McKenzie County, ND v. United States of America; Department of Interior

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1177
___________________________
McKenzie County, ND
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
United States of America; Department of Interior
Defendants - Appellants
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
____________
Submitted: October 23, 2024
Filed: March 20, 2025
____________
Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
This case concerns mineral royalties under certain lands in McKenzie County,
North Dakota. McKenzie County sued the United States, claiming those royalty
interests as its own and that previous litigation settled the matter. The United States

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asserts that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s1 claim
is untimely. The district court granted judgment for the County, and the United
States appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.
I.
Before it achieved statehood in 1889, North Dakota was part of the Dakota
Territory, an organized incorporated territory of the United States. Much of the land
in present-day North Dakota was then part of the public domain: “land owned by the
[Federal] Government . . . that was ‘available for sale, entry, and settlement under
the homestead laws, or other disposition under the general body of land laws.’” See
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 412 (1994) (citation omitted). These lands were “in
the first instance the exclusive property of the United States, to be disposed of to
such persons, at such times, . . . in such modes, and by such titles, as the Government
may deem most advantageous . . . .” Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 558,
561-62 (1857).
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, Congress exercised that authority
“to encourage the settlement of the West.” See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian
Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 868 (1999). It did so by providing land “in fee simple absolute”
to settlers in the Dakota Territory and the newly admitted North Dakota under
various land-patent laws. See id. Some of these acts authorized patents with title to
both the surface and mineral estates. Id.; see, e.g., 1862 Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12
Stat. 392 (1862). Others authorized the conveyance of title in only the surface estate,
reserving the mineral interest as part of the public domain. Amoco Prod. Co., 526
U.S. at 870; Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1983); see, e.g.,
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch.9, 39 Stat. 862. In both cases, the lands
were “valuable for grazing [livestock] and raising forage crops.” See Watt, 462 U.S.
at 38 (citation omitted).
1 For clarity, we refer to the plaintiff-appellee municipal entity as “the
County,” while we refer to the geographic location as “McKenzie County.”

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In the 1920’s and 1930’s, however, the economic bounty of these lands began
to falter. A series of droughts hit North Dakota, causing widespread dust storms and
crop failure. Exacerbated by the onset of the Great Depression, property values
plummeted as the Dust Bowl ravaged the Great Plains. Many landowners were
forced into bankruptcy, unable to afford the property taxes on their once profitable
land. Like many other counties, the County foreclosed on a significant acreage of
land within McKenzie County and acquired title to the property through tax
forfeiture proceedings. Whatever title the previous landowner held passed to the
County: only the surface estate if the United States initially reserved the minerals,
or both the surface and mineral estates if the original patent included title to both.
But the dire times continued. By 1935, vast swaths of land were in such poor
condition “that the operators ha[d] practically no chance of securing a decent living,”
and much of the land remained “submarginal” to the point of nearing “retire[ment]
from cultivation.” See M.L. Wilson, The Report on Land of the National Resources
Board, 17 J. Farm Econ. 39, 44 (1935). Congress responded to the crisis with a
series of emergency relief bills authorizing the President to acquire and restore these
“submarginal” lands. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No.
73-67, §§ 201-03, 48 Stat. 200 (1933); Federal Emergency Relief Appropriation
Acts, Pub. L. No. 74-11, 49 Stat. 115 (1935), and Pub. L. 74-739, § 689, 49 Stat.
1608 (1936). Eventually, Congress enacted the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act,
which, like the earlier acts, codified the authority to “acquire by purchase, gift, or
devise, or by transfer from . . . any State, Territory, or political subdivision,
submarginal land and land not primarily suited for cultivation.” See Pub. L. 75-210,
§ 32(a), 50 Stat. 522, 525-26 (1937). The Act also permitted the Secretary of
Agriculture2 to acquire these lands “subject to any reservations, outstanding estates,
2 The lands in McKenzie County were initially administered by the Secretary
of Agriculture, and that authority was assigned to the United States Forest Service.
See 19 Fed. Reg. 74, 75 (Jan. 6, 1954). These lands were later designated as part of
the Little Missouri National Grassland, with surface administration again vested in
the Forest Service. 36 C.F.R. § 213.1(b), (d), and (e). While the Department of
Agriculture continues to manage the surface, see id. § 213.1, the Secretary of the

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interests, easements, or other encumbrances which . . . w[ould] not interfere” with
the Act’s purposes. Id. § 32(a), 50 Stat. at 526. Moreover, like the earlier relief
acts, the Act authorized the sale, lease, or other disposal of land acquired under the
Act, but not property acquired through other means. Id. § 32(c), 50 Stat. at 526.
Using this collection of statutes and relevant executive orders, the United
States sought to acquire lands from the County. To avoid the possibility of
redemption by the previous landowners and to obtain clear title, the United States
used the power of eminent domain. So, beginning in 1937, the United States invoked
the Condemnation Act, Pub. L. 50-728, 25 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 40
U.S.C. § 3113), and the Declaration of Taking Act, Pub. L. 71-736, 46 Stat. 1421
(codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3114-16, 3118), and filed six declarations of
taking in federal district court in North Dakota. The declarations listed the specific
tracts the United States wanted—some where the County held both the surface and
mineral estates (acquired lands or, when referring to the mineral estate only, acquired
minerals) and others where the County held only the surface estate, as the United
States had retained the mineral estate in the original patent (public domain lands or
public domain minerals). See Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 65
& n.2 (1966) (“[I]n general[,] acquired lands are those granted or sold to the United
States by a State or citizen and public domain lands were usually never in state or
private ownership.”). The lands were listed by tract number and legal description.3
Interior is responsible for managing the subsurface estate. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 181,
189, 226, 352; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1731-32.
3 These legal descriptions followed the Public Land Survey System, which
subdivides and describes land in 30 southern and western states—all states except
the 13 original colonies, Maine, Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia,
Hawaii, and Texas. Under this system, land is divided into 3840-acre “Townships,”
which can be subdivided into 640-acre “Sections,” 160-acre “quarter sections,” and
40-acre “quarter-quarter sections.” Individual parcels can then be labeled according
to a standardized system. For example, one of the tracts now in dispute (Tract No.
277) comprises 320 acres of land in the Northeast and Southeast quarters of Section
20 of Township 147 North, Range 104 West and is labeled as: NE¼ and SE¼, Sec.
20, T147N, R104W.

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Though the declarations took title to the listed lands “in full fee simple,” they
did so “subject . . . to the rights of [the] County . . . to a 6¼% perpetual royalty in
minerals which may exist or may be developed on all of said tracts of land.” In
entering judgment on the declarations, the district court noted that “[a]ll the [taken]
tracts or parcels of land . . . [we]re subject to a 6¼% royalty reservation” in the
County, with the exception of specific tracts. The County then delivered to the
United States the tax deeds for the listed tracts, though these deeds did not include
the royalty reservation. Thereafter, the district court entered final judgment in each
of the condemnation actions (collectively, the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments),
thus completing the acquisition of title.4 Each of the 1930’s Condemnation
Judgments contained the “6¼% perpetual royalty” language, again excepting certain
specified tracts from the reservation,5 but making no reference to public domain or
acquired lands and minerals.
Thereafter, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) at the Department of the
Interior annotated its records to reflect the County’s royalty interest in tracts with
acquired minerals, but not those with public domain minerals. Over the next four
decades, BLM leased both acquired and public domain minerals for oil and gas
development and directed the royalty from acquired lands with producing mineral
leases to be paid to the County. In 1985, however, BLM informed the County that
it would no longer recognize the royalty reservation in the acquired minerals based
on an intervening change in state law prohibiting the County from reserving interests
in lands it had acquired through tax forfeiture proceedings. See De Shaw v.
McKenzie County, 114 N.W.2d. 263, 264-65 (N.D. 1962).
Understandably, the County was displeased. After unsuccessfully appealing
to the Interior Board of Land Appeals, in 1987 the County sued in the United States
4 The condemnation judgments are identified by their “Action At Law”
number and include, as relevant here, Nos. 1000, 1001, 1002, 1006, 1007, and 1028.
5 Additionally, some judgments included the royalty reservation in only
particular tracts as specified.

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District Court for the District of North Dakota.6 In its complaint, the County defined
the suit as “a dispute over ownership of a 6¼% royalty interest under certain lands
located in McKenzie County,” and referenced Enclosure 1 as the “subject lands” in
the dispute. The County also referenced each of the 1930’s Condemnation
Judgments, both as general background information and in listing the tracts from
Enclosure 1 that were taken in each judgment. Among other forms of relief, the
County sought to “[q]uiet title in the name of [the] County, to the 6¼% royalty under
the subject lands.”7
After discovery and initial briefing, the district court certified questions of law
to the North Dakota Supreme Court. See McKenzie County v. Hodel, 467 N.W.2d
701 (N.D. 1991). Leaving the construction of the 1930’s condemnation judgments
to the district court, the North Dakota Supreme Court narrowed its consideration to
two issues. Id. at 703-04. First, it held that “North Dakota Law did not impede the
transfer of title to real property by operation of a judgment” because the judgment
itself “has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.” Id. at 705
(citation omitted). A transfer of real property through a judgment, then, need not
comply with North Dakota’s conveyancing statutes. Id.
Second, the court held that “nothing in . . . De Shaw . . . limit[ed] the County’s
authority to reacquire title to property formerly held by tax title,” and thus the County
6 This complaint named as defendants Donald Hodel (then Secretary of the
Interior), Robert Burford (then National Administrator of BLM), Marv LeNoue
(Area Administrator of BLM), and Cynthia L. Embretson (Chief of the Fluids
Adjudication Section at BLM) in their official capacities. The complaint did not
name the United States as a defendant. Before this Court, the parties proceed as if
it were brought against the United States.
7 Though seeking to quiet title, the County did not invoke the Quiet Title Act.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. Instead, the County relied on the district court’s authority
to issue mandamus relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 1361, declaratory relief, see id. § 2201,
and injunctive relief, see id. § 2202, and to review final agency action, see
5 U.S.C. § 704. The United States did not argue that the Quiet Title Act provided
the exclusive means of adjudicating the dispute in that litigation.

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was permitted to “repurchase, take by eminent domain, or otherwise reacquire an
interest in the property” that it had previously conveyed. Id. Accordingly, North
Dakota law, “and its interpretation in DeShaw, d[id] not prohibit the County from
acquiring title to mineral interests through operation of a condemnation judgment.”
Id.
Back in the district court, the County moved for summary judgment based on
the North Dakota Supreme Court’s opinion and answers to the certified questions.
After hearing opposition from the United States, the district court granted the
County’s motion. It held that “the recognition of a mineral reservation in the County
in the [1930’s Condemnation Judgments] operate[d] as a conveyance of that mineral
interest to the County.” The court thereby directed that judgment be entered
“quieting title in the County to the disputed minerals.” A week later, the court
entered judgment:
The Federal Government’s condemnation actions against McKenzie
County in the late 1930’s extinguished all title McKenzie County had
in the land, including any royalty interests. New title then vested in the
Federal Government and through the condemnation judgments [the]
County received the 6¼% royalty interest. The recognition of a
mineral reservation in favor of McKenzie County in the federal
condemnation judgments operates as a conveyance of that mineral
interest to McKenzie County.
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that title to the disputed minerals
(6¼% royalty) is quieted in McKenzie County; and, the Defendants are
barred from any claim in regard to the same or proceeds from the same;
that McKenzie County is the owner of the disputed minerals (6¼%
royalty) free and clear of any claim of the above named defendants.
(“1991 Judgment”). The United States did not appeal. In the years that followed,
BLM updated its records to again recognize the County’s royalty interest in acquired
lands and directed oil and gas operators to resume paying the royalty to the County.
As before, however, BLM’s records never reflected a royalty interest in public
domain minerals.

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Despite the return to the status quo, the County soon became concerned about
BLM’s compliance with the 1991 Judgment. So the County initiated a project to
“inventory and map all royalties the [C]ounty owns, research the statute of
limitations and then file with the federal government and proceed to court if
necessary.” In the summer of 1998, the County authorized a search of the National
Archives for the case files from the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments. This
inventory effort continued for several years, with the Board of County
Commissioners receiving regular updates on its progress. Throughout the process,
the County and its attorneys had extensive correspondence with BLM about the
mineral royalties and their operation.
In November 2003, BLM sent the County a message which stated that,
according to BLM’s records, “only the acquired minerals in the [1930’s
Condemnation Judgments we]re subject to a 6¼% royalty reservation[].” Two
weeks later, in a meeting on December 2, the Board of County Commissioners noted
“that BLM may not be recognizing the [C]ounty’s royalty right on parcels which
were originally patented with mineral reservations to the federal government.” In
the County’s view, the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments “supersede[d] those
reservations.” After meeting with BLM officials later that month to address the
issue, the County received a letter from BLM on January 27, 2004. Along with a
list of specific tracts, the letter included three relevant statements: that BLM
recognized a royalty interest in only about three-quarters of the lands the County
identified; that the discrepancy was “because [the County’s] records included lands
with Public Domain minerals”; and that “[o]nly lands acquired by the United States
in the condemnations are subject to a 6¼ percent royalty reservation.”
On January 11, 2016, the County sued the United States under the Quiet Title
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, seeking to quiet title to the royalty interest in public domain
minerals, listing specific tracts of land in its complaint. After the County filed an
amended complaint, the United States moved to dismiss, arguing that the County’s
claim was untimely under the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. See
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). The district court denied the motion and granted the County

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leave to file a second amended complaint. In the district court’s view, the 1991
Judgment already quieted title to the public domain minerals for the County, and
thus the Quiet Title Act’s limitations period might not be relevant.
The County then filed its second amended complaint (“2019 Complaint”),
which included an additional claim for relief.8 Invoking the All Writs Act and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70(c), the County sought to enforce the 1991
Judgment or the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments which, in its view, included the
royalty interest underlying the tracts it was now disputing. The United States again
moved to dismiss, claiming that the County failed to plausibly allege a right to relief
under the All Writs Act and reasserting its statute-of-limitations argument under the
Quiet Title Act. The district court denied that motion as well, concluding that the
County had pled facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and reiterating its
decision on the statute of limitations.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Rejecting the United States’
argument that the County could not circumvent the Quiet Title Act, the district court
held that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its orders from both
the 1991 Judgment and the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments. The district court then
concluded that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments clearly and unambiguously
included the royalty interest in all lands listed, whether public domain or acquired,
and that the 1991 Judgment plainly and unambiguously quieted title to the royalty
interests in tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint. In the alternative, the district court
held that the County’s Quiet Title Act claim was not barred by the Act’s statute of
limitations and further, were it to address the issue in the first instance, it would quiet
title to the public domain mineral royalty in the County. The district court thus
denied the United States’ motion for summary judgment, granted the County’s
motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of the County. It
issued the County’s requested writ of mandamus, along with a declaration that the
royalty interest applies to both public domain and acquired minerals, and directed
8 The County also added the Department of the Interior as a defendant.

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the United States to comply with that declaration as embodied in the 1930’s
Condemnation Judgments and 1991 Judgment.
The United States appeals, arguing that the County must proceed, if at all,
under the Quiet Title Act because the All Writs Act does not provide a remedy; that
the County’s Quiet Title Act claim is untimely; and that, even assuming timeliness,
the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments did not convey a royalty interest to the County
in public domain minerals.
II.
The United States first challenges the district court’s grant of judgment under
the All Writs Act. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming
“if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d
1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted).9
The All Writs Act grants “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress [the authority to] issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a). The Act thus “authorizes a federal court ‘to issue such
commands . . . as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the
frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise
obtained.’” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977)).
But this authority is not without limits. For one thing, the Act “is not an
independent source of subject matter jurisdiction.” Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
9 The facts of this case are not in dispute. The only question is whether the
County or the United States was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

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v. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2009). “[W]hile
the All Writs Act empowers federal courts to wield certain ‘procedural tools,’ such
as the ‘various historic common-law writs,’” id. at 820 (citation omitted), such tools
are available “only to the extent that ‘the issuance of process [is] “in aid of” the
issuing court’s jurisdiction,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Clinton v.
Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999)). For another, the All Writs Act is not a
mechanism for “circumvent[ing] statutory requirements or otherwise binding
procedural rules.” Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811, 820 (2022). The All Writs Act
cannot provide relief “[w]here a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at
hand.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Bureau of Corr.
v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985)). The United States invokes this
latter limitation here. According to the United States, the Quiet Title Act precludes
All Writs Act relief when a plaintiff merely seeks to quiet title against the United
States.
As a general matter, the United States is correct. The Quiet Title Act contains
a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for civil actions against the United States
“to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an
interest.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). By its terms, the Quiet Title Act “specifically
addresses” disputes with the United States over title to real property. See Syngenta,
537 U.S. at 32 (citation omitted). Because the Quiet Title Act provides the means
for adjudicating those disputes, the All Writs Act “cannot [be] use[d] . . . to
circumvent [the Quiet Title Act’s] statutory requirements [and] otherwise binding
procedural rules.” See Shoop, 596 U.S. at 820.
The nature of the Quiet Title Act makes this point particularly clear. The
Quiet Title Act is not just “a statute [that] specifically addresses” title disputes with
the United States, see Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32; it is the only such statute. The Quiet
Title Act “provide[s] the exclusive means by which adverse claimants c[an]
challenge the United States’ title to real property.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands (Block I), 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983). Parties cannot use
other statutes or rules “to end-run the [Quiet Title Act]’s limitations.” Match-E-Be-

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Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 216 (2012).
Thus, if a plaintiff “not only challenges [the United States’] claim [to property], but
also asserts his own right” to that property, he must do so subject to the Quiet Title
Act’s strictures. See id. at 217. This is true regardless of how the claim is labeled.
See, e.g., Block I, 461 U.S. at 277-78, 286, n.22 (prohibiting suits brought under
Declaratory Judgment Act and Administrative Procedure Act (APA)); United States
v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 846-49 (1986) (prohibiting suits under General Allotment
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 345); cf. Patchak, 567 U.S. at 220-24 (permitting APA claims when
party does not assert personal property interest adverse to that of the United States).
On its face, then, the County’s claim under the All Writs Act is no different.
The County asserts a royalty interest in certain minerals that conflicts with the
interest claimed by the United States. The Quiet Title Act provides a remedy for
this dispute, and its remedy is exclusive of all others. See Mottaz, 476 U.S. at
846-48. By the United States’ logic, the County thus cannot “avoid [the Quiet Title]
Act’s strictures” by resorting to the All Writs Act. See id. at 847. In the district
court and on appeal, the County suggests two ways the All Writs Act can be used in
this case: through enforcing the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments or through
enforcing the 1991 Judgment. For different reasons, neither option provides the
County the relief it seeks.
A.
The County argues that the All Writs Act can be invoked to enforce the terms
of a prior judgment that itself quieted title, claiming that the 1991 Judgment did so
for the minerals at issue in this litigation. But such relief could be available only if
the 1991 Judgment included the tracts of land now in dispute.10 In other words, the
10 Though we ultimately conclude that 1991 Judgment does not include the
tracts at issue here, we do not doubt that a district court can enforce a Quiet Title Act
judgment, either under Rule 70 or the All Writs Act. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Thompson,
120 F.2d 831, 837 (8th Cir. 1941) (noting “the general rule that when a plaintiff
seeks to quiet title,” he may request judgment “for a writ of possession” to require

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All Writs Act only provides a mechanism for the County to the extent the 1991
Judgment addressed the tracts in the 2019 Complaint. We must therefore determine
the scope of the 1991 Judgment.
The parties have provided no authority from this Circuit—and we are aware
of none—where we reviewed a district court’s interpretation of a prior order or final
judgment, nor is there a clear statement of the standard of review. That being said,
other courts addressing similar issues have held that “[t]he interpretation of the text
of a court order or judgment is considered a conclusion of law subject to de novo
review.” United States v. Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2005). We adopt
that standard here.11 See id.; see also United States v. 60.22 Acres of Land, More or
Less, Situate in Klickitat Cnty., 638 F.2d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing
district court’s interpretation of a condemnation judgment); SEC v. Hermil, Inc., 838
F.2d 1151, 1153-54 (11th Cir. 1988) (reversing district court’s interpretation of
title to be passed in accordance with the underlying judgment); Peacock v. Thomas,
516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996) (recognizing a court’s “inherent power to enforce its
judgments”).
11 We have previously endorsed a more deferential standard for reviewing a
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of a Chapter 11 plan, see In re Dial Bus. Forms,
Inc., 341 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2003) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion), and
for reviewing a district court’s interpretation of its mandate on remand to an
Administrative Law Judge, see Steahr v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“defer[ring] to the district court’s interpretation”). We did so in part because we
were reviewing “a court’s interpretation of its own order,” In re Dial Bus. Forms,
341 F.3d at 744 (citation omitted), and thus the district court was “best able to
determine whether its [order] ha[d] been violated.” Steahr, 151 F.3d at 1126. The
temporal proximity justifying that deference is not present here, nor is the district
judge who issued the order later interpreting it. Instead, this situation is more like
interpreting a consent decree, where we apply de novo review, though we accord
deference when the court that entered the decree and the court tasked with
interpreting it are one and the same. See United States v. City of Fort Smith, 48
F.4th 900, 907 (8th Cir. 2022). Because that is not the case here, we do not accord
that deference. See also Spallone, 399 F.3d at 423 (noting that issuing judge’s
“construction of an ambiguity in his own words” is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

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unambiguous final judgment). In doing so, “[i]t is our responsibility to construe a
judgment so as to give effect to the intention of the court, not to that of the parties.”
60.22 Acres of Land, 638 F.2d at 1178.12
In relevant part, the 1991 Judgment reads as follows:
The Federal Government’s condemnation actions against McKenzie
County in the late 1930’s extinguished all title McKenzie County had
in the land, including any royalty interests. New title then vested in the
Federal Government and through the condemnation judgments
McKenzie County received the 6¼% royalty interest. The recognition
of a mineral reservation in favor of McKenzie County in the federal
condemnation judgments operates as a conveyance of that mineral
interest to McKenzie County.
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that title to the disputed minerals
(6¼% royalty) is quieted in McKenzie County; and, the Defendants are
barred from any claim in regard to the same or proceeds from the same;
that McKenzie County is the owner of the disputed minerals (6¼%
royalty) free and clear of any claim of the above named defendants.
R. Doc. 20-8, at 3. As the district court noted, the question is whether “disputed
minerals (6¼% royalty)” covers the lands and mineral rights at issue in this appeal.
When “a ‘judgment is clear and unambiguous,’ a court must ‘adopt, and give
effect to,’” its plain meaning. Spallone, 399 F.3d at 421 (citation omitted); see also
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 150 (2009) (“[W]here the plain terms
of a court order unambiguously apply, . . . they are entitled to their effect.”). But the
meaning of the 1991 Judgment is not so obvious. Though the order refers to the
12 This makes our analysis slightly different than in the consent-decree context,
where we “look to rules of contract interpretation” to “discern the parties’ intent”
because “the content of a consent decree is generally a product of negotiations
between the parties.” See City of Fort Smith, 48 F.4th at 907 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). To state the obvious, the 1991 Judgment was not the result of a
collaborative effort in any sense of the word.

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1930’s Condemnation Judgments and “the disputed minerals (6¼% royalty),” it does
not reference specific tracts of land, public domain or acquired minerals, or even
specific condemnation actions. Nor is there any clarifying language elsewhere in
the memorandum decision, as the court referred only to “the 6¼% royalty” or “large
tracts of land” that were “‘subject to’ a 6¼% royalty.” The court’s reference to
“disputed minerals” necessarily raises the question of what minerals were in dispute.
The County argues that the court defined the term as the “6¼% royalty,” but that
leaves us in the same place: which minerals under which tracts? Thus, the plain text
of the 1991 Judgment does not “unambiguously apply” to the public domain
minerals at issue here, cf. Travelers Indem., 557 U.S. at 151.
Because the scope of 1991 Judgment is unclear from its plain terms, we may
resort to “the entire record before the issuing court” to determine what was decided.
See Ruiz v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 824 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted); see also City of Fort Smith, 48 F.4th at 907 (“[W]hen
interpreting the meaning of a consent decree ‘as written,’ we are not to ignore the
context in which the parties were operating, nor the circumstances surrounding the
order.” (citation omitted)). We must interpret the order “with reference to the issues
it was meant to decide,” see Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U.S.
259, 269 (1913), so we must not construe it “as going beyond the motion in
pursuance of which the order was made, for a court is presumed not to intend to
grant relief which was not demanded,” see Spallone, 399 F.3d at 424 (citation
omitted). See also Henson 231 U.S. at 269 (“Every decree in a suit in equity must
be considered in connection with the pleadings, and . . . it will be limited by
construction so that its effect shall be such, and such only, as is needed for the
purposes of the case that has been made and the issues that have been decided.”
(citation omitted)).
Applying those principles here, we conclude that the 1991 Judgment does not
include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and at issue in this case. There are
several clues that indicate as much. Start with the language of the County’s
complaint from that case. See id. at 269 (noting that scope of an order “must be

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considered in connection with the pleadings” (citation omitted)). In the second
paragraph, the County defined the litigation as “a dispute over ownership of a 6¼%
royalty interest under certain lands located in McKenzie County.” The County said
the lands were those “described in Enclosure 1,” and defined them as the “subject
lands.” In its own words, then, the County limited its claim to the minerals
underlying the tracts listed in Enclosure 1.
The County doubled down on this limitation a few pages later. It described
the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments by referencing each of the actions at law
through which the United States obtained lands in McKenzie County. But in doing
so, the County explicitly listed specific tracts—the same ones from Enclosure 1 and
not a single tract more. None of those tracts contains public domain minerals, and
none of those tracts is part of the lawsuit now before us. As “master of the
complaint,” it was up to the County to decide which tracts were included, and it only
included those listed in Enclosure 1. See Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., 701 F.3d
243, 247 (8th Cir. 2012); see also The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S.
22, 25 (1913) (“Of course, the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law
he will rely upon.”). If the County wanted the litigation to cover other tracts, it
should have listed them. Cf. Hunter v. Page County, 102 F.4th 853, 869 (8th Cir.
2024) (“If [plaintiffs] did not want to risk removal of their case to federal court, they
should not have pleaded a federal claim.”).
That the County did not list any other tracts is compelling evidence that the
1991 Judgment does not extend beyond those listed in Enclosure 1, particularly
given the strict pleading requirements for quiet title actions against the United
States—requirements the County was capable of fulfilling in the instant case. See
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d) (requiring plaintiffs to describe “with particularity the nature
of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the
circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed
by the United States”). Just as the instant litigation is limited to the tracts particularly
described in the 2019 Complaint, the 1991 Judgment is limited to those tracts the
County chose to include in its lawsuit, nothing more.

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The County’s requested relief further confirms the 1991 Judgment’s scope.
The County first requested a preliminary injunction preventing further claims to the
royalty “under the subject lands.” Similarly, it asked the court to “[q]uiet title” to
the royalty interest “under the subject lands.” With its request for relief tailored to
specific tracts, it is hard to see how the judgment granting that relief would not be
so limited. To be sure, it elsewhere used only the phrase “the 6¼% royalty”—when
asking for reimbursement and when seeking declaratory relief and a permanent
injunction. But each of those references contained no other limiting language and
immediately followed the specific requests tied to the “subject lands.” Because “a
court is presumed not to intend to grant relief which was not demanded,” Spallone,
399 F.3d at 424 (citation omitted), we do not think the court could have intended the
1991 Judgment to extend to lands not listed in Enclosure 1. See also Ford Motor
Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 286 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that
orders must be construed to “give effect to the intention of the court.” (citation
omitted)).
This conclusion is supported by other portions of the record. For example,
the County’s memorandum in support of its renewed motion for summary judgment
referenced the “subject lands” throughout, describing differences among the “subject
lands” and including a list of the tracts taken in each of the 1930’s Condemnation
Judgments—the same tracts from the complaint. That the County itself continued
to refer to the “subject lands” is just further evidence the 1991 Judgment was not
meant to address anything beyond that. See Spallone, 399 F.3d at 424 (noting that
orders must not be construed “as going beyond the motion in pursuance of which the
order was made” (citation omitted)). Each of these facts alone would be persuasive
evidence of the judgment’s scope. Taken together, they compel our conclusion that
the 1991 Judgment was limited to only the tracts listed in Enclosure 1.
The County’s responses are unconvincing. It argues that the plain terms of
the 1991 Judgment include the tracts specifically listed in the 2019 Complaint. As
already discussed, the plain terms do nothing to clarify the judgment’s scope. It
asserts that the dispute was defined as one “over ownership of a 6¼% royalty

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interest,” without limiting the argument to specific tracts of land or minerals. What
the County conveniently omits, however, is the rest of the sentence: “under certain
lands” that are “described in Enclosure 1” and referred to as “subject lands.” Finally,
the County argues that its reference to the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments was
sufficient to incorporate all of the tracts taken in those actions, not just the ones listed
in Enclosure 1. This argument is as implausible as it is factually inaccurate. The
County did not incorporate the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments wholesale in its
1987 complaint; it listed, with particularity, specific tracts from Enclosure 1 that
were taken in each individual condemnation judgment. Moreover, it would require
suspension of disbelief to think that the County incorporated every tract from the
1930’s Condemnation Judgment by specifically listing only a select few. Both
individually and collectively, these arguments are unconvincing. It is clear from the
record that the judgment does not cover tracts that were neither listed nor discussed.
The All Writs Act could only provide relief to the extent the 1991 Judgment
included the royalties from tracts now in dispute. Based on the order’s terms and
the record upon which it was based, we conclude that the judgment was limited to
the tracts listed in Enclosure 1. Because none of those tracts are included in the 2019
Complaint now before us, the All Writs Act cannot provide the relief the County
seeks by enforcing the 1991 Judgment.13
B.
Alternatively, the County argues that the All Writs Act can be used to enforce
the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments directly, even without an intervening quiet title
judgment. We have never addressed whether a plaintiff can enforce or challenge the
scope of a prior condemnation judgment through something other than a quiet title
13 For that same reason, the County cannot rely on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 70. That rule grants courts certain procedural tools to enforce judgments
for specific acts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 70. Because the 1991 Judgment does not
include the tracts from the 2019 Complaint, Rule 70 could not afford the County’s
requested relief either.

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action, but the Circuits that have considered the argument appear to be uniform in
their rejection of it. See, e.g., Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 297-98 (4th Cir.
1987) (prohibiting use of Rule 60(b) to contest original condemnation action); see
also Bank One Tex. v. United States, 157 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that
contests over title to condemned property must be asserted “via an independent
action against the United States” (citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by
Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 156 & n.2 (2023). We join those courts
today and reject the County’s argument.
The reason we do so is because of the nature of eminent domain proceedings.
A condemnation action “proceeds in rem against the property itself” and thereby
“‘extinguishes all previous rights,’ and gives the United States title to the entire
condemned property ‘good against the world.’” Cadorette v. United States, 988 F.2d
215, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.) (citations omitted); see also United States
v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 235 n.2 (1946). The condemnation judgment creates title;
it does not settle disputes over that title’s scope. See Cadorette, 988 F.2d at 222-23.
With that understanding, challenges to the scope or validity of a condemnation
judgment are like any other claim contesting the scope or validity of title in any other
legal instrument. Those types of challenges are properly brought under the Quiet
Title Act. See Patterson v. Buffalo Nat’l River, 76 F.3d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1996)
(addressing Quiet Title Act suit challenging scope of easements in a deed); see also
Block I, 461 U.S. at 277, 285-86 (holding Quiet Title Act is the exclusive remedy in
suit challenging scope of property taken under the equal footing doctrine). A
challenge to a condemnation judgment is no different. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 70(b)
(noting that “judgment divesting any party’s title and vesting it in others” operates
as “a legally executed conveyance”).
When looking to our precedent, this outcome makes sense. We have
previously permitted challenges to the scope of land taken in a prior condemnation
action to proceed under the Quiet Title Act. In United States v. Herring, we held
that a plaintiff could invoke the Quiet Title Act to ascertain “the validity or substance
of the title” acquired through eminent domain. 750 F.2d 669, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1984);

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see Herring v. United States, 781 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986) (recounting that “the
Quiet Title Act can be invoked to collaterally attack the government’s title acquired
through condemnation under the Declaration of Taking Act”). We have applied that
rule in the years since, entertaining suits by plaintiffs arguing that previous
condemnation proceedings “never t[ook]” property in dispute. See Long v. Area
Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (addressing
dispute over scope of land taken in prior condemnation action); Bear v. United
States, 810 F.2d 153, 154 (8th Cir. 1987) (entertaining quiet title action over lands
acquired by United States through condemnation proceedings).
Because the Quiet Title Act can address these claims, only the Quiet Title Act
can do so. See Block I, 461 U.S. at 273; see also Patchak, 567 U.S. at 216 (noting
that where Quiet Title Act provides a remedy, that remedy is exclusive of all others).
And because the Quiet Title Act “specifically addresses the particular issue,” the All
Writs Act cannot provide a mechanism for relief. See Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S.
at 43. Accordingly, the All Writs Act cannot be used to ascertain the validity or
scope of title taken in condemnation proceedings, and such claims must be brought
under the Quiet Title Act. To hold otherwise would permit plaintiffs to avoid the
Quiet Title Act’s “carefully-crafted” remedial scheme through artful pleading,
something Congress could not have intended. See Block I, 461 U.S. at 284-85.
Because the All Writs Act cannot be used to challenge the scope of the 1930’s
Condemnation Judgments, and because the 1991 Judgment does not include the
mineral royalties at issue in this case, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the County under the All Writs Act. The United States was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on that claim. The County must proceed, if at all, under
the Quiet Title Act and subject to the Quiet Title Act’s requirements.

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III.
The United States invokes one of those requirements here, arguing that the
County’s claim is barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations. Claims under
the Act are barred unless they are brought “within twelve years of the date upon
which [they] accrued”—when the plaintiff “knew or should have known of the claim
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). As an alternative to its All Writs Act
holding, the district court granted the County relief under the Quiet Title Act and
rejected the United States’ argument that the claim was untimely. “We review de
novo whether a statute of limitations bars a party’s claim.” Humphrey v. Eureka
Gardens Pub. Facility Bd., 891 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
Because the County commenced its lawsuit on January 11, 2016, its claim is time
barred if it “knew or should have known” of the United States’ claim on or before
January 10, 2004.
The Quiet Title Act contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, so its
12-year statute of limitations must be strictly construed. Spirit Lake Tribe v. North
Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 745 (8th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins,
598 U.S. at 165.14 The Quiet Title Act does not require actual notice of the United
States’ adverse claim. Id. at 738. Rather, “the [Quiet Title] Act’s statute of
limitations’ trigger [i]s light.” Gambrell, 111 F.4th at 875. “Knowledge of the
claim’s full contours is not required,” North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch.
Lands v. Block (Block II), 789 F.2d 1308, 1313 (8th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted),
nor must the United States’ claim have merit, North Dakota ex rel. Wrigley v. United
States, 31 F.4th 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 2022). Instead, the limitations period begins to
run once the plaintiff has “a reasonable awareness” that the United States claims
some adverse interest. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 738 (citation omitted). That
14 Wilkins held that the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations was not a
jurisdictional bar. See 598 U.S. at 165. The law governing when the limitations
period accrues, however, remains valid. See Gambrell v. United States, 111 F.4th
870, 875 (8th Cir. 2024).

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awareness need not be tract-specific so long as the United States’ claim is based on
“single legal theory.” See Wrigley, 31 F.4th at 1041-42 (citation omitted).
The United States argues that the County knew or should have known about
the United States’ claim to public domain minerals at multiple points before January
11, 2004. One date stands out in particular: November 17, 2003.15 On that date,
BLM informed the County that “only the acquired minerals [in the 1930’s
Condemnation Judgments we]re subject to a 6¼% royalty reservation[].” In the
United States’ view, this was an explicit statement that the United States did not
recognize a royalty interest in at least some lands and thus provided notice sufficient
to trigger the limitations period. See Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 738 (noting that
a plaintiff need only know “that the Government claims some interest”).
The County responds that the message was vague, ambiguous, and could not
have put the County on notice of the United States’ claim. The County first asserts
that non-possessory claims like mineral royalties are only adverse when the interest
interferes with the plaintiff’s rights, so the County could not have known that the
United States claimed an adverse interest without more information. See Wrigley,
31 F.4th at 1039. It is true that the limitations period will not begin running until a
plaintiff knows or should know of an adverse government claim, so a non-possessory
interest might accrue later than a possessory one. See Kane County v. United States,
772 F.3d 1205, 1216 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that easements can “peaceably coexist”
with servient estates (citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins, 598
U.S. at 165. But that does not mean the County could never be on notice of the
adverse claim without the United States declaring that it did not recognize the royalty
15 The United States further argues that (1) the 1930’s Condemnation
Judgments themselves; (2) the failure to receive royalty payments from
public-domain minerals at any point since then; (3) a 1981 letter from BLM to the
County; (4) the 1985 BLM decision based on De Shaw; and (5) the County’s
investigation in 1998 triggered the limitations period. Because we hold that the
County’s claim accrued no later than December 2003, we do not reach these
alternative triggering events.

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in specific tracts. Rather, the County still knew or should have known of some
adverse non-possessory claim based on the notice that the United States did not
recognize the royalty interest. See also Wrigley, 31 F.4th at 1039 (public notices
sufficient to place state on notice of adverse non-possessory interest); 28
U.S.C. § 2409a(k)(1) (outlining accrual for claims by a state through public
communications). The fact that the message did not specifically list which tracts the
United States claimed is of no matter, as tract-by-tract notice is not required. See
Block II, 789 F.2d at 1313-14.
The County also claims that the acquired-public domain distinction was not
clear from the message—a distinction the district court thought was merely an
after-the-fact fabrication by BLM to justify its position—and thus the use of the
terms could not provide sufficient notice of anything. This argument falls short for
multiple reasons. First, contrary to the County’s suggestions, there is an established
distinction between acquired and public lands. See, e.g., Murray v. United States,
291 F.2d 161, 162 (8th Cir. 1961) (“Acquired land is Government owned land
acquired from private ownership. Public land is Government owned land which was
part of the original public domain.” (citation omitted)). Nor are these terms merely
creatures of judicial decision making. Congress explicitly codified the distinction
well before the County’s dispute with the United States arose. See Wallis, 384 U.S.
at 65 (noting the distinction and comparing the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub L.
66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.), with the
Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1947, Pub. L. 80-382, 61 Stat. 913
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-60)). The fact that BLM only used one
of these terms of art in the message does not mean that the distinction was fabricated.
The County’s reaction to the message also demonstrates it understood the
distinction. Board meeting minutes from December 2003 show that the County was
“concern[ed] that BLM may not be recognizing the [C]ounty’s royalty right on
parcels which were originally patented with mineral reservations to the federal
government.” This goes beyond whether the County should have known of the
United States’ claim to the royalty interest, as the County actually expressed concern

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about it. The County knew of the United States’ adverse claim, thus triggering the
limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). The County argues that the meeting
minutes only show that the County was concerned about the problem, but it had no
information about which tracts had producing leases and whether BLM was
withholding any royalty payments. This misunderstands the Quiet Title Act’s
accrual rule. The United States’ “claim need not be ‘clear and unambiguous’” or
asserted together with “explicit notice.” Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 738 (quoting
Block II, 789 F.2d at 1313). The question is not whether BLM provided such notice,
but whether the County knew or should have known of the claim’s general contours.
See Gambrell, 111 F.4th at 875 (“[A]ll that is required is constructive notice that the
[G]overnment holds a reasonable claim to some interest in the property.”). The
December 2003 meeting minutes demonstrate that the County had that notice here.
Finally, the County asserts that our decision in Patterson v. Buffalo National
River means the limitations period is not triggered when a claim is vague or disputed.
Patterson involved competing interpretations of language in the original deed. 76
F.3d at 224. In addition to a plot of land, the deed conveyed to the United States an
interest in “any means of ingress or egress.” Id. at 223. The United States interpreted
the phrase to include a “primitive” road accessing ungranted property, while the
grantors felt it applied only to paths to the granted property. Id. at 223-24. Because
the language was “too ambiguous to place the [grantors] on notice of the
Government’s claims”—in large part because Arkansas law supported the grantor’s
interpretation—the limitations period could not have begun by the issuance of the
deed itself. Id.
That situation stands in stark contrast to the one here. BLM made its
interpretation of the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments known. More fundamentally,
the County actually understood what the United States meant: the United States was
not recognizing a royalty interest “on parcels which were originally patented with
mineral reservations to the federal government.” That the County did not know
which tracts had producing leases or which royalty interests the United States
claimed does not affect the analysis. “Knowledge of the claim’s full contours is not

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required,” Block II, 789 F.2d at 1313 (citation omitted), nor is notice of the specific
tracts or royalties, Wrigley, 31 F.4th at 1041-42. All that was needed was “a
reasonable awareness that the Government claims some [adverse] interest.” Block
II, 789 F.2d at 1313 (citation omitted). The County had that awareness here.
At the latest, the County knew the United States did not recognize outstanding
mineral royalties in lands in which the mineral estate was reserved to the United
States in the original patent by December 2, 2003. It had a “generous” twelve years
from that date to figure out which specific tracts were disputed and bring its claim.
See Gambrell, 111 F.4th at 875. The County’s failure to do so is fatal. The County’s
Quiet Title Act claim is untimely, and the district court erred in holding otherwise.
Accordingly, the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of the County, and
its judgment must be reversed.
IV.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and we
remand this case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of
the United States consistent with this opinion.
______________________________

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