United States of America v. Ricky Hilburn

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1117
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Ricky Hilburn
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Harrison
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Submitted: January 13, 2025
Filed: June 4, 2025
[Published]
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Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
In spring 2022, Ricky Hilburn communicated with Robert Riggs, an
individual who was the subject of an FBI investigation into child pornography.
Hilburn and Riggs sent messages back and forth discussing their “sexual interest in
minor males” and sent each other “large amounts of [child sexual abuse material].”
Hilburn later pleaded guilty to distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18

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U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1), and travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual
conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). At sentencing, the district court1
imposed a 500-month sentence, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release.
Hilburn appeals his sentence.
Hilburn’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court improperly applied
an enhancement under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) for distribution “in exchange for any
valuable consideration.” See United States v. Neri, 73 F.4th 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2023)
(explaining procedural error includes “improperly calculating[] the Guidelines
range”). “[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
application of the guidelines de novo,” United States v. Ayres, 929 F.3d 581, 583
(8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Quiver, 925 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2019)),
mindful that “[t]he district court was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the
record,” United States v. Gray, 83 F.4th 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2023) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. McArthur, 11 F.4th 655, 663 (8th Cir. 2021)). “A
finding is clearly erroneous when it ‘leaves us with a definite and firm conviction
that the finding is a mistake.’” United States v. Morrow, 50 F.4th 701, 704 (8th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States v. White, 41 F.4th 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 2022)).
Under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), a five-level enhancement applies “[i]f the
defendant distributed [material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor] in
exchange for any valuable consideration, but not for pecuniary gain.” As we have
explained, “[t]his means that the increase applies where a defendant ‘agreed to an
exchange with another person under which the defendant knowingly distributed to
that other person for the specific purpose of obtaining something of valuable
consideration from that other person, such as other child pornographic material.’”
United States v. Hansen, 859 F.3d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting USSG
§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), comment. (n.1)).
1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas.

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Relying on the undisputed facts in the Presentence Report (PSR), the district
court found that Hilburn agreed to send Riggs child pornography in exchange for
more child pornography. The district court recognized that neither Hilburn nor Riggs
used any “magic words” to indicate an express agreement. But the district court
determined “that the direct evidence in the [PSR] . . . and certainly the reasonable
inferences that one should draw from those facts” showed “that Mr. Hilburn and Mr.
Riggs had an agreed arrangement whereby they would send each other . . . child
pornography for their own sexual gratification purposes.”
We see no clear error in the district court’s findings. See United States v.
Nelson, 106 F.4th 719, 724 (8th Cir. 2024) (“[U]nless a defendant objects to a
specific factual allegation contained in the PSR, the court may accept that fact as
true for sentencing purposes.” (quoting United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970,
975 (8th Cir. 2008))). On a single day in April 2022, Hilburn sent Riggs three videos,
each depicting prepubescent males performing sexual acts, and also sent him a
message stating, “F[***] yess, gimme that child porn.” Less than a month later—
again, on a single day—Hilburn and Riggs sent each other a total of five videos
depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor. They sent the videos one at a time, with
Hilburn sending the first one, Riggs responding with another, and so on. Riggs later
admitted to law enforcement that he “communicated and exchanged” child
pornography with Hilburn. Similarly, Hilburn told law enforcement that he “had
been trading child pornography with Riggs.” Bolstering the district court’s
conclusion, the two men’s interactions were repeated and not anonymous: they had
familiarity with each other, as Riggs told investigators that he knew Hilburn not only
online, but also “in person.”
Hilburn challenges the district court’s reliance on his admission to law
enforcement that he was “trading” child pornography. He argues we “should not
assume that [his] intended use of that word was the same . . . as the word is used
under the Guidelines.” But considering the evidence as a whole, the inference the
district court drew from Hilburn’s admission was reasonable. See Gray, 83 F.4th at
718. After carefully reviewing the record, we are not “le[ft] . . . with a definite and

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firm conviction that the [district court’s] finding[s] [are] a mistake.” Morrow, 50
F.4th at 704 (quoting White, 41 F.4th at 1038).
We affirm.
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