United States of America v. Sylvester George Taylor Staples

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2521
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Sylvester George Taylor Staples
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 24-2522
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Sylvester George Taylor Staples
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 24-2523
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee

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v.
Sylvester George Taylor Staples
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeals from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: March 18, 2025
Filed: March 21, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After Sylvester Staples pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, see
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8), the district court1 revoked his supervised release
in two other cases, sent him back to prison for 24 months, and imposed a consecutive
137-month sentence for the new crime he committed. An Anders brief suggests the
sentences are procedurally and substantively flawed. See Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967).
We conclude otherwise. Staples’s prior Illinois convictions for attempted
armed robbery and aggravated battery qualified as “crime[s] of violence,” which
increased the advisory sentencing range for the felon-in-possession count. U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2); see United States v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 1067, 1077–78 (8th Cir. 2022);
United States v. Brown, 916 F.3d 706, 708 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); United
1 The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.

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States v. Roman, 917 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (8th Cir. 2019). From there, the district
court selected the sentences and explained its reasoning for each one. See United
States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for an abuse of
discretion). In doing so, it sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(3), and did not rely on an improper factor or
commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991,
994 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that the district court “may give some
factors less weight than a defendant prefers or more to other factors, but that alone
does not justify reversal” (citation omitted)). Nor did it abuse its discretion by
considering Staples’s involvement in an uncharged murder, which the government
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Waller, 689 F.3d
947, 959–60 (per curiam) (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining that other crimes can be
relevant to a defendant’s history and characteristics).
We have also independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other
non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). We
accordingly affirm the judgments of the district court and grant counsel permission
to withdraw in all three cases.
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