United States of America v. Dawn Eagle Feather Floyd

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2336
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Dawn Eagle Feather Floyd
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Central
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Submitted: June 11, 2025
Filed: June 16, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Dawn Eagle Feather Floyd appeals from the judgment of the district court1
entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of drug offenses. In counseled and pro
1The Honorable Roberto Lange, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota.

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se briefs, Floyd challenges the denial of her motions to suppress and the tribal search
warrant that was the basis of her suppression motions. Floyd’s pro se brief also raises
issues of judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of
counsel.
After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Floyd’s motions to suppress. The motions were untimely. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(3), (e); United States v. Trancheff, 633 F.3d 696, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting
that desire to suppress incriminating evidence and retention of new counsel are
insufficient bases to establish good cause to excuse untimeliness). In any event, the
court correctly concluded that Floyd lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment
to challenge the warrant, and law enforcement officers had independent probable
cause to search Floyd’s vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances. See United
States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review; explaining
that this court will affirm the denial of a suppression motion unless it finds that the
decision is unsupported by evidence or is based on an erroneous view of the law; or
if the court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made); see also
United States v. Crawford, 93 F.4th 436, 440 (8th Cir. 2024) (stating that, to
determine whether probable cause existed to search a vehicle, this court considers
“the facts and circumstances known by the police when they began the search, or the
totality of the circumstances”); United States v. Wright, 844 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir.
2016) (concluding defendant could not assert Fourth Amendments rights of another).
Turning to the remainder of Floyd’s pro se arguments, we first conclude that
the record does not support a judicial bias claim. See Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d
610, 614 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the presiding judge is presumed impartial and
a party bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise). Second, despite years of
pretrial proceedings and ample opportunities to litigate the assertions, Floyd’s
accusations of government misconduct also lack any support in the record. See
United States v. Clayton, 787 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 2015) (explaining that claim of
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prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the government’s conduct was
improper and affected the defendant’s substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair
trial). Last, to the extent Floyd wishes to challenge her attorneys’ effectiveness,
“[t]he proper procedural mechanism for such a claim is a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.” See United States v. Payton, 168 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (8th Cir. 1999); see
also United States v. Briggs, 820 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel is usually best litigated in collateral proceedings”
where the record can be properly developed).
Following our independent review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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