United States of America v. Raymond Antonio Lewis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1751
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Raymond Antonio Lewis
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
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Submitted: April 18, 2025
Filed: July 24, 2025
[Published]
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Before SMITH, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted Raymond Antonio Lewis of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The

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district court1 sentenced Lewis to 156 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues
that (1) the district court erred in denying his pretrial motions to suppress testimony
and sever the trial, (2) the preindictment delay violated his right to due process under
the Fifth Amendment, (3) the delay between indictment and trial violated his right
to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, and (4) the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual History
On December 20, 2018, Officer John Buford responded to a report that shots
had been fired in the area of 32nd Street and Church Street in West Memphis,
Arkansas. As Officer Buford was driving down Church Street, he spotted a man and
woman walking together. Officer Buford testified that he believed that the man was
“carrying what appeared to be a rifle.” R. Doc. 134, at 21–22.
West Memphis Police Department policy requires officers to activate their
dash cam footage and body microphones when making arrests. The recording system
on the patrol car will automatically illuminate when an officer turns on the blue
emergency lights. Officer Buford did not turn on his lights but continued to approach
the individuals. Officer Buford testified that they “had just had at least three shooting
incidents within a 30-minute period, where one . . . resulted in a homicide.” Id. at
109. Officer Buford admitted that he “didn’t follow the policy.” Id. at 113. Officer
Buford testified that he did not activate the blue lights to maintain a “tactical
advantage” and the “element of surprise” and to avoid the suspects fleeing. Id. at
108.
As Officer Buford’s patrol vehicle approached the individuals, the man
quickly veered toward a ditch that ran perpendicular to Church Street. The woman
continued to walk down the street. After observing this, Officer Buford ordered the
1 The Honorable D. P. Marshall, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.

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man to stop, drew his weapon, and requested backup. Officer Buford testified that
he saw “the rifle . . . laying on the ground next to a silver handgun.” Id. at 24. Officer
Buford exited his vehicle, ordered the man to the ground, and handcuffed him.
Officer Buford then secured the firearms and waited for the other officers to
arrive. Officer Buford identified the man as Raymond Lewis based on his driver’s
license. After radioing in Lewis’s identification, Officer Buford discovered Lewis
had a previous felony conviction and was an “active supervision parolee with a
search waiver on file.” Id. at 30. At that point, Officer Buford arrested Lewis for
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Officer Buford searched Lewis’s person.
He discovered a prescription pill bottle containing suspected ecstasy pills, which
were later determined to be methamphetamine. Lewis also had a bag “contain[ing]
various loose ammunition.” Id. at 32.
B. Procedural History
In May 2021, a grand jury indicted Lewis with one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. In November 2022, the government filed a superseding
indictment that broadened Count I to include possession of a firearm and
ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Additionally, the
new indictment added Count II for possessing methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and Count III for
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A).
Lewis’s initial appearance and arraignment was held on August 4, 2021. After
receiving Lewis’s not guilty plea, the court set Lewis’s jury trial for September 27,
2021. Over the next year, Lewis’s counsel moved for three continuances. For ten
months of this time, Lewis was free on bond until the court granted the government’s
motion to revoke bond on September 29, 2022. On the same day, Lewis’s counsel
moved to withdraw as counsel. The district court granted this request, appointed a
new attorney, and rescheduled the trial for May 30, 2023. On May 3, 2023, Lewis’s
new counsel submitted a motion to suppress and a motion to sever the trial. To have

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time to address the motions, on May 4, the district court entered an order continuing
the trial until June 20, 2023. The order stated that “[t]he [c]ourt must try an older
criminal case starting on 22 May 2023; and the parties’ recent filings in this case
raise issues that need careful consideration and resolution before trial.” R. Doc. 81,
at 1.
The district court held a hearing for the pending motions. Lewis moved to
suppress Officer Buford’s testimony, arguing that his failure to activate his dash
camera and his body microphone violated the police department’s policy and
warranted suppression of Officer Buford’s testimony. The government conceded the
policy violation but argued that it did not warrant suppression of Officer Buford’s
testimony. The district court agreed, finding that “the violation of the policy is not a
sufficient basis to suppress the testimony from the officers.” R. Doc. 138, at 18.
Next, Lewis brought a motion to bifurcate presentation of the proof for the
possession of the firearm from the proof that he had a felony conviction. Lewis
sought this relief to avoid prejudice caused by the admission of his previous
convictions. The government responded with authoritative precedent and
characterized the issue as “open and shut.” Id. at 21. The district court denied the
motion to sever, agreeing that the government was “right on the law.” Id. at 28. The
district court encouraged Lewis to come up with “a stipulation on the prior
convictions.” Id. Ultimately, Lewis stipulated to his felon status. His prior
convictions were not presented to the jury to prove his felon status.2
The district court entered an order denying the evidentiary motions to suppress
and sever on May 25, 2023, and scheduled the jury trial for June 26, 2023. On the
first day of trial, Lewis “raise[d] the issue of speedy trial” for the first time. R. Doc.
133, at 12. Lewis argued that there was an unfair prosecutorial delay because he was
arrested on December 20, 2018, but was not indicted until May 4, 2021. From there,
2 As part of its proof for Count II (possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute), the government did introduce several of Lewis’s past drug convictions
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

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Lewis explained that he “ha[d] been in custody for a year.” Id. at 13. Lewis argued
that “for the last seven months,” defense counsel had been working on the case and
had not sought any continuance. Id. Lewis noted that the court had delayed, in part,
due to “an older case” that it wanted to try first. Id. Lewis asserted this violated “his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.” Id. In response, the district court pointed
out “the earlier continuances . . . [that] were unopposed.” Id. at 15. Moreover,
“defense [counsel] sought several of them, if not all of them, and Mr. Lewis was out
. . . for much of that time on pretrial [release].” Id. Consequently, the district court
denied the motion.
At trial, Officer Buford testified about the events of December 20, 2018. The
officers who arrived on the scene a few minutes later also testified, corroborating
Officer Buford’s account. Moreover, the emergency dispatch log confirmed Officer
Buford’s recall of the sequence of events as the stop progressed. The government
then introduced testimony that the amount of methamphetamine found on Lewis was
consistent with drug distribution. It also offered his prior convictions of drug
distribution under Rule 404(b). Finally, the government provided testimony from
Lewis’s parole officer, who testified that Lewis signed a waiver of his parole
revocation hearing. The waiver admitted to “violat[ing] the . . . conditions of release”
by unlawfully possessing “the weapons and controlled substances” at the time of his
arrest by Officer Buford. R. Doc. 135, at 88.
The defense offered testimony from four witnesses: Antonerica Lewis
(Lewis’s daughter); Tiffany Lewis (Lewis’s niece); Ricky Lewis (Lewis’s cousin);
and Shuntrail King (the father of Tiffany’s children). They all testified that they did
not see Lewis with any guns or drugs that evening and that they only remembered
seeing Lewis holding “his Bible.” See id. at 188; see also id. at 207, 227, 236.
Following the cross-examination of these witnesses, both parties rested. It fell to the
jury to determine whether Lewis carried weapons, ammunition, and controlled
substances or only a Bible on December 20, 2018.

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The jury returned guilty verdicts for Count I (possession of the firearms and
ammunition) and Count II (possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute). However, the jury acquitted Lewis of Count III (possessing firearms in
furtherance of drug distribution). At sentencing, the district court imposed a below-
Guidelines sentence of 156 months’ imprisonment, which Lewis does not challenge
on appeal.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Lewis argues that (1) the district court erred in denying his pretrial
motions, (2) the government violated his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment by delaying his indictment, (3) the district court violated his speedy trial
rights under the Sixth Amendment by delaying the trial, and (4) the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.
A. Motion to Suppress
Lewis argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress Officer Buford’s testimony. He asserts that Officer Buford’s admitted
department policy violation of not activating his dash camera and body microphone
required exclusion of his testimony. In support, Lewis relies on generic principles of
“best evidence,” see United States v. Gibson, 366 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2018),
and the government’s duty to produce exculpatory evidence, see California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). He does not, however, allege a constitutional
violation. He instead contends that a department-policy violation is sufficient to
exclude the officer’s testimony. We disagree. “The exclusionary rule is a blunt
instrument and for that reason courts should be wary in extending the exclusionary
rule in search and seizure cases to violations which are not of constitutional
magnitude.” United States v. Hornbeck, 118 F.3d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1997) (cleaned
up) (holding that district court properly denied a motion to suppress that was based
solely on alleged violations of tribal law with no alleged constitutional violation).
The officer’s decision not to activate his car’s lights and video recording system did
not require exclusion of his subsequent personal observations made at the scene.

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B. Motion to Sever
Lewis argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the
trial.3 Lewis requested that the court “bifurcate[e] the trial to allow the jury to
consider . . . the issue of possession of the firearm, and then if Lewis is found guilty[],
. . . allow the government to present its evidence of the prior convictions.” R. Doc.
79, at 2. We review denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Reichel, 911 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2018). The defendant must show that
the reversal resulted in “severe prejudice, that is, if the defendant would have had
‘an appreciable chance for an acquittal’ in a severed trial.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir. 2017)).
A defendant is not automatically entitled to bifurcation of a felon-in-
possession charge. See United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125–26 (8th Cir.
1996). In fact, “every appellate court that has addressed whether a single count
indictment under § 922(g)(1) should be entitled to a bifurcated trial has rejected the
idea.” United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 244 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (collecting
cases), abrogated on other grounds by, United States v. Adams, 36 F.4th 137 (3d
Cir. 2022). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s motion
to bifurcate proof for Count I. Lewis “stipulate[d] that he is and knew he was a
convicted felon.” R. Doc. 134, at 7. As a result, Lewis’s previous convictions were
not presented to the jury to prove his felon status, and he suffered no prejudice from
having the counts tried together.
3 In his briefing, Lewis contends that the district court also erred in failing to
sever the felon-in-possession charge with his other counts. However, in his motion
in the district court, “Lewis request[ed] the court to sever or bifurcate on the issue
of possession of a firearm.” R. Doc. 79, at 4. During the hearing, Lewis reiterated
his request to “have just a trial . . . on the issue of the possession.” R. Doc. 138, at
20. Lewis never requested separate trials for his felon-in-possession charge and his
remaining charges. Therefore, “failure to raise the issue before the district court
constitutes a waiver.” Ingrassia v. Schafer, 719 Fed. App’x 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2018)
(unpublished per curiam) (citing O’Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1201–02
(8th Cir. 1990)).

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C. Speedy Trial
Lewis alleges that (1) the government’s preindictment delay violated his Fifth
Amendment right to due process and that (2) the district court’s postponement of his
trial for docket management purposes violated his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial.4
1. Preindictment Delay
Lewis alleges that the time between his arrest and his indictment was a delay
that ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. We review a district
court’s findings as to preindictment delay and any resulting prejudice for clear error.
See United States v. Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal
defendant against unreasonable pre-indictment delay.” Id. at 451–52. To prove such
a violation, Lewis “must establish that: (1) the delay resulted in actual and substantial
prejudice to the presentation of the defense; and (2) the government intentionally
delayed his indictment either to gain a tactical advantage or to harass him.” Id. at
452. Actual prejudice requires that “a defendant must specifically identify witnesses
or documents lost during delay properly attributable to the government.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1986)). “It is not sufficient
for a defendant to make speculative or conclusory claims of possible prejudice as a
result of the passage of time.” Id.
4 Additionally, Lewis attempts to allege a violation of the Speedy Trial Act in
his briefing. However, below, Lewis never alleged a violation of the Speedy Trial
Act and only contended that Lewis’s “Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial ha[d]
been violated.” R. Doc. 133, at 13. Failure to raise the Speedy Trial Act before the
district court is fatal to Lewis’s claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); see also United
States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that defendant’s
failure to make any claim based on the Act at trial was fatal to her claim because her
motion to dismiss below was based solely on the Sixth Amendment).

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First, Lewis is unable to show that the preindictment delay actually and
substantially prejudiced him. Lewis alleges that the delay affected Officer Buford’s
testimony. He references multiple instances when the officer could not remember
specific details from December 20, 2018. However, Lewis makes no attempt to show
how the forgotten details that he mentions were material or how their absence
substantially prejudiced him. Officer Buford was unable to recall “the exact streets
that [he] patrolled” on the night of the arrest, see R. Doc. 134, at 62, whether it was
Officer Buford or another officer who “asked [Lewis] for his I.D.,” see id. at 80,
what happened to the “plastic trash bag” that was holding ammunition, see id. at 83,
and other details. Without showing the materiality of these details, any doubt as to
them went only to the officer’s credibility. The officer’s credibility was the jury’s
call. In addition, Lewis does not establish that the government intentionally delayed
the indictment to gain a tactical advantage over him or to harass him. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based
on the preindictment delay.
2. Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Violation
Next, Lewis raised a speedy trial violation under the Sixth Amendment. “We
review the district court’s findings of fact on whether a defendant’s right to
a speedy trial was violated for clear error but review its legal conclusions de novo.”
United States v. Cooley, 63 F.4th 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest or indictment,
whichever comes first, and continues until the trial commences.” United States v.
Johnson, 990 F.3d 661, 670 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Generally, an
“[a]ssessment of whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has
been violated includes consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the

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delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” United
States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2002).
“However, ‘to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the
interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary
from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.’” Id. (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505
U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)). In Lewis’s case, it does. Generally, a delay over a year
has been found to be presumptively prejudicial. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1
(noting that lower courts have usually found delay approaching one year to be
presumptively prejudicial); United States v. Walker, 92 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 1996)
(finding that a delay of 37 months was “sufficient to trigger the speedy trial
analysis”); United States v. Maloney, 102 F.4th 904, 917 (8th Cir. 2024) (finding
that a delay of 17 months was sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis). Here,
the time between formal charges and trial was just over two years and therefore is
sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis.
Next, we consider the reason for the delay. Lewis does not dispute that his
own motions accounted for the majority of the delay. Lewis filed three separate
continuance motions and requested that his counsel be replaced as trial approached.
The only other delay occurred when the district court postponed the trial date to
allow it to address Lewis’s pretrial motions and to conduct a scheduled trial in an
older criminal case. After deciding Lewis’s motions, the district court’s delay
associated with the older criminal case accounted for only 32 days. The remainder
of the two-year delay was attributable to Lewis himself. See United States v. Flores-
Lagonas, 993 F.3d 550, 563 (8th Cir. 2021) (“There typically will be no Sixth
Amendment violation when the defendant was responsible for most of the delay
. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The third factor requires us to consider whether Lewis asserted his right to a
speedy trial. See Sprouts, 282 F.3d at 1042. Here, Lewis did raise a speedy trial
violation objection before the trial began, but “he waited until the first day of trial to
do so” and otherwise “made no attempt to have his case brought to trial sooner.”

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United States v. Shepard, 462 F.3d 847, 864 (8th Cir. 2006). Lewis requested three
of the continuances and did not oppose the district court’s order to postpone the trial
for the fourth time until the first day of trial. See Johnson, 990 F.3d at 671 (holding
that defendant “only weakly asserted her speedy trial right” because “although she
eventually moved to dismiss, she failed to oppose the four continuances”).
Finally, we consider the prejudice to the defendant. See Sprouts, 282 F.3d at
1042. The Supreme Court has recognized that this prejudice can include “oppressive
pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the
accused’s defense will be impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory
evidence.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 (cleaned up). “[T]he inability of a defendant
[to] adequately . . . prepare his case” is the most serious form of prejudice. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Lewis was only in custody for ten months of the
two-year delay period, and Lewis does not allege any emotional or physical harm
caused by the delay. Instead, Lewis claims that the passage of time affected his
ability to make his defense. However, he does not support this assertion with specific
facts indicating any time-related detriment to his case. “In cases without government
negligence, . . . we have required the defendant to show actual or specific prejudice.”
Flores-Lagonas, 993 F.3d at 565. As discussed previously, Lewis’s reliance on
Officer Buford’s occasional lapse in memory on inconsequential details was not
sufficient to show actual prejudice. He fails to explain how the omission of those
details hindered his defense or would have led to exculpatory evidence. Based on
the consideration of the factors, the district court did not err in determining that the
delay did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lewis alleges that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to
support his verdict. We disagree.
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo . . . . view[ing] the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and revers[ing] only if ‘no
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

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United States v. Hoeft, 128 F.4th 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting United States v. Blair, 93 F.4th 1080, 1085 (8th Cir. 2024)).
At trial, Officer Buford testified as to the events on December 20, 2018.
Officer Buford said that he saw Lewis with a “rifle,” see R. Doc. 134, at 22, and
upon searching him found ammunition and controlled substances. The government
presented the dispatch log record to confirm this account. The government also
introduced into evidence Lewis’s admission in his waiver of a parole revocation
hearing. Lewis admitted that he violated his parole conditions by possessing
weapons and controlled substances. Lewis presented counter testimony by several
witnesses that Lewis was only seen carrying “his Bible.” R. Doc. 135, at 188. Lewis
cross-examined Officer Buford as to his narrative of events, challenging his
recollection and credibility. The jury was left to decide the credibility of all these
witnesses. We have said that these types of “credibility determinations are virtually
unreviewable on appeal.” United States v. May, 70 F.4th 1064, 1076 (8th Cir. 2023)
(quoting United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 2010)). “[C]onflicting
evidence . . . affords no basis for reversal without more.” United States v. Cathey,
997 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the jury
heard conflicting testimony as to what Lewis was holding when Officer Buford
approached him. The jury was empowered to weigh this testimony. If believed, the
evidence presented sufficiently supported the guilty verdicts.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
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