United States of America v. Michael Lee Smith

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1789
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Michael Lee Smith
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa
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Submitted: May 12, 2025
Filed: August 14, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Lee Smith pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. The district court1 sentenced Smith to a total of 330 months of
1 The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.

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imprisonment. Smith appeals his sentence, arguing the district court erred in
applying the enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight and in calculating
his criminal history. We affirm.
First, we consider Smith’s challenge to the enhancement for reckless
endangerment during flight. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
provides a two-level increase when “the defendant recklessly created a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from
a law enforcement officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. “Reckless” is defined as “a situation
in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was
of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a
situation.” U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.4 cmt. n.1, 3C1.2 cmt. n.2. “We review for clear error
a district court’s findings with respect to reckless endangerment during flight.”
United States v. Williams, 30 F.4th 796, 799 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States
v. Silva, 630 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011)).
Smith claims the facts and circumstances surrounding his flight from law
enforcement did not rise to the level of recklessness required for the enhancement to
apply because “[t]here was no clear risk of personal injury or property damage.” The
undisputed facts show Smith fled from law enforcement on a motorcycle at a high
rate of speed. During the chase, he “lost control of his motorcycle, struck a trash
can, and spun out in a bystander’s yard.” While the district court acknowledged it
had seen flight that was “worse than [Smith’s] in terms of risk to the community”
and that “[l]uckily there was no one around,” it found Smith created a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person because a bystander “could
have been [around]” and the fact that Smith did not injure another person was beside
the point. This reasoning is consistent with precedent. See United States v.
Bazaldua, 506 F.3d 671, 675 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining the “enhancement does not
require any injury or damage” but only that “the defendant’s actions create[d] ‘a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person’” during flight

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from law enforcement (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2)); U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1
(defining “reckless”). And the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.
Next, Smith argues the district court erred in calculating his criminal history
by treating certain prior offenses as separate offenses even though some of the
sentences for those offenses were imposed concurrently. “This court reviews de
novo the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines, and its factual findings for
clear error.” United States v. Syphax, 127 F.4th 746, 748 (8th Cir. 2025).
“Miscalculating the sentencing guidelines is a procedural error.” Id. “A district
court must establish the sentencing range by calculating an offense level for the
present offense and a criminal history score based on past convictions.” Id. at 747.
Here, the district court assessed three points for each prior sentence at issue, for a
total of eighteen points. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) (adding three points for each prior
prison sentence exceeding one year and one month). Although certain sentences
were imposed concurrently, they were either imposed on different dates, separated
by an intervening arrest, or imposed for offenses that were charged in separate
instruments with different case numbers in separate counties. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2
(a)(2); United States v. Lewchuk, 958 F.2d 246, 247 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding the
district court properly treated concurrent sentences separately as “they were imposed
at different times by different courts under different docket numbers”). Thus, the
district court properly computed Smith’s criminal history score because the prior
offenses at issue encompassed different dates, cases, and facts.2
2 To the extent Smith argues a downward departure was warranted in light of
his criminal history category overrepresenting the seriousness of his criminal history
or likelihood that he would commit future crimes, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1), he
did not raise this argument before the district court and shows no plain error in the
district court’s failure to depart sua sponte from his correctly calculated criminal
history score, see United States v. Carrasco, 271 F.3d 765, 767–68 (8th Cir. 2001).
Also, to the extent Smith argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable, we see
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to impose a below-range
sentence. See United States v. Morais, 670 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting
that “[w]e review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard”).

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The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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