United States of America v. Billy Puckett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1293
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Billy Puckett
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
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Submitted: January 15, 2025
Filed: June 11, 2025
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Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Billy Puckett was convicted of receiving child pornography. Puckett appeals
his conviction. He argues that the district court1 erred in denying his motion to
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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suppress evidence found on his cell phone and statements that he made to law
enforcement. For the reasons given below, we affirm.
I. Background
Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper James Rorie stopped Puckett’s
vehicle for alleged state traffic violations. Puckett improperly displayed a disabled
placard by hanging it from his rearview mirror, and he was not wearing a seatbelt.
Puckett and his dog were the only passengers. Trooper Rorie approached the vehicle,
explained the reasons for the stop, and asked Puckett about his trip. Trooper Rorie
also asked Puckett whether he had ever been arrested. Puckett revealed that he had
an old statutory rape conviction on his record and that he was a registered sex
offender. Trooper Rorie then asked Puckett to join him in the patrol vehicle while
Trooper Rorie confirmed his license and registration. Puckett agreed.
Once inside the patrol car, Trooper Rorie checked Puckett’s criminal history,
including information about his sex offender registration. The check revealed that
Puckett had not registered any social media accounts on his registration. While the
computer check was ongoing, Trooper Rorie and Puckett discussed Puckett’s past
rape conviction. The computer check showed Puckett’s license was valid. Then, in
an exchange lasting around 20 seconds, Trooper Rorie asked Puckett if he had
anything illegal on him or in his vehicle like drugs or stolen items. Puckett replied
that he did not. Trooper Rorie then requested consent to search the vehicle, and
Puckett agreed without delay. Puckett then removed his dog from the vehicle so that
Trooper Rorie could search it.
During the search, Trooper Rorie saw a cell phone sitting on the driver’s seat.
Trooper Rorie testified at the suppression hearing that he “grabbed [Puckett’s] cell
phone . . . and it illuminated.” R. Doc. 30, at 8. Trooper Rorie denied having
manipulated the cell phone in any way and claimed that it powered on automatically
when he picked it up. When the screen illuminated, Trooper Rorie “saw a Facebook
application icon and a Snapchat application icon.” Id. Trooper Rorie then unplugged
the cell phone from its charger and approached Puckett with the cell phone in hand.

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Trooper Rorie asked Puckett if he had any images or applications that he was
not supposed to have and whether he could search the cell phone. Puckett responded,
“Well I do have uh . . . some animated images on there.” R. Doc. 58-1 (Gov’t Ex.
1), at 9:07–14. Trooper Rorie then asked, “You have a problem with me looking
through them?” Id. at 9:28–30. Puckett did not directly answer this request but went
on to explain how when he searched for animated images, they just “pop[ped] up.”
Id. at 9:41–43. Trooper Rorie renewed his request to search the cell phone for any
illegal images, and Puckett replied that he did not “know how they classify” child
pornography. Id. at 9:52–54. Trooper Rorie then asked whether Puckett had
Snapchat on his sex offender registration and whether the cell phone in question was
Puckett’s only cell phone. Puckett confirmed that the device was his only cell phone
and admitted to downloading Snapchat “not too long ago.” Id. at 10:02–03. Trooper
Rorie followed up, asking whether Puckett had “any problem with [him] searching
th[e] phone” because he “want[ed] to make sure” that the images on Puckett’s phone
were “legit” and that there was not “any child porn” on the cell phone. Id. at 10:23–
32. Puckett once again reiterated that he did not “know the imaging” because it “just
pops up.” Id. at 10:34–38. Puckett admitted that he did not “know how to get rid of
them” and that he did not “know if they’re underage or not.” Id. at 11:03–05, 11:25–
27. Trooper Rorie replied, “Well, I’m not a wizard on these things, I can go through
them a little bit; so I might not even find the images you’re talking about, but I’d
like to take a look at it if you don’t mind.” Id. at 11:37–43. Puckett responded, “I
don’t mind. Not a problem.” Id. at 11:44–45.
At that point, Trooper Rorie asked Puckett to put the dog back in the car and
return to the patrol vehicle with him so that they could “get a little more
comfortable.” Id. at 11:47–54. Puckett complied. While searching the cell phone,
Trooper Rorie continued to converse with Puckett. He asked questions about
Puckett’s social media profiles, his sex offender registration, and the photographs
that Trooper Rorie found on the cell phone. Puckett answered them all. A few
minutes later, Trooper Rorie discovered a picture that he believed to be child
pornography. Based on that discovery, he asked Puckett to exit the vehicle. He
arrested Puckett for possessing child pornography and violating the sex offender

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registration laws of Missouri. Trooper Rorie then read Puckett his Miranda2 rights.
While standing outside the vehicle, Trooper Rorie continued to ask questions about
the pornographic images. They waited by the roadside for one of Puckett’s friends
to arrive to take care of Puckett’s truck and dog.
Trooper Rorie escorted Puckett to the police station. In a subsequent Miranda
interview, Puckett admitted to possessing child pornography. Trooper Rorie applied
for a state search warrant to search Puckett’s cell phone and received it. A forensic
examination of its contents revealed multiple images and at least one video of child
pornography.
A grand jury charged Puckett with receiving child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). Puckett moved to suppress the evidence found
on his cell phone as well as the statements that he made before and after he was read
his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress
and recommended that Puckett’s suppression motion be denied. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Puckett waived his right
to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial. The district court subsequently
convicted Puckett of receiving child pornography and sentenced him to 210 months’
imprisonment.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Puckett argues that the district court erred in denying the motion
to suppress on three grounds. First, Puckett argues that Trooper Rorie unlawfully
extended the stop when he requested Puckett’s consent to search his vehicle. Second,
he argues that Trooper Rorie unlawfully searched and seized his cell phone when
Trooper Rorie moved it and it illuminated. He asserts this search and seizure
rendered Puckett’s subsequent consent to search the cell phone involuntary. Finally,
Puckett argues that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without the benefit
2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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of Miranda warnings. As a result, he asserts that any statements made to law
enforcement pre-Miranda and post-Miranda should have been suppressed.
“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Magallon,
984 F.3d 1263, 1276 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552,
555 (8th Cir. 2014)).
We [will] affirm a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress unless
the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is based on an
erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire record, we
are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been
made.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A. The Scope and Duration of the Stop
A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
its “tolerable duration . . . is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (cleaned up). Authority for a
stop “ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are––or reasonably should have
been––completed.” Id. Rodriquez noted that the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence “tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not
lengthen the roadside detention.” Id. However, “a traffic stop ‘can become unlawful
if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of
issuing a warning ticket.” Id. at 354–55 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “An officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.” Id. at 355. But an officer “may not
do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id.

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Our circuit has two post-Rodriguez precedents relevant to this analysis:
United States v. Salkil, 10 F.4th 897 (8th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Mathes, 58
F.4th 990 (8th Cir. 2023). In Salkil, an officer initiated a traffic stop based on the
defendant’s failure to illuminate his rear license plate as required by law. 10 F.4th at
898. The officer ran the defendant’s name through a database, uncovering the
driver’s recent involvement with a seizure of guns and drugs. Id. Another officer
arrived on the scene, and the original officer decided to issue a warning to the
defendant for the traffic infraction. Id. For about 37 seconds before issuing the
citation, the officer questioned the defendant about his connection to the seizure of
guns and drugs and then requested consent to search the vehicle. Id. The defendant
consented, and the second officer began writing the warning ticket while the original
officer searched the vehicle. Id. We reasoned that the officer’s questioning did not
unconstitutionally prolong the detention because “the ticket-writing process
consumed more than three minutes” and the defendant “gave consent to search well
before the warning ticket would have been completed.” Id. at 899. Consequently, we
held that the “police obtained consent to search within the time reasonably required
to complete the mission of the traffic stop.” Id. Thereafter, “[o]nce police lawfully
secured consent to search, any delay occasioned by the search did not constitute an
unlawful extension of the seizure.” Id.
Next, in Mathes, we considered whether an officer’s request for consent to
search a defendant’s vehicle after a records check prolonged the stop in violation of
the Constitution. 58 F.4th at 993. In Mathes, the defendant and two other occupants
were stopped for careless driving and improperly displaying a license plate. Id. at
992. The officer requested information about the vehicle’s occupants from a
dispatcher and questioned the occupants about their criminal history while he waited
for a response from the dispatcher. Id. Once he got the information back from the
dispatcher, the officer asked one of the occupants to follow him to the back of the
vehicle. Id. There, he asked the occupant about their travel plans and then asked for
consent to search the vehicle. Id. at 992–93. The occupant granted consent. Id. at
993. We reasoned that the officer did not impermissibly extend the length of the stop
by requesting consent to search the vehicle. Id. The request was “only a couple

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seconds while [the occupant] was standing at the rear of the vehicle.” Id. The
officer’s brief “inquiry did not extend the stop beyond the time that would have been
required for [the occupant] to return to the driver’s seat.” Id.
Here, Puckett contends that the traffic stop’s mission was complete at the
moment the computer system notified Trooper Rorie that Puckett’s license was
valid. However, at the point Puckett’s license was cleared, Trooper Rorie had not
issued him a warning or citation related to the traffic infractions, and Puckett had not
returned to his vehicle. Thus, at that time, the traffic stop’s purpose remained
incomplete. In contrast, the officer in Rodriguez had run the record checks, returned
all the documents to the occupants of the vehicle, written the warning ticket, and
finished explaining the warning for the traffic infraction to the occupants of the
vehicle. 575 U.S. at 351–52. Subsequently, the officer began an entirely separate
criminal investigation by conducting a dog sniff, which was “not fairly characterized
as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Id. at 356. This case more closely resembles
Salkil and Mathes. Those holdings inform our decision here.
Did Trooper Rorie’s 20 seconds of questioning and request for consent
prolong the stop beyond the time needed to complete the remaining tasks of the
traffic stop? We hold that it did not. The brief duration of the inquiry within the
reasonable period of the traffic stop’s original purpose did not impermissibly
prolong it.
This holding does not contradict, as Puckett suggests, the analysis in
Rodriguez. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez held that an officer cannot gain “bonus
time” by “completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously.” 575 U.S. at 357.
Consequently, when an officer diligently completes his tasks, he cannot pursue an
unrelated criminal investigation under the guise that “the overall duration of the stop
remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar
circumstances.” Id. Trooper Rorie’s questioning is lawful not because he did so
within the duration of an average stop. Rather, it passes constitutional muster
because, in compliance with Rodriguez, it was completed within the duration of

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when “tasks tied to the traffic infraction [were]––or reasonably should have been––
completed.” Id. at 354. Here, Trooper Rorie had not completed his traffic-stop
related duties when he requested consent to search. The 20 seconds of questioning
did not prolong the stop beyond the time that it would have taken Trooper Rorie to
issue a written citation or warning and have Puckett return to his vehicle.
B. The Search and Seizure of the Cell Phone
Next, Puckett contends that Trooper Rorie’s movement of his cell phone
during the search was an unlawful seizure and that his subsequent consent to search
the cell phone was not voluntary.
1. Alleged Seizure
During the consensual search, Trooper Rorie saw a cell phone in the driver’s
seat. According to his testimony, he picked up the cell phone, and it automatically
illuminated. Puckett argues that Trooper Rorie picking up the cell phone and viewing
its screen was an unlawful search and seizure outside the scope of his consent to
search the vehicle. The government contends that Trooper Rorie was entitled to
move objects in the car as part of his general grant to search the vehicle and that the
cell phone screen’s automatic illumination resulted in information being put into
plain view.
“[T]he police do not seize property every time they handle private property.”
United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 706 (8th Cir. 2005). “A Fourth Amendment
seizure of property requires ‘some meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests in that property.’” United States v. Flores, 55 F.4th 614, 618
(8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). The
“meaningful interference” requirement illustrates that “the Supreme Court
inevitably contemplated excluding inconsequential interference with an individual’s
possessory interests.” Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 706 (emphasis omitted). Consequently,
“the seizure standard prohibits the government’s conversion of an individual’s
private property, as opposed to the mere technical trespass to an individual’s private
property.” Id. at 702.

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Here, Trooper Rorie was given consent to search Puckett’s vehicle for
anything illegal. “We measure the scope of consent to search by a standard of
objective reasonableness.” United States v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir.
2006). The test is “what ‘the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by
the exchange between the officer and the suspect.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
Here, Trooper Rorie questioned Puckett about whether he had anything illegal
on his person or inside the vehicle. He followed that up by asking whether Puckett
had any “drugs, stolen items, something like that?” R. Doc. 58-1 (Gov’t Ex. 1), at
6:13–21. Puckett’s consent to search his vehicle authorized a search for drugs, stolen
items, or similar objects. See Siwek, 453 F.3d at 1085 (“When [the defendant]
voluntarily gave a general statement of consent to search his truck, he authorized a
search for the items about which [the officer] had questioned him—weapons, stolen
property and illegal drugs.”). A search for drugs or other stolen items could naturally
result in the movement of items during the course of the search, including a cell
phone. General consent to search the vehicle would not extend to a search of the cell
phone’s digital data without probable cause. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
403 (2014) (holding that the digital data of cell phones contain the “privacies of life”
and therefore police must obtain a warrant prior to searching the contents of a
phone). Nevertheless, some incidental movement of a cell phone left on the seat of
the vehicle is not unreasonable while searching an automobile for illegal items. See
id. at 387 (“Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical aspects
of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon.”). Importantly, based on
Trooper Rorie’s testimony, the district court did not clearly err in finding that he did
not power on the cell phone, tap the screen, or otherwise manipulate it in a manner
to power it on and reveal the digital data of the cell phone. We conclude that Trooper
Rorie did not meaningfully interfere with Puckett’s possessory interest in the cell
phone simply by moving it from the driver’s seat because his action was reasonable
given Puckett’s consent to search his vehicle. The phone was not illegally seized.

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2. Alleged Search
Did Trooper Rorie viewing Puckett’s phone’s home screen when it
automatically illuminated constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment? Puckett argues that it did under Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
He contends that Trooper Rorie unconstitutionally searched the cell phone by
viewing the home screen because he was “taking action, unrelated to the objectives
of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions” of the cell
phone. Id. at 325. In Hicks, the officers entered an apartment under an exigent-
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 323. They were looking
for a shooter, weapons, and other victims. Id. The officer specifically moved the
stereo equipment in order to view the serial numbers and determine whether the
equipment was stolen. Id. at 325. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the
officer’s actions “did constitute a search.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In contrast, Trooper Rorie was acting within the scope of a broadly defined
consensual search for illegal or stolen items. Trooper Rorie did not take any
additional action to manipulate or power on the cell phone screen to view its
contents. The screen illuminated automatically. Hicks is distinguishable and does
not render the trooper’s actions violative of the Fourth Amendment.
3. Extension of the Stop
Next, Puckett argues that Trooper Rorie did not acquire reasonable suspicion
to extend the stop by viewing the social media notifications visible when his phone
illuminated. We disagree. When the cell phone screen illuminated, it displayed
Facebook and Snapchat notifications. Trooper Rorie had previously viewed
Puckett’s sex offender registration and noted that there were no registered social
media accounts on his registration. Under Missouri law, sex offenders must register
social media accounts within three days of downloading them. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 589.407.1(1), 589.414.2(4). Puckett argues that this is insufficient for reasonable
suspicion because Trooper Rorie had no confirmation that the three days had passed
since Puckett had downloaded those apps. However, our analysis focuses on whether
the officer “had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, not whether [his]
reasonable suspicion was confirmed.” United States v. Campbell-Martin, 17 F.4th

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807, 815 (8th Cir. 2021). Here, Trooper Rorie had reasonable suspicion, based on
his experience with sex offender registration requirements and the presence of social
media applications on Puckett’s cell phone, that Puckett was likely violating
Missouri law. This reasonable suspicion justified extending the stop. See United
States v. Woods, 829 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2016) (“If [the officer] had reasonable
suspicion to justify expanding the scope of the investigation, however, the extension
of the stop would not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). Similarly, upon seeing the
Facebook and Snapchat icons on Puckett’s cell phone screen, Trooper Rorie could
seize the phone under the plain view doctrine. See United States v. Weinbender, 109
F.3d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir. 1997).
4. Voluntary Consent
Finally, Puckett argues that his consent to search his cell phone was not
voluntary. The district court’s determination as to voluntary consent is a factual
finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Williams, 97 F.4th 579, 582 (8th
Cir. 2024). “The voluntariness of consent is assessed under the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Thomas, 97 F.4th 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 2024). We
consider various factors including:
(1) the defendant’s age, (2) the defendant’s general intelligence and
education, (3) whether the defendant was intoxicated, (4) whether the
defendant consented after receiving Miranda rights, (5) whether the
defendant was aware of his rights and protections because of previous
arrests, (6) the length of time the subject was detained, (7) whether the
officers acted in a threatening manner, (8) whether law enforcement
made any promises or misrepresentations, (9) whether the defendant
was in custody or under arrest at the time, (10) whether the consent
occurred in public, and (11) whether the defendant was silent as the
search was conducted.
Magallon, 984 F.3d at 1281.
Puckett asserts that his consent to search was not voluntary because Trooper
Rorie’s repeated requests for consent were domineering. Repetition alone does not

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warrant a finding of involuntariness. See Thomas, 97 F.4th at 1143 (finding consent
to be voluntary despite officers asking four times if they could search backpack
because the individual did not object to search requests and watched the search
without objecting). The request must be viewed along with other relevant factors
described in Magallon. Puckett did not refuse or show unwillingness to consent. He
merely avoided Trooper Rorie’s requests with conversation about the images that
might be on his cell phone. The district court found, and the dashcam footage
confirms, that the exchange was not domineering and remained cordial and
cooperative throughout the encounter.
Moreover, the other surrounding facts here support the district court’s finding
of voluntariness. Puckett, 36 years old, was not impaired. He responded and
interacted in a way that showed he understood Trooper Rorie’s questions. He also
had previous experience with the criminal justice system. See United States v.
Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that previous encounters with
the criminal justice system increase defendant’s awareness of his legal protections
and support a finding of voluntariness). The eight-minute detention was brief, see
United States v. Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a thirty-
minute detention before the defendant consented to the challenged search was
“brief”), and the setting was not coercive, see Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 382 (holding that
the inside of a patrol vehicle on the side of a highway during daylight hours was not
a coercive setting). Trooper Rorie did not use threats, physical intimidation, or
punishment to obtain consent. Puckett remained cooperative and answered questions
about the cell phone’s contents. After Puckett gave his consent, he did not object or
revoke his consent to search the cell phone at any point. See Williams, 97 F.4th at
582 (holding consent to be voluntary when defendant was not intoxicated, officers
spoke in a conversational manner, and defendant watched the search without
objecting). Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not
clearly err in finding that Puckett voluntarily consented to the search of his cell
phone.

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C. The Custodial Nature of the Interrogation
Puckett argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the statements that he made during and after the traffic stop. He argues that his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated because he was in custody
and did not receive Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. We review de novo
the question of whether the defendant was in custody and review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error. See United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 719 (8th
Cir. 2004) (en banc).
1. Pre-Miranda Statements
Puckett argues that he was in custody within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment when Trooper Rorie asked him to sit in the patrol car while Trooper
Rorie looked through the cell phone. “Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective
inquiry, where we assess both the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and
whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to end the interrogation and
leave.” United States v. Soderman, 983 F.3d 369, 376 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Our circuit set forth six non-exclusive factors for
determining this question in United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1990).
The magistrate judge examined these six factors, and we will do the same here. The
factors include:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the
questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request
the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest;
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement
during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with
authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to
questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were
employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the
questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was
placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.

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Id. at 1349. Two factors clearly weigh in Puckett’s favor. First, Trooper Rorie never
informed Puckett that he was free to leave or that he was not under arrest. Second,
Puckett was ultimately placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.
Did Puckett have unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning? “A
stop is not custodial if it does not constrain the defendant ‘to the degree associated
with an arrest.’” Soderman, 983 F.3d at 376 (quoting United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas,
345 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2003)). “Although stopped drivers are detained, they are
generally not in custody during the roadside questioning that is permitted during a
traffic stop.” Id. “Even if a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position would not
have felt free to leave, this does not amount to custody.” United States v. Johnson,
954 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2020).
Here, Puckett’s freedom of movement was not constrained to the degree
associated with an arrest. After Puckett gave his consent to search his cell phone,
Trooper Rorie asked Puckett to put his dog back in his vehicle and join him in the
patrol vehicle so they could “be more comfortable.” R. Doc. 58-1 (Gov’t Ex. 1), at
11:47–54. Puckett joined Trooper Rorie in the front seat, and he was “neither
handcuffed nor forced to sit in the back seat.” Soderman, 983 F.3d at 377. Puckett
continued to freely answer Trooper Rorie’s questions and engaged in a cooperative
conversation about the photos on his cell phone. Thus, Puckett “retained a degree of
free movement, as reflected by his frequent gestures, body movement, and
statements.” Id.
Puckett argues that this roadside questioning during a traffic stop was
impermissible because it exceeded the scope of the traffic infraction and pertained
to a separate criminal investigation. However, Trooper Rorie’s prior discovery of
evidence of criminality has no bearing on whether Puckett was in custody. See
Johnson, 954 F.3d at 1111 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)
(“A policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect
was ‘in custody’ at a particular time.”)).

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The remaining factors all weigh against a finding of custody. The dashcam
footage shows that that he voluntarily acquiesced to Trooper Rorie’s questions
throughout the entire encounter. Next, there is no evidence in the record of Trooper
Rorie using any strong-arm or deceptive tactics. The exchange was conversational
and free from intimidation. Finally, police presence did not dominate the setting. It
was a traffic stop conducted in broad daylight by single officer. See Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 438. The questioning only lasted for approximately ten minutes before
Puckett was arrested. See United States v. Laurita, 821 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir.
2016) (holding that the fact that an interview lasted only 20 minutes supported the
district court’s finding that the interview was not police dominated).
Trooper Rorie’s questioning of Puckett did not resemble a formal arrest. See
United States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 336 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that the
defendant was not in custody when he was not handcuffed, the tone was
conversational, the questions were limited in number, and he had not been told his
detention would be anything other than temporary). Considering the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he was at liberty to terminate the
interview and ask the officer whether he was free to leave. The district court did not
err in finding that Puckett was not in custody during the pre-Miranda questioning.
Consequently, Miranda warnings were not required.
2. Post-Miranda Statements
Puckett’s challenge to his post-Miranda statements hinges on whether his pre-
Miranda questioning was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v.
Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 2006) (assuming that an inquiry into the
admissibility of post-Miranda statements is necessary only when a suspect was in
custody under Miranda and later given Miranda warnings). Puckett does not allege
any constitutional violation stemming from his Mirandized interview other than its
connection to his pre-Miranda questioning. Because we conclude that Puckett was
not in custody during his pre-Miranda questioning, we can conclude that Puckett’s
post-Miranda statements are admissible and should not be suppressed.

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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
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