United States of America v. Principal Levell Springer, also known as Lil Moe, also known as Principal Lavelle…

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1478
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Principal Levell Springer, also known as Lil Moe, also known as Principal Lavelle
Springer
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: February 12, 2025
Filed: June 24, 2025
[Published]
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Before LOKEN, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Principal Springer dealt drugs within 1,000 feet of a school and had multiple
guns in his apartment. Although he believes he had a Second Amendment right to
possess the firearms and that his 110-month sentence is too long, we affirm.

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I.
Following a years-long investigation, a search of Springer’s apartment turned
up drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. Two charges followed: conspiring to
deal drugs within a school zone, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846, 860, and
unlawfully possessing firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). According to the
indictment, he could not legally possess the guns because of his drug use, see id.
§ 922(g)(3), and a previous misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction, see id.
§ 922(g)(9).
Springer moved to dismiss the firearm count. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b). As
relevant here, he argued that both restrictions violate the Second Amendment, one
facially and the other as applied. The district court1 disagreed, so Springer pleaded
guilty and expressly reserved the right to renew his Second Amendment challenges
on appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). In the end, he received concurrent
sentences of 110 months in prison.
II.
Springer’s Second Amendment challenges present an unusual twist. Rather
than charge him with illegally possessing a firearm for just one reason, the
indictment listed two. See United States v. Platter, 514 F.3d 782, 786–87 (8th Cir.
2008) (“[W]here a statute specifies two or more ways in which one offense may be
committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one count of the indictment, and
proof of any one of the methods will sustain a conviction.” (citation omitted)). His
position is that neither is consistent with the Second Amendment. See United States
v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2024) (applying de novo review to a Second
Amendment challenge); see also United States v. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978, 983 (8th
Cir. 2023) (reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment de novo).
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, then District Judge, now Chief Judge, United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.

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A.
We recently rejected the argument that the drug-user-in-possession statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is facially unconstitutional. See Veasley, 98 F.4th at 918. As
we explained, it “pass[es] constitutional muster” in at least some of its applications,
id. (quoting N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 30 (2022)), which
is just as true now as it was then, see United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 698
(2024). Circuit precedent, in other words, forecloses Springer’s facial challenge.
See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“It is a
cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.”
(citation omitted)).
B.
It also ends his as-applied challenge to the domestic-abuser-in-possession
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), but for a different reason. A “conviction can be
sustained on any one of the § 922(g) categories” because just one is enough to make
the possession illegal. United States v. Marin, 31 F.4th 1049, 1054 n.2 (8th Cir.
2022). Given that we have already concluded that disarming some drug users is
consistent with the Second Amendment, see Veasley, 98 F.4th at 918, it makes no
difference to Springer whether the other category, which covers domestic abusers,
is too, see United States v. Hoeft, 128 F.4th 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2025) (“pass[ing] no
judgment . . . on § 922(g)(9)” because “[t]he jury stated in a special verdict form that
it found [the defendant] guilty under both § 922(g)(1) and (g)(9), so it would have
convicted [him] . . . even if § 922(g)(9) was removed from the indictment”). Either
way, his firearm conviction stands.
III.
Unable to undo his conviction, Springer argues that the district court should
have at least varied downward at sentencing. We review the refusal to do so for an

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abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gillispie, 487 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir.
2007).
Here, in selecting a sentence at the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range,
the district court sufficiently considered the statutory factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—
including Springer’s offense conduct, criminal history, childhood and education, and
medical conditions—and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error
of judgment. See United States v. Becerra, 958 F.3d 725, 731 (8th Cir. 2020)
(holding there was no abuse of discretion when the district court “made an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented” (citation omitted)).
Although Springer believes he should have received a downward variance, which
would have resulted in an even lower sentence, the district court was under no
obligation to grant one. See United States v. Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 652 (8th Cir.
2022).
IV.
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
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