United States of America v. Jose Francisco Medina de la Cruz, also known as Spider

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-3774
___________________________
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jose Francisco Medina de la Cruz, also known as Spider
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
____________
Submitted: January 15, 2025
Filed: May 1, 2025
[Published]
____________
Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Jose Francisco Medina de la Cruz appeals his 220-month sentence following
his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. After Medina de la
Cruz’s sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated U.S.S.G.
§ 4C1.1(a). It provides that an offender with zero criminal history points can
retroactively seek a two-level reduction if he or she satisfies ten criteria. When

-- 1 of 4 --

§ 4C1.1(a) was promulgated, the tenth criterion required that “the defendant did not
receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. [§] 848.” U.S.S.G.
§ 4C1.1(a)(10) (2023) (emphasis added).1
Based on the new zero-point-offender provision, Medina de la Cruz moved to
reduce his sentence.2 The district court3 denied the motion. The court found Medina
de la Cruz ineligible for the two-level reduction under § 4C1.1(a)(10). The court
based its decision on § 3B1.1(a)’s aggravating role adjustment that Medina de la Cruz
received at sentencing. The court concluded that the role adjustment precluded his
eligibility for the reduction. Medina de la Cruz argues that the court misinterpreted
the guideline. He contends that when read in its entirety, § 4C1.1(a)’s plain language
unambiguously precludes relief under subsection (10) only when a defendant both
received a role adjustment and engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. It is
1Effective November 1, 2024, the Commission amended § 4C1.1(a) “to strike
[§] 4C1.1(a)(10) and replace it with new paragraphs (10) and (11): ‘(10) the
defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role); and (11)
the defendant was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21
U.S.C. § 848.’” United States v. Tahir, No. 24-1279, 2025 WL 720892, at *1 n.2 (6th
Cir. Mar. 6, 2025) (unpublished) (quoting U.S.S.G. Amend. 831). “The Commission
explained that the amendment ‘makes technical changes’ to ‘clarify the Commission’s
intention that a defendant is ineligible for the adjustment if the defendant meets either
of the disqualifying conditions in the provision.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. Amend. 831).
Because “the district court issued its order before the enactment of this amendment,
we rely on solely the statutory text from Amendment 821.” Id.
2See United States v. Morales, 122 F.4th 590, 593 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Section
4C1.1 was made retroactively applicable, so it can be the basis for a motion to reduce
a defendant’s term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” (citing
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10; U.S.S.G. Amend. 825)).
3The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.
-2-

-- 2 of 4 --

undisputed that Medina de la Cruz did not engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
and satisfied all other criteria for a two-level reduction under § 4C1.1(a). He,
therefore, avers that the district court erred by finding that he was ineligible for the
reduction.
We have not yet addressed whether a defendant, who received an aggravating-
role adjustment, is ineligible for the § 4C1.1(a) two-level reduction even though he
did not engage in a continuing criminal enterprise. But our sister circuits that have
addressed the issue have all “concluded that a § 3B1.1 enhancement is sufficient by
itself to disqualify a defendant.” Morales, 122 F.4th at 594 (citing United States v.
Cervantes, 109 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2024) (per curiam); United States v. Milchin,
No. 24-1484, 2024 WL 4441419, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2024) (unpublished), vacated,
No. 24-1484, 2025 WL 399514 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2025), redesignating op. as
precedential, 128 F.4th 199 (3d Cir. 2025); United States v. Shaw, No. 24-6638, 2024
WL 4824237, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2024) (unpublished per curiam)); see also
United States v. Herrera, No. 24-6236, 2025 WL 1005962, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 1,
2025) (unpublished) (citing Morales, 122 F.4th at 594); United States v. Ashrafkhan,
129 F.4th 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Cervantes, 109 F.4th at 946; Morales, 122
F.4th at 595; Milchin, 128 F.4th at 201; Shaw, 2024 WL 4824237, at *1). These
courts agree that “and” in § 4C1.1(a)(10) creates two separate requirements— not one
requirement—that a defendant must satisfy to receive the two-level reduction. See
Morales, 122 F.4th at 594 (“Simplified, § 4C1.1(a)(10) says that a defendant is
eligible for the reduction if he ‘does not have X and did not do Y.’ The plain language
and grammatical structure of the provision set out two separate requirements. To use
an everyday example, this is not a provision stating ‘You must not drink and drive,’
but a provision stating ‘You must not drink and must not drive.’ The ‘and’ connects
several provisions that all must be met.”).
-3-

-- 3 of 4 --

We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits and now
hold that to be eligible for the zero-point-offender reduction, a defendant
must show both that he did not receive an enhancement under § 3B1.1
and that he was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. If a
defendant either received a § 3B1.1 enhancement or engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise, he is disqualified from receiving the
reduction. The district court did not err in its interpretation of
§ 4C1.1(a)(10) or in its denial of [Medina de la Cruz’s] § 3582(c)(2)
motion, and its judgment is AFFIRMED.
Id. at 597.
______________________________
-4-

-- 4 of 4 --