United States of America v. Britt Arthur Lander

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2194
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Britt Arthur Lander
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa
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Submitted: March 19, 2025
Filed: July 21, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
After a police officer informed Britt Lander of his right to counsel during a
custodial interrogation, Lander laughed and stated, “My old lady is my attorney, I
want her present.” The officer refused to let Lander contact his “old lady” and
continued the interrogation, during which Lander admitted to his involvement in
methamphetamine trafficking. Lander unsuccessfully sought to suppress his
incriminating statement, and a jury convicted him of conspiring to distribute

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methamphetamine after having previously been convicted of a felony drug offense.
On appeal, Lander challenges the denials of his motions to suppress and for a new
trial and contends the district court1 erred in sentencing him. We affirm.
I. Background
In June 2022, Alcester Police Department Chief Austin Schuller performed a
traffic stop on Lander’s vehicle and discovered drug paraphernalia and small baggies
of methamphetamine. Chief Schuller informed Lander of his Miranda rights and
took him to the Alcester Police Department for questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). At the station, South Dakota Criminal Investigation Agent
Ryan Pennock read Lander his Miranda rights again. After Agent Pennock informed
Lander that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one, Lander stated,
“I can’t afford sh*t.” Agent Pennock reiterated that counsel would be appointed to
represent him and that Lander did not have to answer any of his questions. Lander
responded by laughing and saying, “My old lady is my attorney, I want her present.”
Lander explained that he wanted his “old lady” present because he trusted her, but
Agent Pennock did not allow Lander to contact her. Agent Pennock told Lander he
could tell her about the questioning afterwards and proceeded to interrogate Lander.
During this recorded interview, Lander identified three individuals involved
in drug trafficking — Hugo Torres, José Duenas-Topete, and Isidro Jaramillo — and
discussed purchasing methamphetamine from them for approximately two years.
After initially denying selling drugs, Lander eventually remarked that he did not sell
to many people. Lander also admitted to helping Duenas-Topete take apart a tire
containing six to eight pounds of methamphetamine. At times during the traffic stop
and subsequent interview, Lander showed signs of nervousness and drug use, but he
answered the officer’s questions appropriately and did not appear to be confused.
1 The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa, who was Chief Judge at the time of the suppression
hearing and trial.

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Officers testified Lander’s signs of methamphetamine use were not enough to be
considered driving under the influence.
Lander was subsequently indicted for conspiring to distribute
methamphetamine after having previously been convicted of a felony drug offense.
He moved to suppress his statements, arguing he was too intoxicated and sleep-
deprived to voluntarily waive his rights and that he invoked his right to counsel when
he requested the presence of his “old lady.” Lander testified at the suppression
hearing that he had been released from jail seven days before the stop, had steadily
used methamphetamine over that week, and did not recall sleeping during that time.
Chief Schuller and Agent Pennock testified that Lander appeared nervous and
possibly intoxicated but they did not believe he was unable to understand them. The
district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding Lander’s will was not
overborne since he understood what was happening and did not appear to be overly
fatigued or intoxicated. As to his claimed invocation of the right to counsel, the
district court determined Lander’s request for the presence of his “old lady” was not
a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney.
In addition to introducing Lander’s incriminating statements, the government
called two of the co-conspirators Lander identified in his police interview to testify
against him at trial. The co-conspirators testified that Lander had purchased several
pounds of methamphetamine from them and had assisted on occasion in unpacking
and storing the drugs. The quantities they cited at trial were generally larger than
the amounts identified in their earlier statements to law enforcement and those
Lander admitted he possessed in his interview. Video and photo evidence seized
from Duenas-Topete’s phone showed Lander removing “kilo-type” packages of
methamphetamine out of a tire. An agent also testified an undercover officer had
purchased six pounds of methamphetamine from Jaramillo, a confidential source
obtained ten pounds from Torres, and Lander had been present during both buys.
The jury convicted Lander on the single count. Lander moved for a judgment
of acquittal and a new trial, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict because

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it relied on unreliable testimony from cooperating witnesses. The district court
denied these motions, noting the cooperating witnesses’ testimony was generally
consistent with each other and supported by video evidence and Lander’s statements.
At sentencing, Lander challenged the presentence investigation report’s (PSR)
findings as to the drug quantity because he claimed the findings depended on
unreliable testimony from cooperating witnesses. He also argued he was entitled to
a reduction in his offense level as a minor participant in the conspiracy. The district
court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 360 months of imprisonment,
the bottom of his advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (Guidelines).
II. Analysis
On appeal, Lander contests the denial of his motions to suppress and for a new
trial. He also challenges his sentence, claiming the district court erred in its
Guidelines calculation and that it imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.
We affirm.
A. Motion to Suppress
Lander first argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements he made while in custody after his traffic stop. He claims that he did not
validly waive his Miranda rights because he was too inebriated and sleep-deprived
to voluntarily consent and that he invoked his right to counsel when he requested to
speak to his “old lady.” We apply a mixed standard of review to the denial of a
motion to suppress evidence: the district court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo while the factual findings underlying those conclusions are reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Figueroa-Serrano, 971 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2020).
Though Lander was informed of his Miranda rights, he claims he did not
provide a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver because he had used
methamphetamine and had not slept in several days prior to the questioning. A

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defendant’s “waiver is voluntary if it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” United States v. Gaddy, 532 F.3d
783, 788 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 643 (8th
Cir. 2006)). We consider the “totality of the circumstances and must determine
whether the individual’s will was overborne.” Id. (quoting United States v. Castro-
Higuero, 473 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2007)). While sleeplessness and drug use are
relevant to this analysis, they “do not automatically render a confession
involuntary.” Id. (quoting United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir.
1990)). Indeed, “we have upheld the conclusion that a suspect who recently used
methamphetamine and had not slept for five days voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights where police officers testified that they had no knowledge of these alleged
impairments and the suspect did not act intoxicated.” Id. (citing Casal, 915 F.2d at
1229). Likewise, an intoxicated defendant validly waived his rights when he “had
previous experience with law enforcement” and “spoke in a manner which indicated
he understood what was happening.” United States v. Howard, 532 F.3d 755, 763
(8th Cir. 2008).
At the suppression hearing, Lander testified that he had consumed ten to
twelve grams of methamphetamine in the week prior to the traffic stop and that he
did not recall sleeping that week. Officers noticed signs consistent with using
methamphetamine, such as Lander’s nervousness, body tension, and difficulties
sitting still, but they also explained they did not think his behavior indicated he was
impaired enough as to have been driving under the influence. Lander did not tell
officers about his lack of sleep, and the officers testified that they did not see any
signs of fatigue. Moreover, Lander gave appropriate responses during the interview
to the officers, did not appear to be confused or unable to think clearly, and had prior
experience with law enforcement. Based on these unchallenged factual findings, the
district court did not err in concluding Lander’s waiver was voluntary rather than the
result of his will being overborne. See Gaddy, 532 F.3d at 788.
Next, Lander claims questioning should have ceased because he invoked his
right to counsel. This alleged invocation occurred when Agent Pennock read Lander

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his Miranda rights for the second time and stated, “My old lady is my attorney, I
want her present.” Agent Pennock rejected Lander’s request and started
interrogating him. Lander contends he invoked his right to counsel because he
clearly requested the presence of his partner, who is not an attorney but whom he
considered to be his legal advisor.
When a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he “cannot be questioned
regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually present.” Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994). But “we have consistently held that only a clear and
unequivocal request for the assistance of counsel may serve to invoke a defendant’s
right.” United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 630 (8th Cir. 2003). This is an objective
test, meaning we consider whether the defendant “articulate[d] his desire to have
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. If “the officers conducting the questioning reasonably do
not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer,” they can continue the
interrogation. Id. at 459–60. Jokes about wanting an attorney are also insufficient
to invoke one’s right to counsel. See United States v. Giboney, 863 F.3d 1022, 1029–
30 (8th Cir. 2017).
We conclude a reasonable officer in these circumstances would not have
understood Lander’s statement that his “old lady is [his] attorney” and that he
“want[ed] her present” as a request for an attorney. Lander’s claim that his old lady
was his lawyer was made in a joking manner after he made multiple prior requests
to contact her. Several times during the traffic stop, Lander asked Chief Schuller if
he could call his partner, whom he referred to as both his girlfriend and his old lady.
Almost immediately after Agent Pennock introduced himself and started his
interview at the police station, Lander again requested to call his old lady or have
Agent Pennock call her. Lander stated he wanted to talk to her so she could calm
him down and that he did not want to make any decisions without her. Shortly
thereafter, Agent Pennock read Lander his Miranda rights, including his right to
appointed counsel, and Lander made his claimed invocation. Lander laughed while

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claiming his old lady was his attorney, and Agent Pennock responded by explaining
why interview protocol would not allow Lander’s old lady to be present while they
discussed possible cooperation due to concerns that multiple people would be unable
to keep a secret. Agent Pennock’s response indicated he did not understand Lander
to have asked for an attorney, and Lander made no other statements to change this
impression. Instead, Lander remarked that he trusted his partner and that she could
keep a secret. Lander ultimately acknowledged he understood why Agent Pennock
denied his request and explained he had asked for her presence so she could calm
him down. In this context, a reasonable officer would not have interpreted Lander’s
remarks as a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney. Rather, Lander asked
for the presence of a non-attorney whom he jokingly claimed was his attorney.
Lander’s request for the presence of a trusted lay person is not an invocation
that requires a custodial interrogation to cease. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459–60, 462;
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718–19, 722 (1979). As the Supreme Court has
explained, Miranda is “based on the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary
system of criminal justice” as a “protector of the legal rights of that person in his
dealings with the police and the courts.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 719. This “pivotal role
of legal counsel . . . distinguishes the request for counsel from the request for a
probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend.” Id. at 722. A non-lawyer friend
or spouse “is not in a position to advise the accused as to his legal rights” to help
him navigate the interrogation. See id. at 719. The existence of a trusted relationship
between the suspect and the non-attorney does not show that person “is capable of
rendering effective legal advice sufficient to protect the [suspect’s] rights during
interrogation by the police, or of providing the other services rendered by a lawyer.”
Id. at 722. As a result, a request for a lay person whom a suspect “considered
trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice” is insufficient to invoke the right to
counsel. See id. at 723. “Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney,
questioning may continue.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.
We therefore conclude the district court did not err in denying Lander’s
motion to suppress his statements.

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B. Motion for a New Trial
Lander next argues the district court should have granted his motion for a new
trial because the government’s case was based on cooperating witnesses who gave
inconsistent testimony. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial based on
the weight of the evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dodd, 391 F.3d
930, 934 (8th Cir. 2004). When considering a motion for a new trial, the district
court can “weigh the evidence, disbelieve witnesses, and grant a new trial even when
there is substantial evidence to sustain a verdict.” United States v. Dowty, 964 F.3d
703, 708 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Amaya, 731 F.3d 761, 764 (8th
Cir. 2013)). These motions are disfavored and should be granted “only if the
evidence weighs heavily enough against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may
have occurred.” Id. (quoting United States v. Delacruz, 865 F.3d 1000, 1006 (8th
Cir. 2017)). We reverse the denial of a motion for a new trial if the district court
“fails to consider a factor that should have been given significant weight, considers
and gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commits a clear
error of judgment in considering and weighing only proper factors.” Amaya, 731
F.3d at 764 (quoting Dodd, 391 F.3d at 934).
Lander argues the district court erred by concluding the testimony of Torres
and Duenas-Topete, two co-conspirators turned cooperating witnesses, was credible
because they “had clear incentives to testify in a way that would benefit themselves”
and provided inconsistent testimony as to the quantity of methamphetamine they
distributed to Lander. Although the district court may disbelieve witnesses in its
evaluation of a motion for a new trial, Dowty, 964 F.3d at 708, generally “[w]e
decline to second-guess that court’s evaluation of witness credibility” on appeal, see
Delacruz, 865 F.3d at 1006. There is no basis to depart from that practice here. Even
if the government’s “witnesses were motivated by the potential for leniency, were
memory-impaired from past drug use, and provided some inconsistent statements”
the district court is not required to discredit their testimony and grant a new trial. Id.
Moreover, “[w]e have repeatedly upheld jury verdicts based solely on the testimony
of conspirators and cooperating witnesses.” Id. (quoting United States v. Buckley,

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525 F.3d 629, 632 (8th Cir. 2008)). While some details changed in their stories, the
cooperating witnesses told a consistent narrative tying Lander to the drug
conspiracy, which was corroborated by testimony from government agents, Lander’s
own statement to authorities, and photo and video evidence. Indeed, Lander
admitted to purchasing methamphetamine from Torres and Duenas-Topete, among
others, and to helping Duenas-Topete unload a tire containing several pounds of
methamphetamine. This evidence, combined with the district court’s credibility
determination, strongly supported the conclusion that Lander knew of and joined a
drug trafficking conspiracy. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Lander’s motion for a new trial. See id.
C. Sentencing
Lander also argues the district court erred in calculating his offense level
under the Guidelines and by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. “We
review a sentence in two parts: first, we review for significant procedural error, such
as an improper calculation of the advisory sentencing guidelines range; and second,
absent significant procedural error, we review for substantive reasonableness.”
United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 940 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States
v. Barker, 556 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Lander claims the district court’s drug quantity calculation was based on
unreliable evidence and that he was entitled to a minor role adjustment. We need
not resolve Lander’s challenges to the Guidelines calculation because, even if he
were correct, any alleged error was harmless because his advisory sentencing range
would remain unchanged. See id. at 941. Based on the district court’s rejections of
his arguments, he had an offense level of 38, which resulted in a Guidelines range
of 360 months to life based on his criminal history category. In addition to Lander’s
offense level calculated under his offense-specific guideline, he was subject to a
career offender enhancement, which established a floor for his offense level. See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), (b). Lander does not contest that the career offender
enhancement applies to him. Since the statutory maximum sentence for Lander’s

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conviction was life imprisonment, his Guidelines range would still be 360 months
to life, even with a lower drug quantity and a minor role reduction, due to the career
offender provision. See id.
Finally, Lander claims his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review
the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Sigillito, 759
F.3d at 940. “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a
relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant
weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate
factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
Lander fails to overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded to his sentence
of 360 months of imprisonment, the bottom of his Guidelines range. See id. at 941.
The district court extensively considered the relevant sentencing factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and addressed Lander’s arguments in favor of mitigation. It noted
the trial evidence showed “Lander was involved in the distribution of
methamphetamine in significant quantities for a period of years.” Lander had an
extensive criminal history, including two prior convictions for conspiring to
manufacture or distribute methamphetamine. One of those was a federal conviction
for which the district court had twice revoked his supervised release for lying to his
probation officer and violating state law, among other things. The district court
remarked that this newest instance of drug trafficking began shortly after his term of
supervision ended. Based on this history, the district court concluded Lander “had
multiple opportunities through his various convictions and prison sentences over the
years” to rehabilitate himself, but instead “when he’s not in jail[,] [h]e sells
methamphetamine.” While the district court agreed there were some mitigating
factors present, it could not “find anything less than 360 months to be a sufficient
sentence in this case.” Given the district court’s consideration of the relevant factors,
it did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Long, 906 F.3d 720, 727–28 (8th
Cir. 2018). Lander’s arguments that the district court should have weighed the
factors in a different manner are unavailing. See id.

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III. Conclusion
We affirm Lander’s conviction and sentence.
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