United States of America v. Jimmy L. Hudson, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1609
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jimmy L. Hudson, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
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Submitted: April 18, 2025
Filed: July 25, 2025
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Before SMITH, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Jimmy Hudson pled guilty to a drug distribution charge and was sentenced by
the district court1 to 151 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals the substantive
1 The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Missouri.

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reasonableness of his sentence. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
After selling fentanyl to a confidential informant, Hudson was indicted on
drug distribution charges. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to one count
of distributing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The
agreement specifically noted that Hudson might be labeled a career offender for
sentencing purposes—a designation which would increase his United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) range—and that the Government would recommend
a sentence at the low end of the range if he was designated as such. As predicted,
the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), prepared by the United States Probation
Office in anticipation of Hudson’s sentencing, determined Hudson was a career
offender because he “ha[d] at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled
substance offense.” Based in part on this designation, his Guidelines sentencing
range was 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. Neither party objected to the PSR.
The Government, as discussed in the plea agreement, recommended a 151-month
sentence; Hudson asked for 120 months.2
The district court adopted the Government’s recommendation and sentenced
Hudson to 151 months’ imprisonment. After listening to comments from both
Hudson and his counsel about the rehabilitative steps Hudson had taken following
his last stint in federal prison, the district court sentenced Hudson based on the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “the sentencing objectives of just
punishment, general deterrence, and incapacitation,” and the necessity of
“fashion[ing] a sentence that’s sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the
statutory factors.” The court further noted Hudson’s status as a career offender and
noted this was his “third major federal court sentence” in addition to several “other
offenses that are on [his] record.”
2 In the same hearing in which Hudson was sentenced for distributing fentanyl,
he was also sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the terms and
conditions of his supervised release. Because Hudson does not appeal the 24-month
sentence, we address only the 151-month sentence at issue.

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On appeal, Hudson claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The crux of his argument is that, because neither of the previous federal convictions
which subjected him to career offender status were for violent offenses, the
Guidelines range was unfairly high and the district court should have sentenced him
to a below-Guidelines range sentence. “Where, as here, an appellant does not argue
that the district court committed a procedural error,” this Court proceeds “directly to
review the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.” United States v. Werlein,
664 F.3d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “We review
the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.”
United States v. Armond, 135 F.4th 626, 628 (8th Cir. 2025).
Under this deferential standard, “[a] district court abuses its discretion when
it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight;
(2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only
the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of
judgment.” United States v. Holmes, 137 F.4th 734, 743 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation
omitted). It is “the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether
within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively
unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (citation omitted).3
Here, the district court made its decision after reading a sentencing
memorandum, reviewing several letters of support regarding Hudson, and hearing
from both Hudson and his attorney at the sentencing hearing. The court considered
the § 3553(a) factors and concluded that 151 months’ imprisonment—a sentence at
the bottom of the Guidelines range—was appropriate in light of Hudson’s status as
3 When, as here, a sentence is within the Guidelines range, this Court
sometimes applies a “presumption of reasonableness.” See United States v. Vavra,
127 F.4th 737, 745 (8th Cir. 2025). Hudson argues that such a presumption is
inappropriate here. We need not address this argument because even without a
presumption of reasonableness, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Hudson.

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a career offender. This is not “the unusual case” in which the district court imposed
a substantively unreasonable sentence. See id. (citation omitted).
Hudson argues that the district court should have varied downward because,
per Hudson, the career offender enhancement overrepresented his criminal history.
Under the Guidelines, the enhancement applies when a “defendant has at least two
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a). In a 2016 report to Congress, however, the United
States Sentencing Commission “concluded that the career offender directive is best
focused on those offenders who have committed at least one ‘crime of violence’”
and “recommend[ed] that Congress amend the directive to reflect this principle by
no longer including those who currently qualify as career offenders based solely on
drug trafficking offenses.” U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Career
Offender Sentencing Enhancements, at 3 (Aug. 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/criminal-history/20160
7_RtC-Career-Offenders.pdf. The Commission further determined that, because
“[d]rug trafficking only career offenders are not meaningfully different from other
federal drug trafficking offenders,” they “should not categorically be subject to the
significant increases in penalties” associated with career offender status. Id.
Although Congress did not adopt this recommendation, see USSG § 4B1.1, Hudson
argues that because his qualifying federal convictions were both controlled
substance offenses, the career offender designation punished him more than the
Commission intended—and more than he should have been.
To the extent Hudson relies on the Commission’s report,4 his reliance fails for
multiple reasons. First, Hudson did not reference the 2016 report before the district
court. We decline to hold “that the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing
4 Hudson’s reliance on this report featured most prominently in his argument
that the presumption of reasonableness should not apply. Though we need not
determine whether the presumption of reasonableness applies here, we address this
argument to the extent Hudson suggests the report supports his argument for a
downward variance.

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to consider an argument that [Hudson] did not raise, particularly where, as here, the
court would have been obligated only to consider—not to accept—the argument.”
See United States v. Embry, 728 F. App’x 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2018). And second,
Hudson’s reliance on the report is “misplaced” because the report was merely the
Commission’s unsuccessful “attempt[] to convince Congress to amend the career
offender directive to exclude career non-violent drug traffickers” and does not reflect
a policy statement or Congressional judgment regarding the provision. See United
States v. Reed, 731 F. App’x 540, 543-44 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); see also
United States v. Angiolillo, 864 F.3d 30, 36 n.4 (1st Cir. 2017) (labeling the report
as “merely a set of recommendations, without any binding effect”).
Hudson’s broader argument that the district court should have varied
downward is equally unavailing. Hudson claims his individual attributes should
have been considered more thoroughly because he is not a typical violent offender,
but the record shows that the district court considered his individual
characteristics—including eight letters of support. In sentencing Hudson, the court
was not just concerned with the nature of Hudson’s criminal history, but also with
his rate of recidivism and the dangerousness of fentanyl. See generally United States
v. Maluoth, 121 F.4th 1158, 1165 (8th Cir. 2024) (“A district court has ‘wide
latitude’ to weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and to ‘assign some
factors greater weight than others.’” (citation omitted)). The district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that Hudson’s background, characteristics, and
offense merited a 151-month sentence.
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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