United States of America v. Quincy Martez Chambers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1640
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Quincy Martez Chambers
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: January 15, 2025
Filed: April 4, 2025
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Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Quincy Martez Chambers for possession of ammunition by
a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court1
1 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.

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sentenced him to 360 months in prison. Chambers appeals his conviction and
sentence. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
Nairobi Anderson, the mother of Chambers’s child, was shot in the chest and
struck in the head with the gun by a man wearing a ski mask. After Anderson and
the child took cover, more shots were fired. On the theory that Chambers committed
the shooting, a jury convicted him for possessing ammunition as a felon under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At sentencing, the district court found the object of Chambers’s offense was
first degree murder, making the base offense level 33. It applied a three-point
enhancement for Anderson’s injuries, and a three-point enhancement for obstruction
of justice under U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.1(b)(1) and 3C1.1, respectively. Finding
Chambers to be an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the district
court applied the statutory range of 15 years to life. It sentenced Chambers to 360
months in prison.
II.
Chambers claims the evidence insufficiently proves he shot Anderson and,
therefore, that he possessed ammunition. This court reviews de novo the sufficiency
of the evidence. United States v. Johnson, 745 F.3d 866, 868–69 (8th Cir. 2014).
“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, granting all
reasonable inferences that are supported by that evidence.” Id. at 869. “We will
reverse a conviction only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “[I]t is within the province of the jury to make
credibility assessments and resolve conflicting testimony.” United States v. Torres,
552 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 2009). A jury’s credibility determinations are “virtually
unassailable on appeal.” United States v. Nosley, 62 F.4th 1120, 1130 (8th Cir.
2023).

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Chambers emphasizes that Anderson recanted her initial identifications of him
as the shooter. And defense witnesses testified that Chambers was traveling at the
time. But conflicting evidence included: body-camera footage of Anderson’s
repeated identifications of Chambers at the scene; multiple witnesses hearing these
identifications; a car associated with Chambers fleeing the scene; messages from
Chambers saying it won’t “happen” again; and Chambers suggesting marriage to
silence Anderson. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government and
deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, the jury had sufficient evidence to
find Chambers committed the shooting.
Chambers challenges as irrelevant and overly prejudicial the admission of text
messages and still shots from a video visitation between Anderson and Chambers.
This court reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and reverses only
“if the district court’s evidentiary rulings constitute a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Keys, 918 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2019). The messages
and images were relevant to show Anderson’s possible bias and motive for recanting
her identifications. See United States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“[E]vidence showing a witness’s bias is almost always admissible.”), citing United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984).
Because Chambers did not object on Rule 403 grounds at trial, this court
reviews for plain error. See United States v. Ridings, 75 F.4th 902, 906 (8th Cir.
2024) (“If the defendant fails to object, we review for plain error.”). See also Fed.
R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .”). The messages
and images were probative of Anderson’s credibility—a key issue—and their
prejudicial effect was lessened in the context of Chambers shooting the mother of
his child with the child present—an egregious act at the core of the case.
Chambers challenges as hearsay the admission of Anderson’s statements
identifying him as the shooter. He argues too much time lapsed between the shooting

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and the statements for them to constitute excited utterances. See Fed. R. Evid.
803(2) (an excited utterance is: “A statement relating to a startling event or
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it
caused.”). “To determine whether a declarant was still under the stress of excitement
caused by an event when a statement was made, we consider the lapse of time
between the startling event and the statement, whether the statement was made in
response to an inquiry, the age of the declarant, the physical and mental condition of
the declarant, the characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the
statement.” United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1170 (8th Cir. 2007) (cleaned
up). Statements by victims with signs of stress are admissible even if made 30
minutes after shots are fired near them. See United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048,
1055 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The lapse of 15 to 30 minutes between an exciting incident
and a statement does not render the statement inadmissible.”). Here, body-camera
footage shows Anderson under stress—shot and repeatedly asking “am I going to be
okay”—while making the statement about 10 minutes after the shooting, thus
admissible as an excited utterance.
III.
Chambers contends the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by
forcing him either to proceed with conflicted counsel or to represent himself. He
alleges a conflict existed because his lawyer previously represented a government
witness. This court reviews de novo the issue whether a defendant’s right to counsel
was violated. United States v. Brown, 956 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2020). “The
mere fact that a trial lawyer had previously represented a prosecution witness does
not entitle a defendant to relief.” United States v. Flynn, 87 F.3d 996, 1001 (8th
Cir. 1996). “The defendant must show that this successive representation had some
actual and demonstrable adverse effect on the case, not merely an abstract or
theoretical one.” Id. (“An example may be where counsel’s cross-examination of a
former client is impeded for fear of misusing confidential information.”). In his
underdeveloped argument, Chambers identifies no actual adverse effect from his
lawyer’s prior representation, thus failing to demonstrate prejudice.

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IV.
Contesting his sentence, Chambers disputes the cross-reference to attempted
murder, the enhancements for severity of injuries and obstruction of justice, and the
Armed Career Criminal statutory range. This court reviews de novo the application
of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Clark, 999 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir.
2021). It reviews the underlying factual findings for clear error. Id.
Chambers argues the district court erroneously applied the cross-reference to
attempted first degree murder because he lacked the requisite intent. See U.S.S.G.
§§ 2K2.1(c) (directing cross-reference to § 2X1.1 “[i]f the defendant used or
possessed any firearm or ammunition . . . in connection with the commission or
attempted commission of another offense”); 2X1.1(c) (directing cross-reference to
another offense guideline for an attempt); 2A2.1(a) (setting a base offense level of
33 “if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder”). “For
this cross-reference to § 2A2.1 to apply, the government need[s] to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] acted with malice aforethought
and premeditation.” United States v. Angel, 93 F.4th 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 2024).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought.”). Attempted first-degree murder “requires the specific intent
to kill.” United States v. Greer, 57 F.4th 626, 629 (8th Cir. 2023). “Ample case law
shows that shooting at a particular person, or a group of people, demonstrates a
specific intent to kill.” Id. (cleaned up). See Angel, 93 F.4th at 1079 (affirming a
cross-reference to attempted murder when defendant fired five shots, with one
hitting the victim in the leg).
Chambers demonstrated a specific intent to kill by shooting Anderson in the
chest, striking her on the head, and, after a pause, firing multiple shots at an
apartment where she and their child took cover.
Because the cross-reference applied, Chambers faced an enhancement for the
severity of Anderson’s injuries. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(b)(1). He argues her injuries

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warranted a two-point enhancement for a “serious bodily injury” rather than a three-
point enhancement for a bodily injury between “serious” and “permanent or life-
threatening.” Id. The district court did not clearly err by finding Anderson’s
injuries—requiring staples in her head, surgery, and a month of hospitalization—
were more than serious.
Chambers disputes the district court’s application of an enhancement for
obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 imposes a two-point enhancement if
“defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice.” This court reviews de novo “whether U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
applies to specific conduct.” United States v. Sykes, 4 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir.1993)
(per curiam). By text, Chambers suggested he and Anderson get married so the
government could not “use” her against him. Chambers’s “scheme” to prevent
Anderson from testifying “amounts to aiding and abetting the obstruction of justice
for purposes of § 3C1.1.” United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 645 (10th Cir. 1995)
(upholding an obstruction-of-justice enhancement when defendant married witness
to invoke marital privilege and avoid testifying). See United States v. Peel, 747 F.
Appx. 498, 501 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding an obstruction-of-justice enhancement
when defendant “tried to convince the girlfriend to marry him so that she would not
testify against him” and his “girlfriend established many facts important to the
outcome of the case.”); United States v. Browne, 89 F.4th 662, 667 (8th Cir. 2023)
(affirming admission of evidence of scheme to marry co-conspirator to trigger
spousal testimonial immunity as relevant to obstruction enhancement).
Chambers contends he lacks the requisite predicate offenses to be sentenced
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A defendant with “three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense” must be sentenced as
an Armed Career Criminal, thus imprisoned for “not less than fifteen years.” 18
U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1), (c)(5)(A).
Chambers agrees he has two violent convictions. He argues that the third
offense—domestic battering in the second degree—is not a “conviction” because he

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pled nolo contendere. A nolo contendere plea “authorizes the court for purposes of
the case to treat [the defendant] as if he were guilty.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 35 (1970). “Implicit in the nolo contendere cases is a recognition that the
Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is
unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is
willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.” Id. at 36. Further, Arkansas state
law treats nolo contendere pleas as convictions. Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544,
547 (Ark. 1993) (“This court has consistently treated convictions based on nolo
contendere pleas as convictions.”). By pleading nolo contendere, Chambers was
convicted of domestic battery.
Chambers argues his domestic battery offense was not “violent” because it
lacked the requisite mens rea. The Arkansas domestic battery offense requires an
act “with the purpose of causing physical injury” in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2),
but only an act that “recklessly causes serious physical injury” in subsection (a)(3).
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-304 (emphasis added). This court “review[s] de novo
whether a previous conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA.” United States
v. Mallett, 66 F.4th 734, 735 (8th Cir. 2023). An offense requiring a reckless mens
rea does not qualify as violent under the ACCA. Borden v. United States, 593 U.S.
420, 423 (2021). “When determining whether a state-law conviction qualifies as a
violent felony under the ACCA, sentencing courts must look ‘to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those
convictions.’” United States v. Pate, 754 F.3d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 2014), quoting
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). “[I]f the statute combines two
offenses, crime (a) and crime (b), and only the elements of crime (a) make it a violent
felony, then to use a prior conviction for enhancement . . . the government must
prove that the defendant committed crime (a), not crime (b).” United States v.
McCall, 507 F.3d 670, 674 (8th Cir. 2007), reh’g granted, opinion vacated, 523 F.3d
902 (8th Cir. 2008) (mem.). This “‘modified categorical approach’ . . . permits a
court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by
consulting the trial record—including charging documents, plea agreements,
transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions of law from a bench

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trial, and jury instructions and verdict forms.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.
133, 144 (2010), quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (cleaned up).
True, Chambers’s charge does not identify which subsection—(a)(1), (2), or
(3)—he violated. Still, according to the state plea hearing transcript, the court
mirrored the statutory language requiring purpose: “The State alleges that on or
about December 11, 2015, in Jefferson County, with the purpose of causing physical
injury to a family or household member, you caused physical injury to [the victim].”
(emphasis added). Without objecting, Chambers affirmed that he understood the
charges against him and pled nolo contendere. Chambers was convicted of
purposeful domestic battery, a violent crime and predicate offense under the ACCA.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
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