Cloetta Brady v. Walmart Stores East I, LP; Walmart Stores East, LP

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2408
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Cloetta Brady
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Walmart Stores East I, LP; Walmart Stores East, LP
Defendants
Walmart Stores, Inc.; Walmart, Inc.
Defendants - Appellees
WalMart #0017
Defendant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin
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Submitted: June 10, 2025
Filed: July 21, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
Cloetta Brady, a former Walmart employee, sought and was denied a
promotion. As relevant here, she brought a disparate treatment claim against
Walmart Stores, Inc. and Walmart, Inc. (collectively “Walmart”), alleging sex
discrimination for failure to promote, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The district court1 granted summary
judgment to Walmart. Brady appeals, and we affirm.
I. Background
In 1987, Brady began her career with Walmart as a stocker and checker at a
Walmart store located in Neosho, Missouri. Beginning in 1990, she served as a
claims associate for the store, a position which she held until her employment with
Walmart ended in 2008.
In June 2007, the Neosho store opened a position as a daytime support
manager, and Brady was interested in applying. Another Walmart employee, Mike
Harms, was also interested. Walmart required applicants for support manager
positions to pass an aptitude test called the Supervisory Leadership Assessment
(“SLA”). However, employees who had been serving in hourly supervisor positions,
including as support managers, since before the introduction of the SLA in 2006
were not required to take the SLA to qualify. At the time, neither Brady nor Harms
had passed the SLA, but Harms was serving as a nighttime support manager. Thus,
Harms met this minimum qualification, but Brady did not. The hiring manager,
Henry Wallace, selected Harms for the position in July 2007.
At the time, Charles Cornelison served as store manager of the Neosho
Walmart. Brady testified that, after initially telling Cornelison about her interest in
1 The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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the support manager position, he told her that he was not going to fill the position.
She also testified that, around two weeks after Harms received the promotion,
Cornelison explained that Harms was given the position “because he was sick” and
“had a family to support.”
Following these events, Brady joined a putative nationwide class action
lawsuit against Walmart that alleged sex discrimination in pay and promotion in
violation of Title VII. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
The Supreme Court reversed the class certification for failure to satisfy Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Id. at 359. The former
Dukes class members were permitted to file charges of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and Brady timely filed hers.
Years later, in 2021, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. Brady sued Walmart in
Missouri state court, and Walmart removed the action to federal court. Brady
asserted several claims, most of which were dismissed. Walmart then sought
summary judgment on Brady’s remaining claims: disparate treatment in promotion,
disparate impact in promotion, and discrimination in pay, all in violation of Title
VII. The district court granted Walmart’s motion for summary judgment. Brady
appeals, challenging only the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her
claim of disparate treatment in promotion due to sex discrimination.
II. Discussion
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and affirming only if there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Huber v. Westar Foods, Inc., 139 F.4th 615, 620 (8th Cir. 2025)
(en banc). “[A] plaintiff may survive the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment” on a Title VII claim “in one of two ways.” Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1044 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “The first is by proof of
‘direct evidence’ of discrimination,” where the term “direct” “refers to the causal
strength of the proof” proffered by the plaintiff. Id. “But if the plaintiff lacks

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evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive,” she can avoid
summary judgment only “by creating the requisite inference of unlawful
discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient
evidence of pretext.” Id.; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
A. Direct Evidence of Discrimination
We first consider whether Brady presented direct evidence of employment
discrimination. Direct evidence of employment discrimination “is evidence showing
a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged
decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an
illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” Towery v.
Miss. Cnty. Ark. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n, Inc., 1 F.4th 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Brady asserts that Cornelison’s remark that Harms was hired as the support
manager “because he was sick” and “had a family to support” constitutes direct
evidence of sex discrimination. According to Brady, the comment reflects sex
stereotypes about men as breadwinners. We addressed a similar situation in
Torgerson, where a female plaintiff alleged sex discrimination in hiring by the city’s
fire department, in violation of Title VII, where the fire commissioner commented
to a city council member that his preferred candidate “was a big guy and that he’d
make a good firefighter.” 643 F.3d at 1036, 1045. The court contrasted that
statement with statements that the court in earlier cases found to be direct evidence
of sex discrimination. Such comments included: “a woman can’t handle [the
administrator’s] job,” id. at 1046 (alteration in original) (quoting Simmons v. New
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 251 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 2001)), and “women in
sales were the worst thing to happen to the company,” id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1318 (8th Cir.
1994)). The court concluded that the fire commissioner’s statement “is not direct
evidence of discrimination” because it “does not relate to [the plaintiff], or to the

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abilities of female applicants.” Id. Accordingly, the court upheld a grant of
summary judgment to the city-employer on that claim. Id. at 1036.
We conclude that Cornelison’s statement does not constitute direct evidence
of sex discrimination. “Direct evidence does not include statements by
decisionmakers that are facially and contextually neutral.” Id. at 1045;2 see also
Guimaraes v. SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 974 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that
“neutral statements, without more, do not demonstrate animus on the part of the
speaker”). Cornelison’s comment that Harms “was sick” and “had a family to
support” was facially and contextually neutral as to sex. On its face, the comment
neither related to Brady nor “to the abilities of female applicants” to perform in the
support manager role. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1046. Further, Brady has not
alleged any other facts from which a juror could conclude that Cornelison was
motivated by sex discrimination. Indeed, in her own deposition testimony, Brady
admitted that Cornelison never made any derogatory comments towards her
regarding her sex or gender. Taken together, Brady has not established “a specific
link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,” and
thus has not presented direct evidence of sex discrimination. See Towery, 1 F.4th at
573.
Brady contends that this conclusion conflicts with decisions from several
other circuits, but we disagree. She first points to Back v. Hastings On Hudson
Union Free School District, in which a school psychologist who was denied tenure
and terminated alleged that, after she returned from maternity leave, her superior
made multiple comments discouraging her from having more children and
suggesting that her profession conflicted with her responsibilities as a mother. 365
F.3d 107, 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit held that “stereotyping of
2 Because we conclude that Cornelison’s statements themselves do not
constitute direct evidence of discrimination, we need not additionally decide whether
he was a “decisionmaker” whose statements are even capable of constituting direct
evidence of sex discrimination. See Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 13 F.4th 681,
693 (8th Cir. 2021).

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women as caregivers”—including through “stereotypical remarks about the
incompatibility of motherhood and employment”—“can by itself and without more
be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.” Id. at 122. Unlike in our case,
the comments at issue in Back were facially non-neutral as to sex because they
explicitly referenced the plaintiff’s womanhood and motherhood. Our holding is not
in tension with the Second Circuit.
Brady next cites Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit held
that a woman who was denied overtime work opportunities “because she did not
have a family to support” had a colorable Title VII claim. 299 F.3d 838, 861 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). The plaintiff was subject to “sexual
language and epithets,” including multiple occasions when her supervisor stated that
he wanted to “get rid of that bitch” and comments such as “[y]ou got more balls than
the guys.” Id. (alteration in original). The plaintiff also received harsher discipline
than her male counterparts. Id. at 845. Unlike in our case, the family support
statement in Costa was contextually non-neutral as to sex in light of the extensive
evidence that the plaintiff faced sex-based mistreatment. Brady, however, has not
alleged any facts suggesting that Cornelison’s family support remark was
discriminatory in context. Our holding therefore does not conflict with the Ninth
Circuit either.
Brady also argues that our conclusion conflicts with two Eleventh Circuit
cases. In Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, a female college math teacher alleged
that the school restricted her from maintaining additional employment even though
male teachers were not similarly restricted. 752 F.2d 558, 559 (11th Cir. 1985). She
claimed that a college administrator explained that “males had families and needs
that [she] did not have.” Id. at 561. However, this case is distinct from ours because
the college administrator explicitly stated a view that men have more financial
responsibilities than do women, and thus was facially non-neutral as to sex.
Finally, Brady points to Taylor v. Runyon, in which a female United States
Postal Service worker was passed over for a promotion in favor of a male employee.

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175 F.3d 861, 863-64 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff alleged that the decisionmaker
explained to her that the male “was a married man with a wife and children to
support” and that he “needed the money more” than she did. Id. at 864, 866. The
court held that the plaintiff had a colorable Title VII claim. Id. at 868. This holding
does not conflict with ours, however, because the Eleventh Circuit based its decision
on the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. at 866-68 (concluding that a jury could
disbelieve the Postal Service’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring the
male). The court did not hold that the statement at issue was sufficiently strong
evidence of sex discrimination so as to obviate the need to apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework.3 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044. Our holding that Brady
failed to present direct evidence of sex discrimination does not conflict with the
Eleventh Circuit.
3 While it is true that the Eleventh Circuit in Taylor suggested “that the type of
statement at issue here constitutes direct evidence,” Taylor, 175 F.3d at 867, it
referred to “direct evidence” as the converse of circumstantial evidence. Id. n.2. In
the context of a Title VII suit, however, “direct evidence” can also take on a meaning
that “is not the converse of circumstantial evidence.” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044.
Rather, the term “‘direct’ refers to the causal strength” of the proffered evidence of
discrimination, such that when the evidence is sufficiently “direct,” or strong, the
plaintiff need not rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework to prevail at summary
judgment. Id. This is the sense in which we use the term. These distinct meanings
can cause confusion in Title VII disputes because strong circumstantial evidence of
discrimination is “direct” in one sense but not “direct” in another. See id. at 1053
(Colloton, J., concurring) (noting that “confusion . . . has arisen from efforts to apply
a ‘direct evidence’ standard” in the Title VII context); see also Ames v. Ohio Dep’t
of Youth Servs., 145 S. Ct. 1540, 1553, 1554-55 (2025) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(explaining that “mak[ing] the often subtle and difficult distinction between ‘direct’
and ‘indirect’ or ‘circumstantial’ evidence” in the Title VII context “has created
outsized judicial confusion”). Because Taylor used the term “direct evidence” in a
different sense than we do here, our holdings do not conflict. More concretely, our
conclusion that Brady’s proffered evidence was not sufficient to support a finding
of sex discrimination without reliance on the McDonnell Douglas framework does
not conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion in Taylor that the plaintiff’s
proffered evidence was not circumstantial evidence.

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B. Inference of Unlawful Discrimination
We now consider whether Brady “creat[ed] the requisite inference of unlawful
discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient
evidence of pretext.” See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044. As a first step under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, Brady must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. See id. at 1046. If she does so, the burden shifts to Walmart to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Harms instead of her.
See id. Then, if Walmart meets its burden, the ultimate burden falls back on Brady
“to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether [Walmart’s] proffered nondiscriminatory justifications are mere pretext for
intentional discrimination.” See id.
Brady cannot satisfy the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. To
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in employment, Brady would have
to establish that “(1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified
to perform the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.” Hester v. Dep’t of Treasury,
137 F.4th 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2025). Her prima facie case fails at the second prong,
as she was not qualified for the support manager position. To be qualified for the
support manager position, Walmart required applicants to have passed the SLA
exam or to have been serving in an hourly supervisory position. Though Brady
eventually passed the SLA in 2008, she had not yet passed the exam when the
support manager position was opened and filled in 2007. She also was not already
serving in an hourly supervisory role. Harms, who was already serving as a
nighttime support manager, was qualified for the position.
Brady resists this conclusion, contending that she was more qualified than
Harms, having worked at Walmart longer and taken and passed other Walmart
exams. Even if true, it would not matter. The record is clear that the position to
which she applied had specific qualifications that she did not meet. Having failed

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to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in employment, Brady cannot
create an inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Brady has neither presented direct evidence of sex discrimination nor has she
“creat[ed] the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination.” See Torgerson, 643
F.3d at 1044. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Walmart on the disparate treatment in promotion claim.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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