David Meza v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1367
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David Meza
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Defendant - Appellee
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: February 11, 2025
Filed: July 25, 2025
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Before LOKEN, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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STRAS, Circuit Judge.

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What does it take for an employer to “regard[]” an employee as disabled under
the Americans with Disabilities Act? 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). It may have
happened here when Union Pacific decided that David Meza’s traumatic brain injury
presented an unacceptable risk of future seizures. For that reason, we vacate the
grant of summary judgment to Union Pacific and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Meza had worked for Union Pacific for over twenty years when he had a
serious non-job-related motorcycle accident. It required him to spend several days
in the hospital recovering from a brain hemorrhage. Fortunately for him, his treating
physicians thought his brain injury would not have lasting effects. One, a
radiologist, determined from an MRI that “no specific or acute intracranial
abnormality” existed and only “a small amount of fluid in the left mastoid air cells”
remained. From there, his neurologist cleared him to return to his regular work and
life activities. In his view, Meza had made a “full recovery,” at least with respect to
his “dizziness, vertigo, and skull fracture.”
Union Pacific was not as sure Meza was ready to return. Its medical examiner
feared that his brain injury could cause unpredictable seizures—a conclusion
consistent with medical guidelines from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. Presumably concerned about the danger of an on-the-job seizure
with heavy machinery around, the examiner recommended restricting Meza’s work
activities for five years. Unfortunately, the restrictions ruled out a return to his old
position, which left him searching for another job in the meantime.
Meza sued for discrimination. His theory was that Union Pacific suspended
him because it “regarded [him] as having [a] . . . physical or mental impairment,” a
type of disability discrimination. Id. § 12102(3)(A); see id. § 12102(1)(C). Given
the length of the suspension, he believed that Union Pacific treated him differently
because of a perceived disability, rather than out of any risk to himself or others. He

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eventually returned to Union Pacific, but requests back pay for the five years he
missed. See id. § 12112(a).
Meza’s claim did not survive summary judgment. The district court
concluded that Union Pacific had not “regarded” him as currently disabled. Id.
§ 12102(1)(C). Rather, it had placed restrictions on him out of concern about how
the injury would affect him in the future. Meza believes Union Pacific illegally
discriminated against him either way.
II.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing the record in
the light most favorable to [Meza] and drawing all reasonable inferences in [his]
favor.” Morgan-Tyra v. City of St. Louis, 89 F.4th 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2024).
Summary judgment is “appropriate” only “when the evidence . . . shows no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Black v. Swift Pork Co., 113 F.4th 1028, 1031 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted).
A.
This appeal is all about what Union Pacific believed. Under the ADA, a
plaintiff can state a disability-discrimination claim even if the employer “regard[s]
[him] as” disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). Unlike suits based on a present
“physical or mental impairment,” regarded-as claims do not require an employee’s
perceived disability to place a limit on “a major life activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A). In
Meza’s view, Union Pacific’s stated reason for sidelining him—the possibility that
he would suffer seizures following a traumatic brain injury—was all but an
admission by the company that it kept him out of work because it regarded him as
disabled. Under a regarded-as theory, a belief is enough.

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The report from Union Pacific’s medical examiner supports Meza’s argument.
One part of it discusses a chemical “alter[ation]” and “injury” to Meza’s brain that
would result in an “ongoing[,] unacceptably increased risk for seizures and other
neurologic events.” A reasonable jury could interpret this passage as creating a
perception among Union Pacific’s decisionmakers that his brain had become
“impair[ed].” Id. That is, the accident had “[d]iminished, damaged, or weakened”
it. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 878 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining “impaired”); accord Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1131
(2002) (adding “diminish[ed] in quantity, value, excellence, or strength” as a
possible definition).
Whether his brain was truly impaired makes no difference. What is important
is that, based on the report, Union Pacific may have thought it was and acted on its
belief by imposing work restrictions. See Sanders v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 108 F.4th
1055, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2024) (holding that a “concern that [an employee’s] heart
was impaired” was enough for the employer to have “regarded [him] as being
disabled” (emphasis added)); see also Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169,
1182 (11th Cir. 2019) (observing “the common[-]sense principle that an employer
that takes an adverse action because it fears the consequences of an employee’s
medical condition has regarded that employee as disabled”). Through their impact
on the “terms, conditions, [or] privileges” of his employment, a jury could find that
Union Pacific violated the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Union Pacific has a different view of the evidence. It interprets the medical
examiner’s report as merely a warning that seizures may impair him later. For
support, it relies on Morriss v. BNSF Railway Co., which involved an obese man
who applied for a railroad job. 817 F.3d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 2016). The company
declined to hire him because it “perceived . . . his obesity” as a “characteristic” that
could cause him to “develop . . . health risks in the future.” Id. We concluded that
his claim could not succeed because the company did not discriminate against him
“on the basis of a presently existing . . . impairment . . . or the perception of” one.
Id. (emphasis added).

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Morriss is distinguishable from this case in one important way. The record
there showed that the company feared that a current “physical characteristic” could
“eventually lead to a[n] . . . impairment.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, by contrast,
there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether the chemical alteration the
examiner identified was itself an impairment, even if it would only be clear to others
if Meza began having seizures. Like the heart condition from Sanders, the perceived
brain changes here could qualify as an existing physical impairment. See Sanders,
108 F.4th at 1060–61; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); cf. id. § 12102(4)(D)
(establishing that an actual impairment that “is episodic or in remission” still counts
if it “would substantially limit a major life activity when active”).
Changing one simple fact shows why. Suppose that Meza had epilepsy rather
than a traumatic brain injury. Both can cause unpredictable seizures. See 3 The Gale
Encyclopedia of Medicine 1859 (6th ed. 2020) (explaining that “epilepsy” can lead
to “[s]eizures . . . spontaneously[,] without any apparent cause”). No one doubts that
epilepsy is a disability, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“[I]t should be easily
concluded that . . . epilepsy substantially limits neurological function.”), so why
would Meza’s condition be any different? At this stage, at least, Union Pacific has
no answer.
B.
We are remanding for further proceedings, “[b]ut take note of what we do not
say.” Washington v. City of St. Louis, 84 F.4th 770, 774 (8th Cir. 2023). We are not
ruling out the possibility that the district court could grant summary judgment on
another ground it “did not reach.” United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Titan Contractors
Serv., Inc., 751 F.3d 880, 887 (8th Cir. 2014). Open questions include whether Meza
continued to be “qualified” for the job after the motorcycle accident, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a); see Stanley v. City of Sanford, 145 S. Ct. 2058, 2063 (2025), and
whether his injury resulted in a “‘direct threat’ to the health or safety of others in the
workplace,” Sanders, 108 F.4th at 1062 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)). The court

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can “consider th[ese] issue[s]” and others on remand. United Fire, 751 F.3d at 887
(citation omitted).
III.
We accordingly vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
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