United States of America v. Eddie Seaton

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3157
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Eddie Seaton
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: September 17, 2025
Filed: October 24, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
While searching Eddie Seaton’s computer, officers found three anime images
depicting sexually explicit acts between minor boys and an adult female. A forensic
examination also revealed a large cache of child pornography images in his
computer’s “carved space,” the unallocated space within the computer’s hard drive,
which contains deleted files that have not been overwritten. Following a four-day

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trial, a jury convicted Seaton of receipt of obscene visual representations of the
sexual abuse of children, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) (Count One), and possession of
child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Count Two). The district court1
denied Seaton’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Seaton argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to
him because the anime images do not depict real children.2 But the statute proscribes
“obscene” images, § 1466A(a)(1)(B), which the First Amendment does not protect
regardless of whether the images depict real or fictional children. See United States
v. Buie, 946 F.3d 443, 445–46 (8th Cir. 2019) (rejecting facial challenge to
§ 1466A(b)(1) because statute limited proscription to “obscene” visual depictions of
minors). Seaton’s reliance on Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition is misplaced. 535
U.S. 234 (2002). There, the Supreme Court found that a law proscribing virtual child
pornography was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted images that were
not the product of child abuse and did not require them to be obscene. Id. at 256.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable
jury could find that the three anime images were obscene. United States v. Cook,
603 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). A work is obscene if: (1)
“‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,” (2) “the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law,” and (3) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
(citations omitted). The anime images depict sexually explicit acts between two
young boys and an adult woman that a reasonable jury could find appeal to the
1 The Honorable D.P. Marshall, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
2 We reject Seaton’s argument that § 1466A(a)(1) requires that the minor
depicted actually exist. § 1466A(c) (“It is not a required element of any offense
under this section that the minor depicted actually exist.”); see United States v.
Arthur, 51 F.4th 560, 568–69 (5th Cir. 2022).

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prurient interest. The jury could also find that the images’ depictions of children
engaging in sexual conduct with an adult are patently offensive and that they are
different from the literary and film works Seaton cites.
Turning to Count Two, Seaton argues that the evidence was insufficient to
show he knowingly possessed the cache of child pornography images found in his
computer’s carved space because the space could not be accessed without additional
software, which was not found on his computer. He also suggests that Kevin
Hicks—a man who had access to Seaton’s home and who was later convicted of
possessing child pornography—could have deposited the images there. But Hicks
testified that he had never used Seaton’s computer and that Seaton had asked him
how to search for child pornography. Seaton also admitted that he used certain
search terms, which appear to match images that were found in the carved space.
And while the location of child pornography in inaccessible computer locations
“‘can raise serious issues of inadvertent or unknowing possession . . . these are
issues of fact, not of law.’” United States v. Hensley, 982 F.3d 1147, 1157 (8th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted). Resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government,
a reasonable jury could find Seaton knowingly possessed the child pornography. See
Cook, 603 F.3d at 437.
Affirmed.
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