Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA, formerly known as Tecno Poultry Equipment SRL

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1508
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Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc.,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,
v.
Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA, formerly known as Tecno Poultry Equipment SRL,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee,
Tecno Poultry Systems, LLC,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Western
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Submitted: November 19, 2024
Filed: May 23, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
This case involves the collapse of an egg farm’s barn and its poultry cage
system. The owner of the farm, Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc., sued the designer and
manufacturer of the cage system, Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA, on several theories.
One claim alleging negligence proceeded to trial. A jury found that Tecno did not
breach its duty to supervise the installation of the cage system and returned a verdict
for the defendant. Rembrandt appeals, arguing that the district court* committed
several errors at trial. We conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the
judgment.
I.
Rembrandt owns and operates an egg farm in Rembrandt, Iowa, that produces,
processes, and distributes egg-based food products. Tecno, headquartered in Italy,
designs and manufactures poultry housing systems, such as egg collection equipment
and trolley feeding systems.
In 2006, the parties contracted for Tecno to design and manufacture a poultry
cage system to be installed in four barns at Rembrandt’s egg farm. Tecno agreed to
furnish an on-site technician for ten weeks and to provide “supervision of
installation” of the cage system. The contract did not define “supervision.”
Tecno selected Andrzej Golebiewski to be the on-site technician during the
assembly and installation of the cage system. Because the contract did not provide
for Tecno to perform assembly or installation, Rembrandt contracted with a third
party to assemble and install the cage system.
*The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa.
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The installation was completed in 2007. The cage system consisted of eight
rows of cages running the length of the barn. There were ten levels of cages divided
into two tiers. A catwalk ran between levels five and six, separating the two tiers.
Feed troughs and water tubes were placed on each row. An egg collection conveyer
and manure conveyer were placed on each tier.
On February 14, 2020, over a decade after the installation, the cage system in
one of the barns collapsed and killed one farm worker. The collapse caused
significant damage to the barn and destroyed eggs and hens.
Rembrandt sued Tecno in 2021 for strict products liability, breach of implied
warranties, and negligence. The district court concluded that there were genuine
issues of fact for trial on whether Tecno was negligent in supervising installation of
the cage system. The court granted summary judgment for Tecno on the remaining
claims.
The parties presented competing evidence about Tecno’s duty to supervise the
installation. The jury also heard competing expert testimony about the cause of the
collapse. Rembrandt’s expert stated that there were thousands of screws missing
from the cage system, and that several bolts used to connect the cage to the barn’s
exterior were placed incorrectly. The expert opined that after weather and
temperature took their toll, the cage system ultimately collapsed because of the
missing screws and misplaced bolts. By contrast, Tecno’s two experts testified that
Rembrandt did not properly dispose of the manure in the barn. They opined that as
manure built up, more weight was placed on the cage system, and the stress of the
weight caused the system to collapse.
After Tecno presented its evidence, Rembrandt moved for judgment as a matter
of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The motion argued that no
reasonable jury could find that Tecno adequately supervised the installation of the
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cage system. The district court denied the motion. Rembrandt renewed its motion
at the close of the evidence before the case was submitted to the jury, and the court
again denied the motion. The jury found that Tecno did not breach a duty to
supervise the installation and returned a verdict in favor of the defense. The court
entered judgment for Tecno, and Rembrandt did not renew its motion for judgment
as a matter of law. Rembrandt appeals.
II.
A.
Rembrandt first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
verdict because no reasonable jury could find that Tecno adequately supervised the
installation of the cage system. Rembrandt argues that the court should not have
submitted the issue to the jury and should have granted judgment as a matter of law
for Rembrandt. We decline to consider this argument because Rembrandt failed to
preserve the issue for appeal.
To preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a party must file a
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) within 28 days of the entry of
judgment. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 404 (2006);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Rule 50(a) permits “a party to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence prior to submission of the case to the jury.” Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 399. “If
the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a),
the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s
later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). “Rule
50(b), by contrast, sets forth the procedural requirements for renewing a sufficiency
of the evidence challenge after the jury verdict and entry of judgment.” Unitherm,
546 U.S. at 400. A party’s failure to renew its preverdict motion for judgment as a
matter of law as provided in Rule 50(b) “forecloses its challenge to the sufficiency
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of the evidence,” id. at 404, and renders “an appellate court . . . ‘powerless’ to review
the sufficiency of the evidence after trial.” Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 189 (2011)
(quoting Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 405).
Rembrandt filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)
after Tecno presented its case-in-chief. Rembrandt renewed its motion at the close
of the evidence before the case was submitted to the jury. The district court denied
both motions. But Rembrandt did not renew its motion under Rule 50(b) after the
jury returned its verdict and judgment was entered. Rembrandt’s failure to renew its
motion precludes our review of its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See
Jackson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 785 F.3d 1193, 1205 (8th Cir. 2015).
While we recognize that Tecno did not raise Rembrandt’s forfeiture in its brief
on appeal, and the rule is not jurisdictional, “[t]he requirement of a timely application
for judgment after verdict is . . . an essential part of Rule 50.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted). A postverdict motion “is necessary because determination of whether a new
trial should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment
in the first instance of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of
the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.” Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 401
(internal quotation omitted). We therefore hold Rembrandt to its forfeiture and
decline to consider its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Rembrandt also raises arguments concerning causation and fault, but with a
jury verdict finding that Tecno did not breach a legal duty, we need not reach other
issues concerning the negligence claim.
B.
Rembrandt next raises an evidentiary issue. Rembrandt argues that the district
court abused its discretion in excluding a screenshot of Tecno’s website. The
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proffered evidence is a page from the website in 2023 that describes services that
Tecno offers when it installs a “turnkey” cage system. The web page states that
Tecno’s “experts will ensure each system is installed correctly and includes the right
accessories.” Rembrandt sought to introduce that page to show Tecno’s
understanding of the term “supervision.” The district court ruled that the screenshot
was irrelevant because it was a current advertisement for a “turnkey” cage system and
did not address the meaning of the 2006 contract. We review the district court’s
ruling for abuse of discretion.
Rembrandt argues that despite the date of the web page, the court should have
admitted the screenshot as the admission of a party opponent. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(a). Rembrandt asserts that Tecno’s cage system has been the same since
the 1980s, and that its assurance about installation from 2023 is relevant to its
obligations under the 2006 contract.
We conclude that the district court properly determined that the screenshot was
not relevant. The web page was dated nearly seventeen years after the parties formed
the contract. The 2006 contract did not promise a “turnkey” system and did not
define “supervision” in accordance with the 2023 web page. The web page is
Tecno’s advertisement about a particular cage system for potential clients at a later
date. The web page from 2023 did not tend to show the intent of the parties in 2006
when they formed the contract at issue in this case.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The unopposed motions to
supplement the record on appeal are granted.
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