United States of America v. Thomas Lamont Davis, also known as Tuck, also known as Tuc

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1836
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Thomas Lamont Davis, also known as Tuck, also known as Tuc
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: June 9, 2025
Filed: August 25, 2025
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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Thomas Lamont Davis on seven drug trafficking and firearm
counts. Before trial, the district court1 denied Davis’s motion to exclude several of
his prior Iowa convictions. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level
1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.

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increase to Davis’s base offense level for maintaining a drug premises, and a six-
level increase for assaulting one of the arresting officers. On appeal, Davis contends
the district court erred when it refused to exclude his prior convictions and when it
calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Davis sold methamphetamine to a confidential source twice in March 2022.
A week after the second sale, on April 6, 2022, investigators searched Davis’s Des
Moines, Iowa, residence pursuant to a search warrant. Davis was absent, but his
brother and his brother’s girlfriend were at the house. Davis’s brother, who lived in
an upstairs bedroom next to Davis’s, told investigators he had stopped using the
basement after moving upstairs but confirmed Davis still used it.
In the basement, investigators found two firearms. One was a .357 magnum
Smith & Wesson revolver, with seven rounds of ammunition. The other was a 9-
millimeter Beretta pistol, with three rounds of ammunition in its magazine and
additional 9-millimeter ammunition in a box. Officers also found baggies and jars
with white residue or trace methamphetamine, loose methamphetamine on a table,
digital scales, a heat-sealing machine, clean baggies, a money counter, two bundles
of cash, and additional drug paraphernalia. Elsewhere in the basement, investigators
found a photo album with photographs of Davis and his children. In a freezer,
investigators found a jar with 62.3 grams of pure methamphetamine, as confirmed
by laboratory testing. Davis’s bedroom contained digital scales, marijuana, and a
safe with thousands of dollars in cash.
A warrant was issued for Davis’s arrest, and in September 2022, Des Moines
police officers attempted to stop a white SUV driven by a person matching Davis’s
description. The SUV driver fled, leading officers on an extended high-speed chase.
During their pursuit, Davis’s SUV ran several stop signs and lights, drove the wrong
way down one-way streets, and made illegal turns. The officers unsuccessfully tried
to stop the SUV by spinning it out of control. Eventually, the SUV crashed, and

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Davis was surrounded by officers. When he was taken into custody, Davis had in
his possession roughly $1,000 in cash. Near the SUV’s passenger side, officers
found a gray bag containing five plastic baggies of methamphetamine and a digital
scale, among other things. A few days later, Davis was released on bond.
In December 2022, officers in Des Moines again attempted to stop a white
SUV driven by Davis. Once again, Davis fled to evade the stop. After a chase
through residential streets, the SUV crashed into a house. Davis emerged from the
vehicle and attempted to flee on foot. When the officers tackled Davis, he began to
struggle. During the struggle, Davis tried to swallow a baggie of methamphetamine.
When an officer reached inside Davis’s mouth to remove the baggie, Davis bit down.
The officer hit Davis, and when that was unsuccessful, used an “eye gouge”
maneuver to free both his injured finger and the baggie of methamphetamine. The
officer’s finger was subsequently treated with stitches and transmittable disease
testing. Davis was detained, with roughly $1,500 in cash on him. Other officers
retrieved a second baggie of methamphetamine near Davis’s vehicle, and a bag with
a digital scale and unused baggies from the vehicle.
Davis proceeded to trial on two counts of distribution of a controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); two counts of
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A); one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); one count of
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2); and one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). Davis
unsuccessfully moved to exclude from evidence his prior felony convictions in Iowa
for controlled substance and firearms offenses. A jury ultimately found Davis guilty
on all counts.
At sentencing, the district court sentenced Davis to a 360-month term of
imprisonment. Davis raises three issues on appeal: (1) the denial of his motion to

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exclude his state convictions; (2) the application of a two-level sentencing
enhancement for maintaining a drug premises; and (3) the application of a six-level
sentencing enhancement for assaulting an officer who arrested him.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Exclude
Davis contends the admission of his Iowa convictions denied him a fair trial
and violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404 because they were relevant only to
demonstrate his criminal propensity. We review interpretations of the rules of
evidence de novo, evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and whether an
evidentiary ruling violates a constitutional right de novo. United States v. Spotted
Horse, 916 F.3d 686, 693 (8th Cir. 2019).
The district court allowed into evidence four prior Iowa felonies: a 2000
marijuana possession with intent to deliver conviction, a 2009 firearm possession
conviction, a 2010 methamphetamine delivery conviction, and a 2010 firearm
possession conviction. These convictions are admissible unless they had no bearing
on Davis’s case and were introduced solely to prove his propensity to commit
criminal acts. United States v. Barbee, 44 F.4th 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 2022).
When Davis entered a general denial, he put his knowledge of the drugs and
guns found in his home—and his intent to possess or distribute them—at issue. See
United States v. Smith, 978 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 2020). Prior convictions are
admissible to demonstrate knowledge and intent. Id. (prior felony firearm
conviction); United States v. Samuels, 611 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2010) (prior
felony drug conviction). The district court gave a limiting instruction directing the
jury to consider the prior convictions only for knowledge, motive, opportunity, and
intent, specifically instructing them that they could not use the past convictions as
“evidence that [Davis] committed such an act in this case.”

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While we have warned about the admission of cumulative prior convictions
potentially turning into propensity evidence, the use of cumulative prior convictions
may be appropriate when it goes to a permissible purpose like intent or knowledge.
United States v. Drew, 9 F.4th 718, 724 (8th Cir. 2021). Neither we nor the Supreme
Court have “set a ceiling on the number of past convictions that the government can
use to prove intent or knowledge.” Id. Typically, so long as the convictions are
admitted for a proper purpose and paired with a limiting instruction, a district court
does not abuse its discretion when it admits multiple convictions. See id. (six
convictions); see also United States v. Aldridge, 664 F.3d 705, 714–15 (8th Cir.
2011) (four convictions, two of which were “merely cumulative”). Because the prior
convictions were admitted for a permitted rationale under the rules of evidence, and
all were accompanied by a limiting instruction, we find no abuse of discretion. See
Drew, 9 F.4th at 724.
B. Sentencing Guidelines Enhancements
Davis also challenges two of the sentencing enhancements applied by the
district court, which we review de novo, including any alleged double counting.
United States v. Canamore, 916 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). We
review the district court’s factual findings to support an enhancement for clear error.
United States v. Hernandez Lopez, 24 F.4th 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 2022).
Davis first challenges the application of § 2D1.1(b)(12) for knowingly
maintaining “a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a
controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Davis asserts the enhancement is
inapplicable because he shared his home with others, used it primarily as a residence,
and did not use the home solely for the purpose of distributing drugs. While the
manufacture or distribution of drugs must be one principal or primary use of the
defendant’s premises, it need not be the only use of those premises. United States
v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 706–07 (8th Cir. 2012). See id.; see also United States v.
Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995) (defendant exercised control over a house
because he “lived there,” “had a key,” and “came and went as he pleased”).

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Evidence in the record supports the district court’s findings that Davis lived
in the home, on two occasions law enforcement observed him distributing drugs
from the home, a large amount of cash was found in Davis’s bedroom,
methamphetamine was stored in the basement of the home where Davis was known
to use, and indicia of trafficking was found throughout the house. Because Davis’s
drug distribution was more than “incidental or collateral” to his use of his home and
he did not point to any error in the district court’s factual findings supporting the
enhancement, § 2D1.1(b)(12) was appropriately applied. See Miller, 698 F.3d at
706–07.
The second challenged enhancement applies if Davis, “in a manner creating a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury,” assaulted a law enforcement officer “during
the course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1);
see United States v. Olson, 646 F.3d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he term ‘assault’
in § 3A1.2(c) is a reference to common-law criminal assault.”). Davis contends the
enhancement is inapplicable because the officer did not break or lose his finger, nor
did he contract a transmittable disease. However, a defendant may create a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury even if only minor injuries result from his
conduct. See United States v. Davidson, 933 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2019)
(concluding a defendant who hopped a fence and struggled with officers created a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury).
The district court found that the body camera footage captured the officer
instructing Davis to let go of his hand as the officer was “clearly in pain and
responding to what’s happening.” The court could hear in the officer’s voice on the
recording that Davis’s actions were causing “extreme physical pain.” It noted that
the bite did not result in a red mark or bruise but required stitches to correct. While
finding the stitches alone were enough to show the officer sustained a serious injury,
the court further found “the risk of serious bodily injury beyond what was actually
suffered is certainly established as well and the substantial risk of serious bodily
injury is present based upon the continued biting of this officer’s finger.”

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Davis has not shown the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous.
Nor has he shown error in the district court’s conclusion that when he bit the officer
with such force that the officer needed stitches, the officer not only sustained a
serious bodily injury, but Davis also created a substantial risk of a more serious
injury, particularly when Davis refused commands to let go. The district court did
not err when it found § 3A1.2(c)(1) applied to Davis’s conduct.
Lastly, Davis contends applying § 3A1.2(c)(1) double counts with a separate
enhancement he received under § 3C1.2. The district court applied the obstruction
enhancement because Davis twice led officers on reckless vehicle chases. After
reviewing evidence presented at trial, the court noted the first incident involved
Davis driving the wrong way on streets and running red lights. The second time
Davis crashed into a house while speeding away from officers. As explained by the
district court, these risks are distinct from the risks created when Davis bit an
arresting officer’s finger. Davis has not shown the district court clearly erred in its
findings relating to the enhancements. Given the separate and distinct conduct, we
find no error, clear or otherwise, in the district court’s application of enhancements
under both § 3A1.2(c)(1) and § 3C1.2. See United States v. Lovato, 868 F.3d 681,
684 (8th Cir. 2017).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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