Quindon M. Yelder v. Pete Hegseth, Secretary of Defense

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2731
___________________________
Quindon M. Yelder
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
Pete Hegseth, Secretary of Defense
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
____________
Submitted: May 14, 2025
Filed: August 15, 2025
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
____________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Quindon M. Yelder, a former employee of the Defense Commissary Agency
(DeCA) at Offutt Air Force Commissary (Offutt), filed suit against the Secretary of
Defense (government) alleging that he was denied accommodations for his
disabilities and was harassed in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He
additionally alleged that he was discriminated against based on his race and gender

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and was subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. The government moved for summary judgment, which
the district court1 granted. Yelder appeals the district court’s adverse grant of
summary judgment on all claims. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
The DeCA is an agency within the Department of Defense (DoD). Offutt is one
of the commissaries that the DeCA operates, which provide military personnel
retirees and their families with tax-free shopping. Offutt employs approximately 42
to 50 federal workers and an additional 45 contractors. From October 17, 2016, to
August 1, 2019, Yelder was a Store Worker in Offutt’s Produce Department.2 At the
outset of Yelder’s employment, Joe Messina was the Produce Department Manager
and Yelder’s first-level supervisor. After Messina’s retirement in December 2017,
Rikki Parker became the Produce Department Manager and Yelder’s first-level
supervisor in January 2018.
Several months into Yelder’s employment, in February 2017, Yelder’s father,
Tim Yelder (Tim), requested a meeting with management “to communicate Quindon
Yelder’s [c]oncerns.” R. Doc. 91-2, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Tim
advised management that Yelder “need[ed] support from his team to be more
productive and succeed in [the] store.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). On
February 25, 2017, Messina; Yelder; Tim; and Store Manager Dawnell Pafundi,
1The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska.
2The Produce Department operates with three shifts: opening, mid, and closing.
Employees working the morning shift must place perishable items on the sales floor,
ensure that shelves and displays are fully stocked, and receive items. Employees
working the mid-shift must clean, assist customers, stock, and cull items from shelves
and displays. Employees working the closing shift must clean, stock, take out the
trash, warehouse, and place perishable items back into coolers.
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Yelder’s second level manager, met to discuss Yelder’s work. According to Tim, he
wanted Yelder “to feel comfortable in his environment” and wanted to “eliminate”
Yelder feeling “any type of intimidation.” R. Doc. 101-9, at 25. Yelder “felt he was
being retaliated against and abusive conduct and language [were used] towards him.”
Id. During the meeting, Tim raised several topics for discussion, including quarterly
performance reviews, access to email and training, and scheduling and leave.
Also during the meeting, Tim stated that “Yelder had a disability.” R. Doc. 91-
2, at 6. But Tim never identified or explained “the nature of . . . Yelder’s disability.”
Id.; see also R. Doc. 91-7, at 18 (“I didn’t give them his specific medical disability.”).
Yelder himself also never stated or acknowledged that he had a disability. “When Tim
. . . said that [Yelder] had a disability, he looked at [Yelder] and [Yelder] shook his
head no.” R. Doc. 91-2, at 6. Yelder never provided Pafundi with “any paperwork or
medical or school reports that alleged that . . . Yelder had a disability.” Id.3
Tim requested, on Yelder’s behalf, that Yelder be afforded “more time to . . .
complete tasks” because management had said that Yelder “was moving too slow.”
R. Doc. 101-9, at 26. Tim and Yelder “asked that [Yelder] have open communication
with his supervisor to be able to relay his thoughts and ideas and, . . . reasons for
whatever shortcomings that came up.” Id. Another “accommodation” that Tim and
Yelder requested “was making sure [that Yelder] g[o]t trained properly” because he
lacked computer-based “training at that time.” Id. They also requested that Yelder “be
able to take breaks when he needed to.” Id. at 28. At the meeting’s conclusion,
Yelder, Tim, Pafundi, and Messina agreed that Yelder would receive additional
training; could ask questions of his training sponsor; would be afforded a few extra
3During Yelder’s employment, Pafundi observed that Yelder was “a little
slower than others.” R. Doc. 101-1, at 3. Pafundi did not know the reason for this. R.
Doc. 91-2, at 6. Pafundi did not connect this to a disability. R. Doc. 101-1, at 10–11.
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minutes to complete tasks; and would have his school schedule accommodated for the
semester, to the extent possible.
On April 29, 2017, Messina held an “Employee Performance and Results
meeting” with Yelder. R. Doc. 101-6, at 1. During the meeting, Messina advised
Yelder that his work was unsatisfactory. Following the meeting, Yelder sent a
memorandum to Messina in which he claimed that he had “not received all the
support [that he had] requested” during the February 2017 meeting. Id. Yelder listed
the following “[w]orkplace items” that he had not yet “received support with[,]
includ[ing] obtaining computer access, email account, leave website, worklist, new
employee orientation, sponsor, web base training, training resources, Occupational
Training Plan (skills to perform duties), and Individual Development Plan.” Id. He
also asserted that he had “requested reasonable accommodations for speed limits and
learning new tasks.” Id. He maintained that, during the February 2017 meeting,
“everyone agreed upon solutions which would help [Yelder] improve as an
employee.” Id.
The following year, shortly after Parker became the Produce Department
Manager in January 2018, she noticed that “Yelder did not complete tasks in the same
timeframe that other employees d[id]” and “that he had to be retrained many times on
the same tasks.” R. Doc. 91-3, at 8. Parker, along with other employees, retrained
Yelder.
In February 2018, Parker “mandated that all employees be trained to work all
shifts” “to make the store more efficient.” Id. at 3. That meant that “employees
normally assigned to do opening shift had to train on closing procedures and vice
versa.” Id. “In August 2018, after everyone was trained on all shifts and job duties,
[Parker] assigned shifts based on the employee’s strengths.” Id. Parker notified
employees “of their work schedules and shift duties (receiving, inventory, culling or
warehousing) at least two weeks in advance of the workweek.” Id. at 5. Parker
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assigned warehousing “to the closing shift so that all produce was placed in the
proper storage location before the store was closed for the day.” Id. at 4. Warehousing
duties included “lift[ing] heavy boxes of produce [and] unpack[ing] and organiz[ing]
them, oftentimes in the cooler which is very cold.” Id.
According to Yelder, he, along with the other male employees, complained
about warehousing duties. Yelder believed that Parker “started scheduling people [to]
do warehousing because . . . . nobody liked doing the warehousing.” R. Doc. 101-2,
at 30–31. Yelder believed that Parker scheduled him the most for warehousing
“because she didn’t like [him]” and did it “for . . . punishment.” Id. at 31. He thought
that Parker might not like him because of his “race or personality.” Id. Parker would
write Yelder up for not completing his warehousing duties. Yelder believed that
Parker did not schedule female employees for warehousing. See id. at 35 (stating that
the female employees “wouldn’t do warehousing at all”). He also believed that female
employees got weekends off more often than he did. See id. at 38 (stating that Myra
Lammert “didn’t do warehousing, and she got weekends off all the time”). Shift
schedule records, however, confirm that all job duties were performed on a rotating
basis, including by the female employees. See R. Doc. 91-3, at 14–50.4
4See also id. at 4 (“Warehousing duties were assigned [by Parker] to all
employees (male and female) on a rotating basis.”); R. Doc. 91-4, at 4 (“I [Steven
Kelsey] have personally witnessed female employees do warehousing.”); R. Doc. 91-
5, at 4 (“I [Rebecca Miteff] personally witnessed Myra [Lammert] do warehousing.
Warehousing was assigned on a rotational basis.”); R. Doc. 91-6, at 4 (“I [Shawn
Benson] have personally witnessed female employees do warehousing.”). In the fall
of 2018, Parker had ten male employees and two female employees in the Produce
Department. According to Parker, “[n]one of the employees . . . like warehousing.”
R. Doc. 91-3, at 4. Parker also required “all employees . . . to work at least one day
on the weekend (Saturday or Sunday).” Id. at 2; see also R. Doc. 91-4, at 3 (“I
[Steven Kelsey] have personally witnessed female employees work on weekends.”);
Doc. 91-5, at 3 (“When [Parker] was my supervisor, I [Rebecca Miteff] had Sundays
off, but I worked on Saturdays.”); R. Doc. 91-6, at 3 (“I [Shawn Benson] have
personally witnessed female employees work on weekends.”).
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Yelder contends that Assistant Commissary Officer Judy Ring, Pafundi’s direct
supervisor, as well as Messina or Parker, would “harass” Yelder about needing a
doctor’s note each time he called in to take a sick day. R. Doc. 91-7, at 32. Yelder
asserts this was harassment because sick leave policy only required employees to
provide a doctor’s note if they were sick longer than three days.
According to Yelder, Parker denied and overly scrutinized his annual leave
requests by not “allow[ing] [him] to take [his] vacation leave.” R. Doc. 101-2, at 39.
Yelder recalled Parker letting Lammert take annual leave instead of him despite
Yelder having seniority.5 Yelder also remembered Parker ripping up his leave request
form for vacation leave in 2019. Parker told Yelder that “it was the wrong one.” R.
Doc. 101-2, at 41. Yelder agreed that “[i]t was the wrong form” but felt that Parker’s
tone was “mean.” Id.
Parker held weekly meetings with Produce Department staff to discuss
problems and procedural changes. During these weekly meetings, Parker admits
telling the “staff that Walmart is down the street, and they are all free to go work for
them. [She] . . . also told staff to ‘pick up the pace’ when it comes to getting tasks
done in a timely manner.” R. Doc. 91-3, at 9. Parker’s comments were made to the
entire staff, not just Yelder.6 During the meetings, Parker also had the staff put tissue
5To take annual leave, employees were required to “submit annual leave
planners to their supervisor by February 1 of each year to identify their desired annual
leave.” R. Doc. 91-3, at 6. “If multiple employees request[ed] the same annual leave,
final approval [was] based on seniority.” Id. Leave requested after February 1 was
“granted on a first come, first serve basis, again keeping in mind staffing
requirements and employee workload.” Id.
6See id. (“These comments were made in the presence of and directed at all
produce department staff, not just Mr. Yelder.”); R. Doc. 91-4, at 4 (“During [weekly
staff] meetings[,] [Parker] would say things like ‘pick up the pace.’ Her comments
were directed at all staff.”); R. Doc. 91-5, at 4 (“During [weekly staff] meetings[,]
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in their ears to show that they were not listening. The staff “listened” and put the
tissue in their ears. R. Doc. 101-2, at 15. Yelder also recalled Parker having him put
tissue in his ears during reviews. Additionally, Parker called Yelder “too slow” and
“lazy” during his reviews. Id. at 47.
“In early 2019, [Parker became] suspicious that Mr. Yelder had a mental
disability” and sought counsel from Osbert Okebata, DeCA Human Resources
Specialist. R. Doc. 91-3, at 8. “Okebata advised [Parker] that there was nothing in Mr.
Yelder’s personnel file to indicate that he had a mental disability. As such, [Parker]
continued to treat Mr. Yelder as if he did not have a mental disability.” Id. At no time
did Yelder advise Parker “that he suffered from any mental disability or medical
condition, nor did he request an accommodation” from Parker. Id.
On August 1, 2019, matters came to a head. Yelder was scheduled to do
warehousing from 10:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. At 12:45 p.m., Parker made her usual
rounds. When Parker entered the warehousing area, Yelder asked Parker if he could
go to lunch. Parker inquired of Yelder whether he had completed his warehousing
duties. Yelder replied that he had two pallets left. Parker advised Yelder to complete
the two pallets and then take his lunch. Parker returned to her office. After a few
minutes, Yelder came to Parker’s office door and said that he did not understand why
he could not take his lunch. Parker reiterated that Yelder could take his lunch after
completing the two pallets. When Yelder expressed disagreement, Parker requested
that Yelder come into her office to have a private conversation. “Yelder responded,
‘[G]ood because you are not going to like it.’” Id. at 11. Yelder entered the office, sat
down, and again asked why he could not take his lunch break. Once again, Parker
informed Yelder that he would need to complete the two pallets. Yelder insisted “that
[Parker] would say things like ‘speed it up.’ . . . Her comments were directed at all
staff to make sure we stayed on task to get everything done.”); R. Doc. 91-6, at 4
(“When we had meetings around holidays or after [Parker] received complaints from
other managers . . . , [Parker] would tell us to ‘pick up the pace.’”).
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it was his time to go to lunch.” Id. Parker directed Yelder to finish processing the two
pallets. Yelder refused. Parker informed Yelder that he had been at work for less than
three hours. Yelder “accused [Parker] of playing favorites,” stating that “some of his
peers were allowed to take breaks wherever they want.” Id. Parker responded “that
his peers generally worked at a quicker pace and as such [she] did not have to ask
them if they completed tasks before they were allowed to go on break.” Id. at 11–12.
“Yelder then complained that a female peer left salads that needed to be
warehoused.” Id. at 12. Parker responded “that the peer was working by herself and
got behind and that sometimes the next shift must be flexible.” Id. Parker additionally
“reminded him of the times when he was on closing shift and did not complete his job
duties, which made more work for the morning shift.” Id. Parker instructed Yelder
that if he failed to complete the two pallets before taking his lunch break, “he would
receive a letter of counseling for insubordination.” Id. Yelder responded that he did
not care. When Parker suggested that they go speak with Pafundi, Ring, or Store
Director Anthony Chaki, Yelder declined. Yelder told Parker that he quit and exited
the office.
Pafundi saw Yelder leaving the building and approached him. Pafundi
requested that Yelder come back into the store so they could talk. According to
Pafundi, Yelder “cussed [her] out.” R. Doc. 91-7, at 8. Pafundi retrieved Yelder’s
boots and key card.7
Yelder submitted a “Memorandum for HR” dated August 1, 2019, regarding
his resignation. R. Doc. 101-3, at 2 (all caps and bold omitted). In the memo, Yelder
alleged that Parker “unfairly tried to characterize [him] as someone who intentionally
7Pafundi claims that Yelder “threw his boots in the middle of the street” and
“threw his [key] card in the middle of the road” when she asked for them. Id. In his
brief, Yelder denies doing so. See Appellant’s Br. at 8.
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does not follow instructions,” noting that he had “received three letters of counseling
within six months.” Id. Yelder stated his belief that Parker treated him unfairly
because she intended to fire him. Yelder described experiencing stress in his work
environment because Parker pressured him and favored other employees in
scheduling.
Yelder also outlined some of Parker’s conduct in the memorandum (much of
which is described above). Yelder drafted the memorandum hoping that “someone
[would] look into [his] complaint to prevent others from being subjected to this type
of treatment and environment.” Id. at 6. Notably, Yelder’s memorandum did not
allege that he asked for or failed to receive a disability accommodation.8
On August 6, 2019, Yelder contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity
counselor. Yelder told the counselor that he was denied a reasonable accommodation
for his disability. Kevin Hennelly, DeCA Disability Program Manger, advised Offutt
management to engage in the reasonable accommodation interactive process to
determine whether Yelder could be reinstated. Pafundi and Chaki agreed to
participate in the interactive process.
On August 28, 2019, Yelder submitted a Confirmation of Request for
Reasonable Accommodation form. Parker responded by sending Yelder a Reasonable
Accommodation memorandum with an ADA-Related Questionnaire (questionnaire)
attached. It contained eight sections for completion. In late September 2019, Hennelly
received the completed questionnaire signed by Dr. Matthew Garlinghouse, a
neuropsychologist. In relevant part, section 1 of the completed questionnaire listed
Yelder’s medical diagnoses as “[e]pilepsy, [c]omplex [p]artial, [s]eizures, and
8Yelder’s only reference to “accommodation” in the memorandum was his
statement that upper management had told him in the past that he “would not be able
to attend college because set scheduling or other accommodations were not allowed”
despite Yelder “see[ing] accommodations made for others.” Id. at 6.
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[p]ains;” additionally, it stated that Yelder “has education records qualifying him as
an individual with disabilities in [h]ealth impairment, [l]earning disability and
[s]peech-[l]anguage impairment.” R. Doc. 91-1, at 10. Section 4 explained how
Yelder’s impairments limit him:
[Yelder] reported he has been working the job for thirty-three months
without limitations. However, his medical diagnoses, educational
support history and communication skills shows how his major life
activities are affected. Speaking: [Yelder] requires support due to
[s]peech impairment in generalizing his articulation skills to
spontaneous conversation. Learning: [Yelder] requires support with a
learning disability. He is a visual and hands on learner that requires
simple and clear directions with repetitions to fully comprehend.
Concentrating: [Yelder] is easily upset, distracted and loss [sic] focus.
A supportive, non-threatening, low stress and professional work
environment would help him concentrate, manage pains and anxieties.
Communicating: [Yelder] needs support with communication due to
[s]peech [l]anguage impairment; particularly receptive language.
Although, I do not see any tasks to limit, I do recommend some
accommodations to help him manage his health.
Id. at 11. Section 6 described how Yelder’s medical impairments limit his ability to
perform his duties:
[Yelder] has reported performing the duties for almost three years, so I
do not see an issue there. However, there is a caution that should be
taken with a patient that have [sic] a history of seizures and that is the
patient could have a seizure, fall and injure their head which could cause
brain damage. Therefore, I recommend the following reasonable
accommodations to help [Yelder] manage his health: taking allowed
breaks and leave, allow enough time to complete tasks at his pace,
provide worklists, shift rotation, open communication w/supervisor,
repetition and hands on visual instructions, no public shaming, allow
mistakes as training opportunities, allow sick call.
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Id. at 12. Section 7 stated, “I do not recommend reassignment,” and Section 8
answered “[n]o” to whether Yelder should “consider reducing the number of hours
he . . . is scheduled to work” and whether he should “invoke his entitlement to time
off under the Family and Medical Leave Act.” Id.
After reviewing the completed questionnaire, Hennelly “was unable to find any
information to suggest that Mr. Yelder’s medical diagnoses of epilepsy, seizures and
pain would cause him to act in the manner Ms. Pafundi described.” Id. at 3.
Ultimately, the interactive process ended with no resolution. Subsequently, the EEOC
sent Yelder a Notice of Appeal rights indicating that Yelder did not prove that the
government “subjected him to unlawful disparate treatment and harassment based on
his sex, race, and disability as presented in his formal complaint or that management
failed to accommodate him as agreed upon in February 2017.” R. Doc. 114, at 2–3
(citing R. Doc. 1-1, at 7).
Yelder then filed suit in district court, alleging that the government violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by
discriminating against him based on his disability, race, and gender. He further
alleged that the government failed to accommodate his disability and created a hostile
working environment leading to his constructive discharge on August 1, 2019. During
discovery, Dr. Garlinghouse was deposed. Dr. Garlinghouse testified that Yelder
“refused an evaluation.” R. Doc. 91-7, at 61. But he recalled that Yelder and Tim
“request[ed] that [he] write a letter.” Id. Dr. Garlinghouse had no “recollection of
doing any record review for this case because [Yelder] did not want an evaluation.”
Id. at 63. Dr. Garlinghouse had “no recollection” of completing section 4 of the
questionnaire concerning how Yelder’s impairments limit him. Id. at 62. Dr.
Garlinghouse did not “see how [he] could have written [it] . . . because [he] didn’t
evaluate [Yelder].” Id. Dr. Garlinghouse denied knowing whether Yelder “has a
disability in health impairment,” “a learning disability,” or a “speech language
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impairment.” Id. at 64. During Tim’s deposition, he admitted that he—not Dr.
Garlinghouse—completed section 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the questionnaire.
The government moved for summary judgment on all claims, which the district
court granted. First, the district court determined that Yelder’s disability
discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims failed because “Yelder
provided no relevant evidence” of his disability. R. Doc. 114, at 13. Specifically,
“Yelder failed to specifically identify his alleged disability and resulting limitations”
during the February 2017 meeting, and the completed questionnaire signed by Dr.
Garlinghouse was “not evidence” of a disability given Dr. Garlinghouse’s agreement
that “[i]t lacks credibility.” Id. Second, the district court determined that Yelder’s
hostile work environment claim failed because Yelder failed to prove that any
“connection [existed] between any alleged harassment and Yelder’s race or gender.”
Id. at 15. Furthermore, the court found “no evidence of severe or pervasive conduct.”
Id.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Yelder argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on his disability discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and hostile
work environment claims.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Torgerson
v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). A district court
properly grants summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine
dispute as to those facts.” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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A. Disability Discrimination
“The Rehabilitation Act . . . forbids discrimination against an ‘otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . , solely by reason of her or his disability.’”
Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (second ellipsis in original)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794). “In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination,[9] we
apply the [McDonnell Douglas10] burden-shifting framework . . . to disability-
discrimination claims of disparate treatment.” Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d
748, 755 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)).11
Under this burden-shifting analysis, the employee must establish a prima face case
of disability discrimination; if successful, “[t]he burden of production then shifts to
the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.”
Oehmke, 844 F.3d at 755. After the employer sets forth its reason for the adverse
action, “the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the proffered reason was,
in reality, a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
To establish a prima face case of disability discrimination, the employee must
show the following: (1) he was disabled, (2) he “was qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job”; and (3) there is “a causal connection between an
adverse employment action and the disability.” Id. Here, the parties agree that the
second element of the prima face case is satisfied. See R. Doc. 114, at 8 (“[The
9It is undisputed that Yelder proffered no direct evidence of discrimination.
10McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11Like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA also “prohibit[s] employers from
discriminating against a disabled individual qualified for a job because of the
disability of such individual. Our cases interpreting these acts are interchangeable.”
Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted). As a result, cases analyzing the ADA apply the same analysis as those
analyzing the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
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government] agrees that Yelder can do the job functions with or without reasonable
accommodations.”).
“The first element requires the plaintiff to show that [he] was a disabled person,
or a person regarded as disabled, within the meaning of the [Rehabilitation Act].”
Canning v. Creighton Univ., 995 F.3d 603, 614 (8th Cir. 2021). The Rehabilitation
Act uses the same definition as the ADA for an individual with a disability. See 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). “[D]isability” is defined as “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C). Working is recognized as a major life
activity. Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2006).
Yelder challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to prove he was
“disabled.” Yelder argues that he has a “disability” within the meaning of
§ 12102(1)(A) because he “suffers from several conditions that limit one or more of
his major life activities, including work.” Appellant’s Br. at 14.12 According to
Yelder, these conditions “limit [his] ability to learn, speak, communicate, concentrate,
and . . . may [cause him to] suffer from seizures due to stress.” Appellant’s Br. at 14.
Yelder maintains that, as his father Tim testified, he “marked the box on his
[employment] application indicating that he had disabilities.” Id. He also cites Tim’s
request for the February 2017 meeting “specifically to discuss Yelder’s needs and
12Yelder has not argued that his employer “regarded [him] as having . . . an
impairment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C); see also Canning, 995 F.3d at 615 (“[A]
person is regarded as disabled if [his] employer mistakenly believes that [he] has a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities or
mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one
or more major life activities.”). As a result, we will only address whether Yelder
produced sufficient evidence that he has “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A).
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accommodation requests.” Id. He asserts that during the February 2017 meeting, he
and his father “notified [d]efendant’s management of the relevant details and
explained how Yelder’s disabilities limited his life activities.” Id. Yelder maintains
that Pafundi “was aware of the nature of Yelder’s disabilities, likening them to her
son’s.” Id. at 15. He asserts that he was not required “to disclose the exact name or
nature of his disability, just how it limits a major life activity.” Id. According to
Yelder, he “disclosed sufficient details of his disability to put [d]efendant on notice
of it and his need for accommodations.” Id.
The government responds that the record contains insufficient evidence that
Yelder has a disability. First, the government argues that “the record contains no
applications to corroborate” Tim’s testimony “that Yelder self-disclosed a disability
on his application.” Appellee’s Br. at 25 (citing R. Doc. 101-9, at 20). We agree. Tim
testified, “If you look at [Yelder’s] application, he had self-identified with needing
[sic] a disability. He didn’t put the reason because . . . he thought he can do this on
his own . . . .” R. Doc. 101-9, at 20. But there are no applications in the record to
substantiate this testimony.
The government also points out that neither Yelder nor his father “conveyed
during the February 2017 meeting” “[t]he nature of Yelder’s disability.” Appellee’s
Br. at 31. The government is correct. Yelder failed to identify the “physical or mental
impairment[s]” he suffers from “that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); cf. Kowitz v. Trinity Health,
839 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2016) (“An employee is required . . . to provide the
employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can
be fairly said to know of . . . the disability . . . .” (cleaned up)). During the meeting,
Tim stated that “Yelder had a disability.” R. Doc. 91-2, at 6. But Tim never explained
“the nature of . . . Yelder’s disability.” Id.; see also R. Doc. 91-7, at 18 (“I didn’t give
them his specific medical disability.”). Furthermore, “[w]hen Tim . . . said that
[Yelder] had a disability, he looked at [Yelder] and [Yelder] shook his head no.” R.
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Doc. 91-2, at 6. Tim’s statement that Yelder had a “disability,” followed by Yelder
shaking his head “no,” is insufficient to show that Yelder suffered from a disability
that substantially limited a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Finally, the government argues that Yelder’s claim lacks evidence for his
contention that he has a disability because the relevant portions of the completed
questionnaire addressing Yelder’s disabilities were not authored by a medical doctor
but by Yelder’s father Tim. Our review of the record supports this conclusion. During
his deposition, Tim admitted that he answered the portion of the questionnaire
indicating that Yelder has medical diagnoses “of [e]pilepsy, [c]omplex [p]artial,
[s]eizures, and [p]ains,” as well as “education records qualifying him as an individual
with disabilities in [h]ealth impairment, [l]earning disability and [s]peech-[l]anguage
impairment.” R. Doc. 91-1, at 10. Dr. Garlinghouse could not substantiate these
diagnoses.
Because Yelder failed to produce sufficient evidence that he is “disabled”
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the government on his disability discrimination claim.
B. Failure to Accommodate
We have explained that
[a]n employer commits unlawful discrimination if the employer does not
make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless the employer can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of the employer.
Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). “When evaluating
claims of failure to provide reasonable accommodations, we apply a modified burden-
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shifting analysis.” Ehlers v. Univ. of Minnesota, 34 F.4th 655, 659 (8th Cir. 2022).
As part of his facial showing, the employee must prove that he is disabled. Id. (“The
plaintiff must first make a facial showing that he or she . . . is disabled . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For the reasons set forth supra, Yelder has failed to satisfy
the facial showing that he is disabled. See supra Part II.A.13
C. Hostile Work Environment
“A hostile work environment arises when . . . conduct has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Bell v. Baptist Health, 60
F.4th 1198, 1204 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yelder’s claim
for hostile work environment is also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2004).
To establish a prima facie claim for hostile work environment, Yelder must show the
following: (1) he “was a member of a protected group”; (2) he was subjected to
“unwelcome harassment”; (3) there was “a causal nexus between the harassment and
[his] membership in the protected group”; (4) “the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment”; and (5) his “employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.”
Bell, 60 F.4th at 1204 (internal quotation marks omitted).14
13Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
government on Yelder’s failure-to-accommodate claim, we need not address the
government’s alternative argument that Yelder failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies for this claim.
14The government does not dispute that Yelder belongs to a protected class
(African-American male), and it concedes that Yelder does not have to establish the
fifth element of the prima facie case “because Yelder is alleging harassment by a
supervisor.” Appellee’s Br. at 40.
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“In order to show that the harassment affected a term or condition of
employment, the conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and that actually
altered the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Hales v. Casey’s Mktg. Co., 886
F.3d 730, 735 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is a twofold
inquiry. First, the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
objectively hostile work environment.” Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d
1040, 1047 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, if the
[employee] does not subjectively perceive the environment as abusive, then the
conduct has not altered the conditions of employment.” Id.
To satisfy the objective prong of the inquiry, the conduct “must be more than
merely offensive, immature or unprofessional; it must be extreme.” Id.; see also
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 687 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[M]erely
rude or unpleasant conduct is insufficient to support a claim for hostile work
environment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the conduct “does not exceed
the threshold of severity,” then the employee has failed “to create a prima facie case
of . . . harassment.” Kratzer, 398 F.3d at 1047. “Title VII is not a general civility code
for the American workplace.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 687 (cleaned
up). It “was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and
conduct in the workplace.” Kratzer, 398 F.3d at 1047 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A court must examine “all the circumstances” to determine “[w]hether an
environment is hostile or abusive.” Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302
F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993)). Such circumstances “may include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “More than a few isolated
incidents are required, and the alleged harassment must be so intimidating, offensive,
or hostile that it poisoned the work environment.” Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051,
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1057 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The stringent hostile work
environment standard is designed to filter out complaints attacking the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language and
occasional teasing.” Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1083 (8th Cir.
2010) (cleaned up), abrogated in part by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1058 (Appendix).
Here, Yelder argues that the following conduct constitutes severe or pervasive
conduct: (1) Parker ripping up his leave request form for vacation leave in 2019; (2)
Ring, Messina, or Parker, “harass[ing]” Yelder about needing a doctor’s note each
time he called in to take a sick day, R. Doc. 91-7, at 32; (3) Parker scheduling Yelder
to work weekends and night shifts; (4) Parker “calling [him] lazy, telling [him that he]
w[as] moving too slow, [and] telling [him] to get a job at Walmart in a demeaning
tone,” R. Doc. 101-2, at 46; and (5) Parker telling staff during group meetings and
Yelder during individual meetings to put tissue in their ears for failure to listen. We
hold that this conduct—either individually or collectively—fails to satisfy the
demanding standard that our case law has established for showing severe or pervasive
conduct. The conduct occurred over a period of 20 months. And although Parker’s
comments were insensitive and offensive, they do not rise to the level of hostile or
severely abusive.15
15See, e.g., Watson v. CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc., 619 F.3d 936, 937–41 (8th Cir.
2010) (holding African-American employees established a genuine issue of material
fact on their hostile work environment claim based on the following facts: “white
employees routinely refused to work with African-American employees,” including
comments such as a supervisor saying, “[o]h, that’s not going to happen,” when a
white employee was going to be assigned to work with an African-American
employee and being told that a certain employee “don’t [sic] want to work with black
people”; “racial graffiti appeared in several locations” on company premises; “‘KKK’
and ‘I hate n****rs’ were carved into a workbench in the employees’ locker room,”
and “KKK” was also carved into work lockers; racial slurs were written on the walls
and stalls of the bathroom, including the word “n****r”; a railcar had the words
“hang a n****r today” painted on its side; “kill the n****rs” and “f**k n****rs”
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III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________
were painted alongside swastikas on railcars; several white coworkers exhibited
Confederate flags and other racial emblems at work; white coworkers made false
accusations of safety violations against African-American employees; plaintiff had
a shuttle accident and was immediately sent for drug testing and suspended, actions
that did not occur when a shuttle operated by a white employee experienced the same
accident; plaintiff was called to work an overtime shift because a white coworker
refused to work with an African-American employee, saying “I told you I wasn’t
going to work with that n****r”; white coworker stated “I hate them damn n****rs”
and falsely reported unsafe behavior from plaintiff; white coworker told plaintiff,
“[n]****r, go down there and throw the switch”; white coworker told plaintiff, “I told
your black ass I wasn’t going to do it”; white coworker called plaintiff “a large black
male”; white coworker said “I’m going to get you canned, n****r”; and white
coworker, in response to a question, said that he did not like black people).
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