Susan Davenport; Chris Davenport; Lloyd St. Clair; Floyd St. Clair v. City of Little Rock, A Municipality

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2834
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Susan Davenport; Chris Davenport; Lloyd St. Clair; Floyd St. Clair
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
City of Little Rock, A Municipality; Kenton Buckner, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as Police Chief; Amber Kalmer, Individually; Russ Littleton,
Individually; Jason Follett, Individually; Timothy Calhoun, Individually; Matthew
Thomas, Individually; Vicky Keathley, Individually; Kenneth Temple,
Individually
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: January 15, 2025
Filed: July 7, 2025
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Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge.

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On September 1, 2016, law enforcement officers conducted narcotics raids1
at a home and shop located on the same piece of property in Pulaski County,
Arkansas. Officers found contraband in both locations, and, during the raid of the
shop, an officer shot and injured a man named Lloyd St. Clair. Lloyd2 and other
occupants of the home and shop brought a lawsuit under § 1983, alleging that the
officers and the City of Little Rock violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court3 granted summary judgment to defendants, plaintiffs appeal, and we
affirm.
I.
Officers investigating drug activity came to suspect that contraband would be
found at a home and shop located on King Road. After obtaining no-knock search
warrants4 from a state judge, officers executed them on the morning of September
1. The officers divided into two teams to search the home and shop simultaneously.
At the time of the searches, Susan and Chris Davenport were inside the home, and
Floyd and Lloyd St. Clair were inside the shop.
At the home, officers deployed distraction devices upon entry. After a search,
they recovered a small amount of marijuana from the home.
1 According to the Little Rock Police Department’s Divisional Operating
Procedures, a “narcotics raid” is “[t]he execution of a search warrant utilizing
forcible entry with the goal of seizing narcotic contraband and its purveyor(s).”
2 We refer to appellants collectively as plaintiffs, but individually by their first
names to avoid confusion.
3 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.
4 Plaintiffs dispute whether there were two warrants at the time of the searches.
As explained in detail below, we conclude there is no genuine dispute as to whether
both warrants existed prior to the searches.

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At the shop, Officer Matthew Thomas was the first to enter and, after scanning
the room, he deployed a distraction device. Thomas then saw Floyd sitting at a desk
and ordered him to put his hands up; Floyd complied. Thomas moved further into
the shop and saw a man holding a shotgun in a separate room. Believing that the
man—Lloyd—was pointing the gun at him, Thomas shot Lloyd several times. A
medic treated Lloyd’s injuries while the officers completed the search, and Lloyd
was later taken to a hospital. The officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia at the
shop.5
State charges were filed against Lloyd, Floyd, and Chris based on the
recovered evidence. Lloyd and Floyd pleaded guilty to various charges,6 and both
were sentenced to probation and a fine.
Lloyd, Floyd, Chris, and Susan later brought this § 1983 suit. The complaint
alleged a Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim against Little Rock police
department (LRPD) narcotics officers Amber Kalmer and Russ Littleton; an
unlawful entry claim against LRPD SWAT officers Jason Follett, Timothy Calhoun,
and Matthew Thomas, as well as Kalmer and Littleton (collectively, officer
defendants); an excessive force claim against Thomas; and a Monell claim against
the City of Little Rock, Arkansas and then-Police Chief of the LRPD Kenton
5 Relevant here, the officers recovered: “two baggies w/ crystalline substance,”
a “glass pipe with white residue,” “two green pills in [a] container,” a “digital scale,”
a “baggie w/ green leafy substance,” a “black digital scale,” “two marijuana seeds
in [a] container,” an “unknown caliber rifle,” a “Stevens 20 gage,” “misc. rounds,”
and an “unk[nown] shot gun.”
6 Lloyd pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, three
counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, one count of
possession of a controlled substance, and aggravated assault. Floyd pleaded guilty
to possession of drug paraphernalia. As for Chris, he was charged with possession
of a controlled substance, but the charge was later dismissed.

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Buckner, in his official capacity.7 The district court granted summary judgment to
defendants.
Plaintiffs appeal.
II.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. We
construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and give
[them] the ‘benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record.’” Hodge ex rel. Farrow
v. Walgreen Co., 37 F.4th 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2022) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Shanner v. United States, 998 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2021)). “We affirm
if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” LADS Network Sols., Inc. v. Agilis Sys., LLC, 138
F.4th 1059, 1061 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). To create a genuine
dispute of material fact, “[t]he nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ and must come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)).
7 The complaint alleged additional claims, but the above-listed claims are the
only ones plaintiffs meaningfully address on appeal. Thus, all others are waived. See
Milligan v. City of Red Oak, 230 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding waiver
where an issue was “mention[ed] in passing” with no “argument or legal authority”
in support); United States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Because
the brief does not support this assertion with any argument, this court deems the
issue abandoned.”).

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A.
We begin with plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful search and
entry against the officer defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs assert that they created two
disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
First, on the unlawful search claim, plaintiffs argue that a genuine dispute
remains as to whether Kalmer and Littleton had two separate warrants, one for each
location, at the time of the searches.8 The record includes two search warrants and
accompanying affidavits-in-support: one for the home and one for the shop. Both
warrants are signed and dated by the same state judge—the warrant for the home on
August 17, the warrant for the shop on August 31. And the warrants, affidavits, and
inventory lists all contain a file stamp of September 2, 2016, the day after the raids.
The chief clerk of the Little Rock District Court, criminal division, attested that she
recognized the state judge’s signature on each of the warrants, and that the “two
separate original warrants . . . ha[d] been continuously maintained in the [state]
District Court records.”9
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the fact that the warrant and affidavit for the shop
bear additional, circular District Court seals, also dated September 2, 2016, but the
8 Plaintiffs appear to admit to the validity of the warrant to search the shop but
argue that no valid warrant existed for the home.
9 Plaintiffs argue that the chief clerk’s affidavit is unreliable because it lacked
foundation and was not supported by personal knowledge. See Brooks v. Tri-
Systems, Inc., 425 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining “that affidavits may
be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment” but they must “be made
on personal knowledge . . . and . . . show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))). The clerk
attested that she worked for the state judge who authorized the warrants for ten years
and thus, was easily able to recognize the judge’s signature. And as the criminal
division’s records custodian, the clerk was competent to testify about the state
court’s recordkeeping. The affidavit is proper summary judgment evidence.

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warrant and affidavit for the home do not—a discrepancy the chief clerk could not
explain. But plaintiffs did not introduce evidence explaining why the presence or
absence of the seal was relevant to whether the warrant for the home issued,
particularly in light of the filed, stamped copy in the court’s records.
Plaintiffs also highlight statements from officers about executing “a” warrant
and assert that this supports an inference that only the warrant to search the shop—
not the warrant to search the home—existed at the time of the searches. But several
officers also gave statements, including in reports prepared on the day the warrants
were executed, that expressly referred to two warrants. And the officers were divided
into two teams who conducted the searches of the locations simultaneously. Each
team executed “a” warrant. Each warrant was also accompanied by its own
supporting affidavit from Kalmer, describing separate, controlled drug buys outside
the home and shop on August 17 and August 29, respectively. We agree with the
district court that statements about “a” warrant, under these circumstances, “do[] not
call into question the existence of two warrants.”
As we understand plaintiffs’ theory, they assert the warrant to search the home
was fabricated after the fact. But they offer no evidence of fabrication, and the theory
otherwise lacks support in the record. See Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d
844, 853 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient [to survive summary judgment]; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986))). On this record,
plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
warrant for the home existed at the time of the raids.
Second, on the unlawful entry claim against the officer defendants, plaintiffs
argue there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was reasonable
suspicion to justify no-knock entries at the two locations. Kalmer testified in
deposition that she sought no-knock warrants because she saw Facebook videos of

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Amy St. Clair10 shooting firearms—a handgun and either an automatic or
semiautomatic firearm—on King Road. Plaintiffs do not dispute that, if Kalmer did
see the videos in advance of the raids, there was reasonable suspicion to expect
weapons at the home or shop and therefore to execute the warrants as no-knock
entries. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (establishing that “[i]n
order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would
be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime” (emphasis added)).11 Thus, the only question plaintiffs present is if there is a
genuine dispute of fact about whether Kalmer saw the videos in advance.
Plaintiffs first point to Kalmer’s deposition testimony where, in their view,
she either concedes that she did not see the videos prior to the day of the raids,12 or
at a minimum, contradicted herself. At her deposition, Kalmer testified as follows:
10 Amy St. Clair is not a party to this action, but she is a family member of
Susan, Lloyd, and Floyd.
11 Plaintiffs do not challenge the state judge’s decision to authorize no-knock
entries for the home and shop. Therefore, whether the generalized information
provided in the affidavits was sufficient to justify the issuance of no-knock warrants
is not before us. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394–95 (rejecting a state’s “blanket
exception to the knock-and-announce requirement” for search warrants in felony
drug investigations and clarifying the distinction between the probable cause
requirement for issuance of a warrant and the reasonable suspicion requirement “to
justify a ‘no-knock’ entry”).
12 It is not entirely clear whether plaintiffs argue only that Kalmer did not see
the videos prior to seeking the warrants, or that she never saw the videos at all. We
note that, “for Fourth Amendment purposes, the relevant question is whether the
police have reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances at the time they execute
the warrant.” Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if
Kalmer had not seen the videos before seeking the warrants, no-knock entries would
have been constitutionally permissible so long as the officers had reasonable
suspicion of exigent circumstances at the time the warrants were executed. See id.

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Q: All right. So did you have any reason to believe that there’d be
firearms at either of the locations on King . . . Road?
A: Yes. Yes, sir.
Q: . . . What’s the basis for that?
A: Amy St. Clair had posted several videos of her shooting weapons at
what appeared to be up there at . . . King Road.
Q: Right. But you hadn’t seen those prior to the no-knock raid.
A: I never had interaction with Amy, so no, sir.
. . .
Q: What proof do you have that you can tell me or show me right now
that you were aware of any of those videos at the time that you drafted
these affidavits?
A: I’m telling you that I viewed them and knew of the videos.
. . .
Q: Okay. So what you’re saying is, is that . . . you saw the video of Amy
St. Clair firing that gun before you drafted these affidavits?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why didn’t you put that information in the affidavits?
A: I just didn’t put it in the affidavit.
When first asked if she had “seen those prior to the no-knock raid,” Kalmer said, “I
never had interaction with Amy, so no, sir.” But when asked to clarify whether she
was “aware of any of those videos at the time that [she] drafted the[] affidavits,”
Kalmer responded, “I’m telling you that I viewed them and knew of the videos.”
Plaintiffs also argue that Kalmer made “pre-raid statements” that she was
unaware of any potential threat that would justify no-knock entries. In support, they
rely on forms from a separate unit of the LRPD, the SWAT team, called Warrant
Service Information Sheets. These forms are generic, pre-raid worksheets that ask
stock questions about the property to be searched and, as relevant here, whether “the
suspect [is] known or believed to possess a weapon.” Two of these forms were filled
out for the King Road raids—one for the home and one for the shop—and both show
that the weapon-possession question was answered as “unknown.” Plaintiffs
attribute these answers to Kalmer, and contend they are inconsistent with her
assertion that she did believe guns may be present. But Kalmer was not a member
of the SWAT team, and there is no indication that she filled out the worksheets or

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otherwise adopted or approved them. Instead, Kalmer attested that she participated
in the pre-raid briefing, where she told the SWAT unit about the videos she saw on
Facebook. Three SWAT team officers—Calhoun, Follett, and Thomas—submitted
affidavits stating that Kalmer told them about the videos at the pre-raid briefing. And
Calhoun and Follett specifically attested that the forms indicated it was “unknown”
if weapons would be present only because the officers “could not be absolutely
certain.”
Taken together, plaintiffs’ characterization of Kalmer’s deposition testimony
and the SWAT unit forms do not call into question Kalmer’s assertions—supported
by the averments of Calhoun, Follett, and Thomas—that she saw the videos before
the raids. See Hodge ex rel. Farrow, 37 F.4th at 464 (“The movant has the burden of
showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, but the plaintiff is not thereby relieved
of his own burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury verdict.”
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256)). We affirm the grant of summary judgment to
the officer defendants on these claims.
B.
Next, we turn to Lloyd’s excessive force claim against Thomas. “To establish
a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from
excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was objectively
reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Z.J. ex rel. Jones v. Kan. City Bd.
of Police Comm’rs, 931 F.3d 672, 681 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. City of
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009)). “Whether the use of deadly force
is reasonable turns on ‘the totality of the circumstances, including [1] the severity of
the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officer or others, and [3] whether the suspect is actively fleeing or resisting
arrest.’” Wallace v. City of Alexander, 843 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012)).

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We have held that deadly force is reasonable where an officer believes a
suspect is pointing a gun at him. See Partlow v. Stadler, 774 F.3d 497, 502 (8th Cir.
2014) (holding use of deadly force reasonable when suspect “move[d] the shotgun
in such a way that the officers believed that [he] was aiming the barrel of the shotgun
at them”). Here, the parties dispute whether Thomas saw Lloyd doing so before
shooting at him through a wall. But there is no genuine dispute of fact because
Thomas stated that Lloyd pointed the gun at him, and Lloyd admitted that he did.13
As to the second time Thomas shot at Lloyd, Thomas claimed it looked like Lloyd
was reloading his gun. Lloyd does not offer evidence contradicting Thomas’s
assertion, let alone showing how Thomas’s belief that Lloyd continued to pose an
imminent threat was unreasonable. See Partlow, 774 F.3d at 503 (“It is possible that
the officers were mistaken in perceiving that Partlow was taking aim at them. Any
such mistake, however, was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances
known to the officers.”). Under our precedent, Thomas’s use of deadly force was not
unconstitutional.
C.
Finally, turning to the municipal liability claim against the City and Buckner
in his official capacity, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants
after finding that there was no underlying constitutional violation. We agree.
“[A]bsent a constitutional violation by a city employee, there can be no § 1983 or
Monell liability for the City.” Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th
Cir. 2018); see also Jones v. Faulkner County, 131 F.4th 869, 876 (8th Cir. 2025).
13 Lloyd admitted to pointing the gun at Thomas, under oath, at his combined
plea and sentencing hearing. His later statements to the contrary do not create a
genuine dispute of material fact. See Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.
1995) (“We have held that a party cannot avoid summary judgment by contradicting
his own earlier testimony.” (collecting cases)).

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Thus, we need not reach plaintiffs’ arguments about evidentiary errors allegedly
committed by the district court regarding this claim.14
III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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14 For the same reason, we need not reach plaintiffs’ additional argument that
Kalmer and Littleton violated LRPD policies in conducting the controlled buys.

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