United States of America v. Michael Garrick Denson, also known as Ice Mike

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1561
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Michael Garrick Denson, also known as Ice Mike
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: January 17, 2025
Filed: June 2, 2025
[Published]
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A jury found Michael Garrick Denson guilty of conspiring to distribute
methamphetamine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),
(b)(1)(B), and 846, and possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21

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U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The district court1 sentenced Denson to 419
months and 18 days in prison, varying downward from a Guidelines range of life.
Denson appeals, and we affirm.
I.
Denson argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. “We
review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor, and
accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.
Hayward, 124 F.4th 1113, 1120 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Thompson,
881 F.3d 629, 632 (8th Cir. 2018)).
To prove conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, “the government
needed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that ‘there was an agreement to
distribute [the charged] drugs, that [Denson] knew of the conspiracy, and that
[Denson] intentionally joined the conspiracy.’” United States v. Ramirez-Martinez,
6 F.4th 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782,
804 (8th Cir. 2021)). “An agreement to join a conspiracy need not be explicit and
can be inferred from the facts of the case,” United States v. Davis, 826 F.3d 1078,
1081 (8th Cir. 2016), and “[t]he Government ‘need only establish a tacit
understanding between the alleged co-conspirators, which may be shown through
circumstantial evidence,’” United States v. Myers, 965 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2019)).
The government offered sufficient evidence to support Denson’s conviction
on the conspiracy count. At trial, two cooperating witnesses testified that they sold
methamphetamine and heroin on Denson’s behalf: F.A.M. testified that she sold
methamphetamine and multiple pounds of heroin for Denson between January 2018
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge, now Chief Judge,
for the Northern District of Iowa.

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and April 2019; and B.L. testified both that she sold methamphetamine and heroin
for Denson between 2019 and 2020, and that she made multiple trips to retrieve
several pounds of methamphetamine for Denson around August 2019. Eight other
witnesses testified to buying methamphetamine or heroin from Denson during the
relevant period. The government also presented evidence that officers confiscated
more than 200 grams of methamphetamine that Denson arranged to sell to a
confidential informant. And F.A.M. testified that Denson kept drugs and money in
a closet at another woman’s residence. When police searched that residence, they
found a safe containing $935, heroin, other drugs, Denson’s social security card and
birth certificate, and similar identification documents belonging to numerous others.
Denson argues that this evidence was not sufficient because no officers
testified from personal knowledge about Denson’s involvement in drug trafficking,
and no direct evidence affirmatively showed Denson selling methamphetamine or
heroin. But “the absence of . . . direct evidence does not undermine the jury’s
verdict” in a conspiracy case, and the jury could credit both circumstantial evidence
and witnesses’ testimony in finding that Denson conspired to sell drugs. See United
States v. Flax, 988 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases, rejecting the
notion that a conspiracy to distribute drugs requires direct evidence from “controlled
buys or wiretap[s]”). Denson also argues that the cooperating witnesses’ testimony
was too uncorroborated, exaggerated, or unreliable to be believed. “But in reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[i]t is axiomatic that we do not pass upon the
credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony.’” United States v.
Moua, 895 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Clay, 618 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).
Indeed, “we have upheld jury verdicts based solely on the testimony of cooperating
witnesses.” Ramirez-Martinez, 6 F.4th at 868 (quoting United States v. Bradley, 643
F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2011)). Sufficient evidence supported Denson’s conviction
for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.
Denson next argues that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for
possession of heroin with intent to distribute. In July 2019, Denson was riding in the

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passenger seat of a car when it was pulled over. After officers stopped the car,
Denson fled on foot. Denson got away, but officers found six bindles2 of heroin
around the passenger area of the car. Denson concedes that his conviction on this
count rests “on somewhat firmer ground” than the conspiracy count, but claims that
the heroin in the car could have belonged to the driver, not Denson. However, the
driver denied knowing about the heroin in the car, and the jury was entitled to credit
that testimony. See United States v. Hansen, 111 F.4th 863, 867 (8th Cir. 2024)
(“[W]e are not in the business of second-guessing a jury’s credibility
determinations.”).
We affirm Denson’s convictions.
II.
Denson also challenges his sentence.
First, Denson argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level
enhancement for possession of a firearm. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) (“If a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels.”). “We review a
district court’s factual findings supporting its Sentencing Guidelines calculation for
clear error and its application of the Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Wilson,
122 F.4th 317, 325 (8th Cir. 2024).
To support an enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), the government must
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that “(1) the gun was possessed, and (2)
it was not clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug offense.”
United States v. Coleman, 97 F.4th 566, 568 (8th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Rivera, 76 F.4th 1085, 1091 (8th Cir. 2023)). The enhancement
“should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
2 An officer with experience on a drug task force testified that, as relevant here,
a bindle is a small amount of heroin packaged in a plastic baggie for individual
purchase.

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weapon was connected with the offense.” United States v. Millsap, 115 F.4th 861,
874 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.11(A))).
At sentencing, the district court credited the trial testimony of two witnesses
who saw Denson regularly possess a firearm while dealing drugs. F.A.M. testified
that she saw Denson trade a firearm for heroin sometime around 2018, that he kept
a nine-millimeter handgun underneath a mattress in a hotel room he shared with her,
and that she found a handgun in the center console of his car, where Denson told her
he stored drugs. B.L. testified that she saw Denson with firearms “all the time,” that
he carried a small gun in a holster either on his person or in his car’s cupholder, and
that he carried a firearm while selling drugs. She also said that she was once driving
with Denson, and when they noticed that officers were following them, Denson
“threw the gun out the window.”
Denson argues that the district court nonetheless erred because he has never
been convicted of a gun-possession crime, the police never actually found him with
a gun, and only two of the many witnesses at Denson’s trial testified that they saw
him with a gun. The district court’s choice to believe F.A.M. and B.L.’s testimony
is, however, “virtually unreviewable on appeal.” United States v. White, 41 F.4th
1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Holly, 983 F.3d 361, 363 (8th
Cir. 2020)). And as the district court pointed out at sentencing, the lack of further
inculpatory testimony “is not the same as evidence that he [affirmatively] did not
possess a gun,” so F.A.M. and B.L.’s testimony did not contradict other evidence.
See United States v. Browne, 89 F.4th 662, 666 (8th Cir. 2023) (noting that unless
they are “contradicted by extrinsic evidence or internally inconsistent,” district
judges’ credibility assessments “can virtually never be clear error” (quoting Adzick
v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 351 F.3d 883, 889 (8th Cir. 2003))). The district
court did not clearly err. Coleman, 97 F.4th at 568–69 (“The evidence is sufficient
to apply the [§ 2D1.1(b)(1)] increase where there is a temporal and spatial
relationship between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.”
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bandstra, 999 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th
Cir. 2021))).

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Second, Denson argues that the district court failed to sufficiently explain the
sentence it imposed. “Our precedent is not entirely clear” as to the standard of review
for the kind of procedural error Denson alleges. United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d
607, 618 (8th Cir. 2021) (noting the question is unresolved and outlining different
approaches of our sister circuits). We need not address the appropriate standard,
however, because we conclude that Denson’s claim fails under de novo review. See
id. at 619.
The district court calculated a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history
category VI, resulting in a range of life imprisonment. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A.
However, the court granted a slight downward variance, finding a life sentence “too
blunt of an instrument” in Denson’s case. The court noted that it had “considered all
the factors” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and then discussed Denson’s “substantial
drug conspiracy”; his “difficult childhood”; his family circumstances; and his
criminal history, including the fact that his offenses did not seem to be getting less
severe with age and that Denson had not accepted responsibility. “When explaining
a sentence, a court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the
parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decisionmaking
authority.” United States v. Bertucci, 83 F.4th 1086, 1088 (8th Cir. 2023). The
district court adequately explained the sentence it imposed.
We affirm.
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