United States of America v. Lemarcus Arthur Wright

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1012
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Lemarcus Arthur Wright
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
____________
Submitted: June 9, 2025
Filed: July 29, 2025
[Unpublished]
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
In 2015, Lemarcus Wright pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine
base. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846. The district court1 sentenced
him to 92 months’ imprisonment followed by 5 years’ supervised release.
1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.

-- 1 of 4 --

-2-
Wright’s term of supervised release began on July 20, 2020. Wright
repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised release, leading the district court to
revoke it twice. On December 17, 2024, the district court held a third revocation
hearing following nine more violations—four failures to follow the probation
officer’s instructions, one failure to truthfully answer the probation officer’s
questions, one failure to reside at an approved residence, two uses of marijuana, and
patronization of a bar. The district court calculated an advisory sentencing
guidelines range of 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment and sentenced him to a top-of-
range term of 14 months without any further supervised release to follow. Wright
appeals his sentence, contending that the district court committed procedural error
and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
We begin with Wright’s procedural challenge. See United States v. Black,
129 F.4th 508, 513 (8th Cir. 2025) (“We review a district court’s sentence in two
steps, first reviewing for significant procedural error, and second, if there is no
significant procedural error, we review for substantive reasonableness.”). Wright
contends that the district court committed procedural error by commenting at the
revocation hearing that “marijuana puts you in that world of people who sell drugs.”
In Wright’s view, this comment suggested that his marijuana use necessarily put him
in company with criminals, in violation of the terms of his supervised release. He
claims that this insinuation is unfounded because Illinois has state-licensed
marijuana dispensaries that are easily accessible to Wright, whose hometown of
Davenport, Iowa borders Illinois. Therefore, Wright argues, his use of marijuana
did not necessarily mean that he had associated with criminals. See United States v.
Tumea, 103 F.4th 1349, 1352 (8th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (“Procedural errors
include selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Wright did not object to the district court’s comment during the revocation
hearing, so we review his challenge for plain error. See id. To prevail under the
plain error standard, Wright “must show that there was an error, the error is clear or
obvious under current law, the error affected [his] substantial rights, and the error

-- 2 of 4 --

-3-
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
See id. (alteration in original). Even assuming the other requirements are met,
Wright fails to establish that the alleged error affected his substantial rights. “An
error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable probability . . . that but for the
error [the defendant] would have received a more favorable sentence.” United States
v. Sholley-Gonzalez, 996 F.3d 887, 899 (8th Cir. 2021). There is no such reasonable
probability here. The district court did not ground its sentence solely on Wright’s
potential association with criminals. Rather, it listed his violations of several of the
conditions of his supervised release, including drug use and not living in a residence
approved by his probation officer. Moreover, the district court emphasized that it
was “less concerned, frankly, about the marijuana use than [it was] about the
constant and chronic lying to the probation office.” It was on the basis of Wright’s
repeated violations of numerous conditions of his supervised release that the district
court sentenced him to prison time instead of a fourth stint of supervised release.
Therefore, even assuming that the challenged comment was erroneous, Wright has
not shown a reasonable probability that, but for the comment, he would have
received a more favorable sentence. Accordingly, we reject Wright’s procedural
challenge to his sentence.
We now turn to Wright’s argument that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable. He contends that the district court improperly weighed the sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by overemphasizing aggravating factors and
underemphasizing mitigating factors. “We review the substantive reasonableness of
a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
Garcia, 61 F.4th 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2023). “A district court abuses its discretion
when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant
weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3)
considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear
error of judgment.” Id.
We detect no abuse of discretion here. The district court noted that it had
“considered all of the factors under [§] 3553(a).” “A district court has wide latitude

-- 3 of 4 --

-4-
in deciding how to weigh the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. The
district court noted Wright’s longstanding issues complying with the terms of his
supervised release, including his drug use, dishonesty with probation officers, and
failure to reside at his approved residence. Based on Wright’s repeated violations
and multiple revocations, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion
in sentencing him to a within-guidelines prison term instead of yet another term of
supervised release. See id. (“A sentence below or within the Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable on appeal.”).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
______________________________

-- 4 of 4 --