William R. Schlecht v. Stanley Goldman; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2095
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William R. Schlecht
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Stanley Goldman; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: November 4, 2025
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Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
William R. Schlecht appeals from the district court’s1 order dismissing his
action against Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance (“Northwestern Mutual”) and its
1 The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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agent, Stanley Goldman, and the court’s denial of his motion for rehearing. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
William Schlecht, an attorney with more than 20 years’ experience, sued
Northwestern Mutual and Goldman after his Term-65 life insurance policy with
extended protection and $250,000 death benefit lapsed in 2015. The policy lapsed
because Schlecht missed a payment. Schlecht contends he cured the deficiency
when he called Goldman, paid the delinquent premium, submitted his medical
history, and received confirmation of the policy’s reinstatement. Northwestern
Mutual subsequently refunded Schlecht’s payment for reinstatement.
In 2023, Schlecht commenced an action in state court alleging breach of
contract and various other state law claims. Schlecht alleged Northwestern Mutual
told him the policy had been reinstated and a couple months later, without a
permissible reason, Northwestern Mutual refunded Schlecht’s premium payment
and rescinded its prior decision to reinstate the policy. Northwestern Mutual denied
it ever reinstated the policy and asserted the policy expired by its own terms when
the paid-up additions to the policy were exhausted in 2022.
Following Northwestern Mutual’s removal to federal court, the parties
reached a resolution in mediation and signed a “Settlement Term Sheet
Memorandum” (“settlement memorandum”) listing five “essential/material terms.”
These terms included: (1) Northwestern Mutual’s agreement to pay Schlecht a total
sum of $10,000; (2) Schlecht’s willingness to sign a release of all claims, known or
unknown, with the understanding that Northwestern Mutual had agreed to resolve
disputed claims without admission of liability; (3) a provision obligating the terms
of the settlement agreement to be kept confidential to the extent allowed under
Missouri law; (4) Schlecht’s agreement not to disparage Northwestern Mutual or
Goldman; and (5) after receipt of the payment, the parties would effectuate dismissal
of the case with prejudice and without an award of costs or attorney fees. The

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specific phrasing of the terms was “to be in accordance with standard contractual
language” to be prepared by one of Northwestern Mutual’s attorneys.
Once the parties signed the settlement memorandum, the mediator notified the
court that the case had settled. Three days later, on March 8, 2024, Schlecht received
a draft settlement agreement for his review and signature. He refused to sign the
agreement because he believed it contained terms that the parties had not agreed to
during mediation. One of those terms was a provision that stated the parties “have
conducted an independent investigation of the facts and do not rely upon any
statement or representation of the other party or representatives of the other party in
entering into the Agreement, other than as expressly provided for in the Agreement.”
(referred to as “the non-reliance clause” in this litigation). Schlecht also began
inquiring about reinstatement of the policy and the applicable death benefit. More
specifically, he asked Northwestern Mutual’s counsel several questions in an email:
“Most importantly: Has NML treated the Policy as fully enforceable after the
disputed lapse raised eight years ago and as you now represent? If so, what is the
current status of both components of the Policy? The event of my death, does either
component of the Policy apply?”
Unable to come to a resolution, Schlecht moved to vacate the settlement
memorandum and take additional depositions. Northwestern Mutual and Goldman
moved to enforce the settlement. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing,
but Schlecht failed to appear. The court granted Northwestern Mutual’s and
Goldman’s motions to enforce settlement and denied Schlecht’s motions to vacate
the settlement and take additional depositions. Schlecht filed a motion for rehearing,
which was denied.
Schlecht appeals, contending the district court’s enforcement of the draft
settlement agreement was in error for two reasons: (1) inclusion of the non-reliance
clause is an essential settlement term under Missouri law, and Schlecht’s refusal to
agree to that provision meant there was no settlement agreement at all; and (2) to the
extent the parties reached a settlement, the terms should be those included on the

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settlement memorandum, not Northwestern Mutual’s subsequent draft agreement.
Schlecht further contends that the district court abused its discretion when it refused
to hold a new evidentiary hearing after Schlecht missed the hearing for a serious
medical reason.
II. DISCUSSION
1. Material Settlement Terms and Settlement Enforceability
The parties agree that Missouri law governs this dispute. Under Missouri law,
a party asking to enforce a settlement agreement bears the burden of proving “by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence” that it is entitled to relief. Stickler v.
McGinnis, 649 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted). “Evidence is
clear and convincing if it instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative when weighed
against the evidence in opposition, such that the fact finder’s mind is left with an
abiding conviction that the evidence is true.” Id. at 44 (cleaned up). Because
enforcement of a settlement agreement is an equitable remedy of specific
performance, the trial court is “afforded much discretion” when deciding whether to
compel settlement. Id.
“The question of whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement
agreement is governed by contract law.” Jameson v. Still, 643 S.W.3d 306, 309
(Mo. 2022) (en banc). To establish an enforceable settlement agreement,
Northwestern Mutual must prove the essential elements for a contract: offer,
acceptance, and bargained for consideration. Id. Consideration may be either “a
promise (to do or refrain from doing something) or the transfer or giving up of
something of value to the other party.” Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d
15, 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)).
We review a district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard and its interpretation of a settlement agreement de novo. Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. North Little Rock Sch. Dist., 109 F.3d 514, 516 (8th Cir. 1997). “Whether

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the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement is a question of fact we
review for clear error.” Schultz v. Verizon Wireless Services, LLC, 833 F.3d 975,
978 (8th Cir. 2016). “The essential elements of a valid settlement agreement are the
involvement of parties who are competent to contract, a proper subject matter, legal
consideration, mutuality of obligation, and mutuality of agreement.” Chaganti &
Associates, P.C. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1221 (8th Cir. 2006).
Here, the district court found that Northwestern Mutual’s offer to pay $10,000
in exchange for Schlecht’s willingness to settle the lawsuit was sufficient
consideration to form a valid contract. “A valid settlement agreement also requires
‘a meeting of the minds and mutual assent to the essential terms of the
agreement.’” Youngs v. Conley, 505 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting
Reppy v. Winters, 351 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)). A meeting of the
minds occurs if there is a “definite offer,” an unequivocal acceptance, and a mutual
agreement on the “same thing in the same sense at the same time.” Stickler, 649
S.W.3d at 43. Schlecht contends no valid settlement agreement was reached because
he accepted the terms set forth in the settlement memorandum and when
Northwestern Mutual subsequently added the non-reliance clause into the final
settlement agreement, there was no longer a meeting of the minds. Schlecht claimed
in a letter he wrote to Northwestern Mutual after the mediation that his “long-held
belief of the facts was turned on its head Tuesday” at mediation, asserting “I had life
insurance after all. I just didn’t know it.” He further asserted: “I also learned
Tuesday that I no longer have the life insurance. I didn’t know that either.” Schlecht
recounted that his $1.5 million settlement offer made at the beginning of the day
ended in a $10,000 settlement at the end of that day based on what he believed was
Northwestern Mutual’s decision to rescind reinstatement of the policy eight years
prior. Schlecht then proposed alternative settlement options, which Northwestern
Mutual declined to consider.
Evidence in the record shows Schlecht knew that he had agreed to settle the
case at mediation for the sum of $10,000 on a policy that he knew had a death benefit
of $250,000 and that he believed also accrued dividends and cash flow.

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Subsequently, Schlecht became unhappy with the settlement terms he had reached,
contesting that there was a meeting of the minds. Resolution of Schlecht’s claim
depends on whether, under Missouri law, the disputed non-reliance clause is an
essential/material term that the parties had to be agreed on for there to be a meeting
of the minds, as Schlecht contends, or, as Northwestern Mutual contends, whether
that clause is a standard contractual term which is neither essential nor a basis to
undo the settlement reached at mediation. The district court found the settlement
memorandum demonstrated there was a meeting of the minds and the parties’
agreement was “final enough” for an experienced mediator to inform the court that
the matter had settled, with no indication that any material term remained
unresolved. The district court further found that only after signing the settlement
memorandum did Schlecht take “issue with the standard contractual term.” The
court declined to allow Schlecht to rescind the settlement reached at mediation
“because there is clear and convincing evidence that both parties agreed to the
settlement.”
A determination of which contractual terms are “essential depends on the
agreement and its context and also on the subsequent conduct of the parties,
including the dispute which arises and the remedy sought.” Shellabarger v.
Shellabarger, 317 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). The settlement memorandum
listed five terms that the parties mutually characterized as the “essential/material
terms.” Notably, Schlecht, although an experienced attorney, did not include any
provision regarding the continued enforceability of his life insurance policy or its
benefits in the settlement memorandum. The documents in the record establish that
the first time Schlecht raised an issue or questioned the policy’s continued
enforceability and applicable benefits was after he received and reviewed the draft
settlement agreement—days after he had unambiguously accepted Northwestern
Mutual’s offer to settle all claims for $10,000.
To undo the settlement, Schlecht argues Northwestern Mutual added a
material term in the draft settlement agreement that was not agreed to at mediation.

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Schlecht, however, has not persuaded us that the non-reliance clause either adds a
material term to the settlement or alters a material term contained in the settlement
memorandum. This clause restated concepts that were already in essence part of the
settlement memorandum. The non-reliance clause provided that each party had an
opportunity to conduct an independent investigation of the facts, and no party was
relying on the other party’s statements or representations when deciding whether to
sign the agreement. This clause is consistent with the settlement memorandum
which memorialized Schlecht’s awareness of his right to obtain the advice of his
own counsel and his choice to decline to exercise that choice and instead proceed as
a self-represented litigant. In addition, the parties expressly acknowledged in the
settlement memorandum that the meaning of any items in the memorandum was the
sole responsibility of the parties. By signing the settlement memorandum, each party
agreed that they were acting “voluntarily, of their own free will, and [] under no
duress when signing.” The parties further recognized that by signing the
memorandum “they may adversely alter their legal rights in court, and, by signing
this Memorandum, they are waiving all trials and appeals, except for judicial
enforcement of this Memorandum.”
The settlement memorandum made plain that the final settlement documents
would contain phrasing consistent with “standard contractual language.” Although
an experienced attorney, Schlecht did not defer accepting Northwestern Mutual’s
settlement offer until he had an opportunity to review “the specific final phrasing of
the terms” that were forthcoming. Nor did Schlecht ask for an opportunity to consult
with his own counsel or verify any information or representation that had been made
by Northwestern Mutual either prior to mediation or during mediation. Instead,
Schlecht unambiguously agreed to settle the case. He did so with the understanding
that he was “completely releas[ing] and forever discharg[ing]” Northwestern Mutual
(and all past, present, and future officers, principals, policy owners, etc.)
from any and all rights, claims, demands, debts, contracts, accounts,
torts, misfeasance, malfeasance, costs, losses, expenses, obligations,
causes of action, damages and liability of any kind or character
whatsoever, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured,

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asserted or unasserted, and whether legal, equitable, or statutory in
nature, that [Schlecht] ha[d] or may have had against [Northwestern
Mutual or Goldman] as of the date of the settlement agreement,
including without limitation any claim that was asserted, could have
been asserted, or was in any way related to the Case No. 23-645-SRB
and Policy No. 920799, understanding that resolution is for disputed
claims and without admission of liability.
The phrasing of the non-reliance clause did not add or alter any settlement term or
provision in the settlement memorandum, let alone a material term. Because the
settlement agreement is consistent with the terms and provisions set forth in the
settlement memorandum, Schlecht’s alternative request to enforce the settlement
memorandum but not the settlement agreement is unavailing. Under these
circumstances, we find no error, clear or otherwise, in the district court’s finding that
the non-reliance clause drafted by Northwestern Mutual was standard contractual
release language. Further, Schlecht has not shown by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence that he is entitled to relief from his agreement to settle. We
affirm the district court’s decision to enforce the settlement.
2. Evidentiary Hearing
Schlecht also argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a rehearing. Schlecht failed to attend the scheduled hearing, initially
telling the district court clerk that he had car trouble and subsequently claiming he
had experienced a medical episode. Schlecht now asserts that his phone call to the
clerk was a motion to continue, and he “appeals both the denial of the continuance
and the refusal to hold a new hearing.”
A party is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion
relating to a settlement agreement. Stewart v. M.D.F., Inc., 83 F.3d 247, 251 (8th
Cir. 1996). This Court has noted the district court’s “considerable discretion” when
deciding a motion to compel settlement, suggesting a hearing is warranted “only if

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there are substantial questions of fact that are not already a matter of record.” Barry
v. Barry, 172 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Stewart, 83 F.3d at 251.
Schlecht has not demonstrated the existence of any factual dispute, which
would require the presentation of evidence for resolution. Instead, the factual record
was developed and included exhibits Schlecht submitted. The district court stated it
had thoroughly reviewed all the exhibits before making its decision. Schlecht has
not explained how a new hearing could change the outcome. And “[t]he judicial
policy favoring settlement rests on the opportunity to conserve judicial resources,
not expend them further.” Stewart, 83 F.3d at 252 (citation omitted). On this record,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to continue the matter when
Schlecht did not appear at the scheduled hearing or by declining to hold a second
hearing before issuing a decision on whether to enforce the parties’ settlement.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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