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25-1628•United States of America v. Marlon T. Jordan
25-1628Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitSep 30, 2025
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1876
___________________________
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Marlon T. Jordan
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
___________________________
No. 25-1878
___________________________
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Marlon T. Jordan
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
____________
Appeals from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
____________
Submitted: September 25, 2025
Filed: September 30, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, Marlon Jordan appeals the sentences the district
court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to a new drug offense pursuant to a written
plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, and upon the revocation of the
supervised release term he was serving for a prior firearm offense. His counsel has
moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief challenging the sentences as
substantively unreasonable.
Upon careful review, we conclude that the appeal waiver is valid, applicable,
and enforceable as to the appeal from the sentence for the new offense. See United
States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and
applicability of an appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing the enforceability of appeal waivers). We also
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the revocation
sentence, as there is no indication that it failed to consider a relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors, and the revocation
sentence was within the statutory maximum. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d
910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009) (abuse of discretion review); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(maximum revocation prison term is 2 years if underlying offense is Class C felony).
For the new drug charge, we have independently reviewed the record and found
no non-frivolous issues outside the scope of the appeal waiver. See Penson v. Ohio,
1The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.
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488 U.S. 75 (1988). Accordingly, we affirm the sentence in No. 25-1878, dismiss the
appeal in No. 25-1876, and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
______________________________
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