United States of America v. Dominic Gregory Lacava

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1750
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Dominic Gregory Lacava
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: April 18, 2025
Filed: July 8, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Dominic Lacava pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). Lacava’s total offense level of 33 combined
with a criminal history category of V resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines
range of 210 to 265 months. Because the sentencing guidelines range exceeded the
statutory maximum sentence of 180 months, the statutory maximum became the

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applicable guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). After considering the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court1 sentenced Lacava to the statutory
maximum. On appeal, Lacava argues that the district court committed procedural
error and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.
We first address whether the district court committed procedural error.
“Procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d
455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
determining whether a district court committed procedural error, “we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its interpretation and application
of the Guidelines, de novo.” United States v. Frisch, 704 F.3d 541, 543 (8th Cir.
2013) (alteration omitted).
Lacava contends that the district court procedurally erred in finding that he
was subject to a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for
possessing three to seven firearms. We need not address the merits of this contention
as Lacava has waived argument on the issue. Prior to sentencing, the United States
Probation Office submitted a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which
attributed a two-level enhancement to Lacava for possessing three to seven firearms.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel initially objected to the two-level
enhancement. However, after conferring with Lacava, defense counsel withdrew
the objection and conceded that Lacava possessed at least three firearms. Because a
defendant who withdraws his objection to facts set forth in the PSR waives any
objection to those facts, United States v. Bowers, 743 F.3d 1182, 1184 (8th Cir.
2014), Lacava has waived any objection to the fact that he possessed at least three
firearms.
1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.

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Next, Lacava asserts that the district court procedurally erred because it found
that he was subject to a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for
possessing a firearm in connection with “another felony offense.” At sentencing,
the detective assigned to investigate Lacava testified that Lacava had sexually
abused one of his girlfriend’s children and physically abused all of her children. He
further testified that the children knew that Lacava possessed firearms in the
residence they shared and that the children had observed Lacava shoot the firearms
on several occasions. Based on this testimony, the district court determined that
Lacava’s possession of the firearms facilitated or had the potential to facilitate his
abuse of the children, which qualified as “another felony offense” under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). See, e.g., Iowa Code § 709.3 (2021) (stating that sexual abuse of
a minor is a class “B” felony). In addition, the district court noted that law
enforcement had located numerous controlled substances in Lacava’s residence, the
firearms had been located in that same residence, and Lacava had conceded that he
had distributed controlled substances from that residence. The district court thus
determined that Lacava’s possession of the firearms facilitated or had the potential
to facilitate his drug distribution and possession activities, each of which qualified
as “another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). See United States v.
Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that a district court must
apply the enhancement if the other felony offense is drug trafficking, and that it may
apply the enhancement if the other felony is simple possession so long as the district
court makes “a finding that the firearm facilitated the drug offense”). We discern no
clear error in the district court’s determinations.
Lacava’s final claim of procedural error is that the district court erred in
denying him a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of
responsibility. We disagree. “As the guidelines note, a defendant who falsely
denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true
has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.” United States
v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1096 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Lacava frivolously contested relevant conduct, including domestic abuse
against his girlfriend, possession of firearms in connection with other felony

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offenses, and gang membership. See United States v. Myrick, 107 F.4th 873, 878
(8th Cir. 2024) (finding no clear error in the district court’s decision to deny a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility because the defendant had “raised factual
objections to nearly every paragraph in the PSR . . . and contested relevant conduct
that was well supported in the record”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). He also
committed nineteen disciplinary violations in prison prior to sentencing. See United
States v. Winters, 411 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the district court
did not clearly err in denying a downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility in part because the defendant had faced disciplinary problems while
in pretrial detention). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
determining that these facts were inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility and
denying Lacava the two-level reduction.
We next address whether the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
under an abuse of discretion standard. Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. A district court
abuses its discretion when it “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have
received significant weight,” “gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
factor,” or “considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors
commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 651
(8th Cir. 2022).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. “If the
defendant’s sentence is within the Guidelines range, then we may, but are not
required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461
(citation modified). Here, the district court sentenced Lacava to 180 months, which
was within his advisory sentencing guidelines range. The sentence was supported
by several aggravating factors, including Lacava’s extensive criminal history and
disciplinary violations in prison prior to sentencing. We discern no abuse of
discretion.

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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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