United States of America v. Miguel Angel Alcantar Mercado, also known as Miguel Alcantar

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2590
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Miguel Angel Alcantar Mercado, also known as Miguel Alcantar
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: May 16, 2025
Filed: July 21, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
After pleading guilty to a drug-related offense, Miguel Alcantar Mercado was
sentenced to 204 months’ imprisonment, 6 months below the bottom of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) range given the nature of his offense and his
criminal history. Following a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines that changed

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Alcantar Mercado’s sentencing range, the district court1 considered whether to
reduce his sentence and decided not to do so. Alcantar Mercado appeals, arguing
that the district court failed to sufficiently explain its decision and thus erred in
declining to reduce his sentence. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
Alcantar Mercado spent several months participating in a drug distribution
operation, possessing and distributing more than 1,300 grams of heroin and wiring
more than $45,000 in drug proceeds. Following his indictment, Alcantar Mercado
pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The United States Probation
Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), which calculated an
advisory Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The Guidelines
range calculation factored in Alcantar Mercado’s criminal history, which was a
category III2 in part because Alcantar Mercado committed the drug offense “while
under [a] criminal justice sentence” for other crimes. See USSG § 4A1.1(e).
The district court then sentenced Alcantar Mercado to 204 months’
imprisonment, 6 months below the Guidelines range. The court noted it was
required to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and had done so. It reflected
that Alcantar Mercado’s offense was a “very serious” one, involving a significant
amount of money and drugs, and committed while Alcantar Mercado was on
probation for other crimes. But the court also noted several mitigating
circumstances, including Alcantar Mercado’s “modest criminal history” and his
family support. The court ultimately rejected Alcantar Mercado’s request for a
1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.
2 At the time, “a defendant received two additional criminal history points,
known as status points, ‘if the defendant committed the instant offense while under
any criminal justice sentence.’” United States v. Youngman, No. 24-1369, 2025 WL
1554929, at *1 n.2 (8th Cir. June 2, 2025) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

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downward variance to 120 months’ imprisonment, deciding instead that 204 months’
was “sufficient but not greater than necessary.”
After Alcantar Mercado was sentenced, the Sentencing Guidelines were
amended, revising the way in which criminal history categories are calculated.3 See
USSG App. C, amend. 821. The Sentencing Commission further determined that
the amendment applies retroactively. Id. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.7). Under the
amended Guidelines, Alcantar Mercado’s criminal history is only a category II,4
making his Guidelines range 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. See id. § 5A Table.
Thus, Alcantar Mercado became eligible for a discretionary sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Shortly after the amendment became effective, Southern District of Iowa
Chief District Judge Stephanie M. Rose adopted a procedure for handling sentence
modifications related to the amendment. In re Case Procedures for Amendment 821
Cases, No. 23-AO-9-P. The Probation Office then prepared a report in which it
identified Alcantar Mercado as eligible for consideration of a sentencing reduction,
noted the court’s comment at sentencing that “the offense was very serious involving
a lot of money and drugs,” and observed that Alcantar Mercado was participating in
3 Following the amendment, a defendant who commits the instant offense
while under another criminal justice sentence only receives additional “status” points
if he has seven or more points under other criminal history subsections. See USSG
App. C, amend. 821; id. § 4A1.1(e); Youngman, 2025 WL 1554929, at *1 n.2.
4 The parties agree Alcantar Mercado had a criminal history score of five prior
to the amendment: three points from relevant offenses and two “status” points
because he “committed the [conspiracy] offense while under a criminal justice
sentence for” two other offenses. A criminal history score of five equates to a
category III criminal history. USSG § 5A Table. Following the amendment,
Alcantar Mercado is not subject to the additional “status” points because he only had
three other criminal history points—fewer than the seven required to trigger the
additional status points. See id. § 4A1.1(e). Because a criminal history score of
three places him in category II, id. § 5A Table, Alcantar Mercado’s Guidelines range
changed.

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rehabilitative programs and incurring no disciplinary violations while in prison. The
district court declined to modify Alcantar Mercado’s sentence, noting—in the part
of the order titled “Factors Considered Under USSG §1B1.10 and 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)”—that “[a]lthough [Alcantar Mercado] has completed programming and
received no violations while in custody, the variance that he received is consistent
with his sentence at the new [G]uideline[s] range.” The district court said nothing
more.
On appeal, Alcantar Mercado argues the district court erred by failing to
exercise its discretion to reduce Alcantar Mercado’s sentence. Specifically, he
asserts the district court did not provide an adequate justification for denying the
sentence reduction because the court did not explain why a below-Guidelines
sentence had been appropriate at the initial sentencing but a mid-range sentence was
appropriate now—despite Alcantar Mercado’s progress while in prison. Unlike at
the initial sentencing, where the district court considered all aggravating and
mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Alcantar Mercado says, the court’s
reasoning in its modification order was sparse. We review the district court’s
sentence reduction decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tollefson, 853
F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 2017).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), courts “may reduce the term of imprisonment”
of a defendant whose sentencing range has been lowered “after considering the
factors set forth in [§] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” But such
consideration does not require a district court to “mechanically recite the sentencing
factors listed” or “make specific findings.” United States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740,
748 (8th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Instead, we are generally satisfied so long
as there “is evidence that the district court was aware of the relevant factors.” United
States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008). District courts have “wide
latitude” in weighing the factors. United States v. Powers, 828 F.3d 731, 734 (8th
Cir. 2016) (per curiam). And because “we do not require lengthy explanations from
district courts in the context of initial sentencings,” we likewise “find no compelling

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basis to demand more from courts when amending sentences pursuant to § 3582(c).”
United States v. Clark, 563 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2009).
Here, we are satisfied that the district court considered the relevant factors.
The order denying Alcantar Mercado a sentencing modification references the
§ 3553(a) factors twice and calls out Alcantar Mercado’s good behavior. The district
court also considered the § 3553(a) factors at the original sentencing hearing,
specifically addressing the seriousness of the offense and protection of the public.
We “need not turn a blind eye” to those explanations. See Chavez-Meza v. United
States, 585 U.S. 109, 119 (2018). Moreover, the court properly considered evidence
of Alcantar Mercado’s rehabilitative efforts, but “[wa]s not required to adjust [his]
sentence” based upon them. See Tollefson, 853 F.3d at 486 (citation omitted). Thus,
though the district court’s explanation here was “less than robust,” see United States
v. Dailey, 958 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2020), it was “within the permissible range of
discretion,” United States v. Banderas, 858 F.3d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 2017).
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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