinarily does not apply, however, “where Congress
has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a
statutorily created right.” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
The DPPA has a detailed remedial scheme. It vests the Attorney General with
the power to impose civil penalties against “[a]ny State department of motor vehicles
that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance” with the DPPA.
§ 2723(b). “That Congress explicitly excluded states from the DPPA’s definition of
persons subject to civil suits while creating a separate avenue of enforcement against
one particular type of agency strongly suggests that it did not intend to authorize the
more sweeping injunctive relief which would be available against any state official
sued in her official capacity under Ex parte Young.” Nisi v. Brown, 369 F. Supp. 3d
848, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see also Potocnik v. Carlson, 9 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 n.5
(D. Minn. 2014) (“Because the DPPA specifically provides for a separate civil-
penalty provision against state motor-vehicle departments, . . . the Court interprets
the DPPA to preclude even suits for prospective relief against state officials acting
in their official capacities.”).
Nor did AGA plead a viable individual capacity claim. AGA alleged that
Simon and Maeda acted in their individual capacities when they entered the contract
with ERIC and when they approved the disclosure of personal information to ERIC.
Am. Compl. ¶ 220. But it also alleged that Minnesota law authorizes the Secretary
to do just that. Am. Compl. ¶ 160 (alleging that Minn. Stat. § 201.13(3)(d)

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authorizes the Secretary to share personal information with ERIC). So AGA’s claim
is really one against Simon and Maeda in their official capacities—meaning the state
itself—which, as we have already explained, cannot be maintained under the DPPA.
See §§ 2724(a), 2725(2); cf. Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“But even when a suit is against a public officer in his or her individual capacity,
the court is obliged to consider whether it may really and substantially be against the
state.”).
Affirmed.
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