Michelle Siebrecht v. Mercy Health Services - Iowa Corp., doing business as MercyOne Siouxland Medical Center

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-3159
___________________________
Michelle Siebrecht
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Mercy Health Services - Iowa Corp., doing business as MercyOne Siouxland
Medical Center
Defendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Western
____________
Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: January 5, 2026
____________
Before SMITH, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
____________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Michelle Siebrecht sued her former employer, Mercy Health Services Iowa
Corp. d/b/a MercyOne Siouxland Medical Center (Mercy), alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), and the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). She claims that Mercy discriminated
against her because of her disability and for taking FMLA leave. Mercy denies these

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allegations. The district court1 granted summary judgment for Mercy on all claims.
Siebrecht appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I. Background
A. Mercy’s Hawarden Facility
Siebrecht worked as a physician assistant for Mercy in the emergency room
(ER) at Mercy’s facility in Hawarden, Iowa. Because the Hawarden facility was a
critical access facility, the ER was required to be staffed with at least one provider2
at all times—24 hours per day, 365 days per year. ER providers are not plentiful in
rural Iowa.
During the relevant time, Mercy usually staffed the Hawarden ER with four
providers, including Siebrecht. Mercy referred to these providers collectively as
advanced practice providers (APPs). APPs worked under employment contracts
with initial terms. The contracts provided that at the end of the initial term, the
hospital and the providers could extend the contract by written agreement.
Otherwise, the contracts would continue month-to-month for up to 90 days. This 90-
day period was known as the Temporary Renewal Period (TRP). If no extension
agreement was reached during that period, the contract terminated after either 30
days’ written notice or at the end of the TRP.
APPs worked 72 hours per two-week pay period. They did not have assigned
shifts. Instead, a shift coordinator would circulate a calendar to APPs a month in
advance, and they would respond by indicating their preferred shifts for that month.
Pursuant to their contracts, APPs were required to work three 24-hour shifts per pay
period. The contracts also stated that APPs were required to work weekends. When
1 The Honorable Kelly K.E. Mahoney, United States Chief Magistrate Judge
for the Northern District of Iowa, to whom the case was referred for final disposition
by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
2 “Provider” refers to doctors, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.

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a shift could not be covered by an APP, workers known as PRNs and locums
(temporary replacements) covered them.
B. Siebrecht’s First FMLA Leave
Siebrecht was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS).3 Due to effects of her
condition, she took FMLA leave from June 3, 2021, to August 1, 2021. When her
doctor filled out the paperwork for her leave, he indicated that ongoing stress at work
and at home exacerbated Siebrecht’s MS. He also stated that Siebrecht’s episodic
MS flareups could periodically prevent her from performing her job functions.
C. Mercy’s Attempt to Renew Siebrecht’s Contract
Siebrecht’s employment contract was set to expire on February 28, 2022. On
January 25, 2022, the CEO at the Hawarden facility presented Siebrecht with a
proposed contract extension. Siebrecht declined the offer and never made a
counteroffer. Neither party ever raised the issue of negotiating a new contract with
the other.
D. Siebrecht’s Second FMLA Leave
Siebrecht took her second FMLA leave from January 31, 2022, to March 14,
2022. Her FMLA paperwork stated that the leave was due to chronic MS with acute
exacerbation. Siebrecht’s doctor again attributed exacerbation to her strenuous work
schedule and continued stress at home.
E. Siebrecht Seeks Accommodations
On February 25, 2022, while still on leave, Siebrecht attended a doctor’s
appointment. After evaluating Siebrecht, her doctor cleared her to return to work by
the middle of March with the following limitations: no more than one 24-hour shift
per week and no weekend shifts because, according to him, weekend shifts in the
3 In denying Siebrecht’s partial motion for summary judgment, the district
court concluded that “[a] fact question exists as to whether Siebrecht in fact has MS,
and if so, whether it qualified as a disability under the law (whether it substantially
limited a major life activity).” R. Doc. 112, at 15.

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ER tend to be more hectic. In his treatment notes, the doctor opined that 24-hour
shifts seemed to be an extremely long time for someone with her condition. He
scheduled a three-month follow-up appointment with Siebrecht. He also suggested
that if she continued to do well, he would permit her to work additional days.
However, he also noted that her condition would have flareups for the rest of her
life.
Siebrecht’s doctor informed Mercy that her restrictions were expected to last
through December 31, 2022. On March 16, 2022, the HR specialist stated that Mercy
could accommodate Siebrecht’s restrictions but could not confirm that the
accommodation could be made through December 31, 2022.
F. Termination of Siebrecht’s Employment
The CEO of the Hawarden facility emailed an executive at Mercy, stating:
“[Siebrecht] is now saying that her doctor notes states that she will be doing 1 (24)
[hour] shift through December. This is not working out the best and I think we need
to terminate her and let her disability run out. Or she can work at MercyOne her 24
[hour] shift.” App. Vol. II, at 793. In his deposition, the CEO explained that he was
expressing concern that Siebrecht was unable to meet her required shifts and that it
was unfair to others in the department. Moreover, at least one of Siebrecht’s
colleagues complained to the CEO that Siebrecht’s medical leave was unfair to other
APPs.
Mercy decided to terminate Siebrecht’s employment on April 26, 2022.
Mercy notified Siebrecht of its decision via written letter dated April 28, 2022. The
letter stated that because the parties had not renewed Siebrecht’s employment
contract, her employment with Mercy was terminated effective May 30, 2022, the
day after her TRP would end. On May 20, 2022, Mercy communicated to Siebrecht
that she was relieved of further shifts but would continue to be paid through May 30.
Siebrecht never had any formal disciplinary actions during her employment with
Mercy.

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During a doctor’s appointment on May 26, 2022, Siebrecht’s doctor noted that
her MS appeared stable. He signed a “Release to Return to Work” statement that
released her to return to work with no restrictions effective June 13, 2022.
G. Litigation
Siebrecht filed a lawsuit against Mercy in Iowa state court alleging violations
of the ADA, the ICRA, and the FMLA. Mercy removed the case to federal court
based on federal question jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Mercy on all of Siebrecht’s claims.4 Siebrecht appeals.
II. Discussion
Siebrecht argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
on her disability discrimination claims and her FMLA claim. “We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Lipp v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 911
F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If there is a genuine
dispute of material fact, we view the disputed facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
banc). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. (quoting Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)).
A. Disability Discrimination
Siebrecht alleges that Mercy discriminated against her in violation of the ADA
and ICRA. The district court granted summary judgment for Mercy on both claims
after concluding that Siebrecht was not a “qualified individual.” Siebrecht argues
that the district court erred. We disagree.
4 The district court’s order also denied as moot Siebrecht’s motions to
supplement the record (R. Docs. 79, 94), denied Siebrecht’s motion for partial
summary judgment (R. Doc. 43), and denied as moot Mercy’s motion for sanctions
(R. Doc. 37).

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“ADA and ICRA disability claims are analyzed under the same standards.”
Tjernagel v. Gates Corp., 533 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2008). Both statutes prohibit
an employer from discriminating against a “qualified individual” based on the
individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Rumsey v. Woodgrain Millwork, Inc.,
962 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Iowa 2021) (explaining that only “qualified individuals” can
establish a claim under the ICRA). To be a qualified individual, “an employee must
(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and training for her position,
and (2) be able to perform the essential job functions, with or without reasonable
accommodation.” Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation
modified); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). An employee bears the burden of proving
that she is a “qualified individual.” Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S.
795, 806 (1999).
It is undisputed that Siebrecht possesses the requisite skill, education,
experience, and training for her position. At issue is whether she was able to perform
the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. We
conclude that, on this record, the district court correctly concluded that she has not
shown that she could perform the essential functions of her job.
1. Essential Job Functions
“An employer has the burden of showing a particular job function is an
essential function of the job.” Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 2007).
Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires.” EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477
F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d
784, 787 (8th Cir. 1998)). When determining what constitutes an essential job
function, we consider evidence such as:
(1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2)
written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job
performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the

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incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the current work experience
of incumbents in similar jobs.
McNeil v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 936 F.3d 786, 789–90 (8th Cir. 2019).
The district court concluded that Mercy met its burden of showing that the
ability to work three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekend shifts was an
essential function of Siebrecht’s job. Siebrecht contends that the district court erred.
She contends that the essential function of her job was to treat patients, not to work
specific shifts. She argues that if the ability to work 24-hour shifts and weekend
shifts was an essential job function, Mercy would have referenced her inability to
work those shifts as a reason in her termination letter.
Applying the factors discussed above, we conclude that Mercy has met its
burden of establishing that the ability to work three 24-hour shifts per pay period
and weekend shifts constituted an essential function of Siebrecht’s job. Mercy
considers working three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekend shifts essential
functions of an APP. Mercy included both requirements in Siebrecht’s, and every
other APP’s, employment contract. The contracts stated that “Provider’s schedule
shall include event and weekend coverage” and “Provider will be expected to work
three (3) twenty four (24) hour shifts per pay period.” R. Doc. 70-3, at 74. Moreover,
the APPs schedules were comprised mostly of 24-hour shifts. Finally, if Siebrecht
was not required to work her three 24-hour shifts per pay period or weekend shifts,
other APPs, PRNs, or locums would have to cover for her by working additional
shifts.
Siebrecht’s argument that the essential function of her job was patient care
misses the point. Patient care is certainly the ultimate purpose of the work that
Siebrecht performed, as would be the case for most positions in a hospital. The focus
of the inquiry is not on the ultimate purpose of services that Siebrecht performed but
on the specific tasks required to complete the purpose of the particular position that
she occupied. As we have explained, “the term essential function encompasses more

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than core job requirements; indeed, it also may include scheduling flexibility.”
Rehrs, 486 F.3d at 358. Further, we have explained that requiring employees to work
certain undesirable shifts—here, weekends—can be considered essential job
functions because it enhances the non-work life of employees by spreading the shifts
among them. See Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 931 (8th
Cir. 2012) (“Shift rotation also enhances the non-work life of Resource Coordinators
by spreading the less desirable shifts—nights and weekends—among all Resource
Coordinators.”).
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
working three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekend shifts were essential
functions of Siebrecht’s position at Mercy. We affirm the conclusion that they were.
2. Siebrecht’s Ability to Perform Essential Job Functions
Next, we address whether Siebrecht could perform these essential job
functions related to her shifts with or without reasonable accommodation. It is
undisputed that at the time Mercy terminated Siebrecht’s employment, she could not
work three 24-hour shifts and weekend shifts without reasonable accommodation.
Thus, we must determine whether she could have worked the shifts with reasonable
accommodation.
“Under the ADA . . . an employer must reasonably accommodate an
employee’s disability and engage in an interactive process to identify potential
accommodations that could overcome her limitations.” Burchett v. Target Corp., 340
F.3d 510, 517 (8th Cir. 2003). The employee has the “burden to make a facial
showing that a reasonable accommodation would enable her to perform her essential
job functions.” Scruggs v. Pulaski Cnty., 817 F.3d 1087, 1093 (8th Cir. 2016)
(citation modified). An employee only needs to show that accommodation is
reasonable on its face. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002). If the
employee meets her burden of showing that a reasonable accommodation is possible,
“the burden of production then shifts to the employer to show that it had a legitimate

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nondiscriminatory reason not to provide the accommodation.” Burchett, 340 F.3d at
517.
a. Reduced Work Schedule
Siebrecht argues that a reduced work schedule, with fewer 24-hour shifts and
no weekend shifts, constituted a reasonable accommodation that would have
enabled her to perform the essential functions of her job. However, as discussed
above, the ability to work three 24-hour shifts per pay period and weekend shifts
were essential job functions. Thus, the inability to work those shifts prevents
performance of those essential functions. As the district court explained, “both the
ability to work all of her shifts (and not just two-thirds of them) and the ability to
cover weekend shifts both constitute essential functions of Siebrecht’s job.” R. Doc.
112, at 21 (emphasis added). There is no genuine dispute of material fact about
whether a reduced work schedule would have enabled Siebrecht to perform the
essential functions of her job.
b. Reassignment
Siebrecht also argues that reassignment to a new position would have been a
reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the essential
functions of her job. “While reassignment to a vacant position can be a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA, it is not necessarily required.” Burchett, 940 F.3d
at 517. “[R]eassignment to another position is a required accommodation only if
there is a vacant position for which the employee is otherwise qualified.” Ehlers v.
Univ. of Minn., 34 F.4th 655, 660 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Minnihan v. Mediacom
Commc’ns Corp., 779 F.3d 803, 814 (8th Cir. 2005)). To establish reassignment as
a possible accommodation, an employee “must make a facial showing that a position
is available for which [she] qualifies.” Id. An employee can establish that she
qualifies for an available position by “mak[ing] a facial showing that she satisfied
the legitimate prerequisites for an alternative position and would ‘be able to perform
the essential functions of that position with or without reasonable

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accommodations.’” Id. (quoting Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City,
214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Here, Siebrecht has not met her burden of establishing that reassignment to a
new position was a reasonable accommodation. She has not identified an alternative
position that was vacant during the relevant period. Nor can Siebrecht satisfy her
burden by relying on the Hawarden facility’s CEO’s email to another executive that
“she can work at MercyOne her 24 [hour] shift.” App. Vol. II, at 793. This email
does not identify an available position that Siebrecht was qualified for. Further, the
CEO was the CEO of the Hawarden facility, not MercyOne, so his statement does
not mean that there was an available position at MercyOne. The absence of an
available position forecloses reassignment to an alternative position. There is no
genuine dispute of material fact about whether reassignment would have been a
reasonable accommodation.
c. Interactive Process
Lastly, Siebrecht argues that Mercy failed to engage in the interactive process.
“[A] plaintiff can survive summary judgment on a reasonable-accommodation claim
by showing that the employer failed to engage in an interactive process.” Ehlers, 34
F.4th at 660.
To establish that an employer failed to participate in an interactive
process, a disabled employee must show: (1) the employer knew about
the employee’s disability; (2) the employee requested accommodation
or assistance for his or her disability; (3) the employer did not make a
good[-]faith effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodation;
and (4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but
for the employer’s lack of good faith.
Id. (quoting Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1021). Ultimately, “[t]he employee still carries the
burden of showing that a particular accommodation rejected by the employer would

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have made the employee qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.”
Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 954 (8th Cir. 1999).
Here, Siebrecht satisfies the first two elements. Mercy knew about Siebrecht’s
asserted disability and Siebrecht’s requested accommodation. However, Siebrecht
fails the fourth element. Even assuming Mercy failed to make a good-faith effort to
assist Siebrecht in seeking accommodation, Siebrecht has not met her burden of
showing that she could have been reasonably accommodated but for Mercy’s lack
of good-faith effort. As discussed above, Siebrecht has failed to identify any
reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the essential
functions of her job. Thus, Mercy’s actions with respect to the interactive process
yield no genuine dispute of material fact.
B. FMLA Claim
Siebrecht also alleges that Mercy retaliated against her for taking FMLA
leave, in violation of the FMLA. The district court granted Mercy’s motion for
summary judgment on this claim after concluding that there was no causal
connection between Siebrecht’s FMLA leave and Mercy’s termination of her
employment. Siebrecht argues that the district court erred. We disagree.
The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for
exercising their rights under the Act. Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir.
2002). This “includes consideration of an employee’s use of FMLA leave as a
negative factor in an employment action.” Id. But “[t]aking FMLA leave . . . does
not give an employee any greater protection against termination for reasons
unrelated to the FMLA than was available before.” Malloy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 756
F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2014).
When an employee’s FMLA retaliation claim is not based on direct evidence,
we analyze the claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.5
5McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2008). Under this framework, the
employee has the initial burden to establish a prima facie FMLA retaliation claim.
Id. To do so, she must present sufficient facts for a jury to find that (1) “she engaged
in activity protected under the Act,” (2) “she suffered an adverse employment action
by the employer,” and (3) “a causal connection existed between the employee’s
action and the adverse employment action.” Darby, 287 F.3d at 679. If the employee
is successful, the burden shifts to the employer to present evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Phillips, 547 F.3d at 912. Finally,
if the employer satisfies its burden, the employee must present evidence that creates
an issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was pretext for discrimination.
Id.
Because Siebrecht’s FMLA retaliation claim is not based on direct evidence,
we analyze the claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
1. Prima Facie Retaliation Claim
First, did Siebrecht meet her burden of establishing a prima facie FMLA
retaliation claim? The first two elements are not at issue. It is undisputed that
Siebrecht engaged in protected activity when she took FMLA leave and that she
suffered an adverse employment action when Mercy terminated her employment. At
issue is whether a causal connection existed between the protected activity and
adverse employment action, i.e., whether Mercy terminated Siebrecht’s employment
because she took FMLA leave.
The only evidence Siebrecht relies on to support the causation element of her
claim is the following deposition testimony from the CEO of the Hawarden facility:
Q: Why did you tell Ms. Pingel that you believed [Siebrecht] should be
terminated?
A: Because of her unreliability.
. . .

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Q: Well, when you said that Ms. Pingel asked you if Ms. Siebrecht
should be terminated and you said yes, and the reason was because of
her unreliability and the fact that she could only work 24 hours a shift,
what were you referencing when you were talking about only working
24 hours a shift?
A: Well, that was the restriction. I mean, I—that was the restriction of
her 24-hour shifts, and that was an accommodation we tried to make
work out, but it just didn’t work out.
Q: Okay. So you’re talking about a restriction that [Siebrecht] had when
she came back to work following her FMLA leave in 2022?
A: Again, I’m looking at blocks of—blocks of situations. [Siebrecht]
went out on some time related to FMLA. She then came back, which I
believe she had no restrictions of what I can recollect. And then she
went out for another period of time with restrictions when she came
back.
R. Doc. 70-3, at 194, 106:12–15, 108:20–109:13.
Siebrecht contends that when the CEO testified that he believed Siebrecht’s
employment should be terminated because of her “unreliability,” he was referring to
the “blocks of situations” he referenced in response to a subsequent question.
Siebrecht argues that the “blocks of situations” were the two times that she took
FMLA leave. Thus, according to Siebrecht, the CEO believed that Siebrecht was
unreliable because she took FMLA leave twice. Siebrecht asserts that this testimony,
viewed in the light most favorable to her, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to the causation element of the prima facie retaliation claim.
Siebrecht’s argument, however, unreasonably construes the CEO’s testimony.
The CEO’s reference to “blocks of situations” made no statement that her FMLA
use played a role in her termination. It was the medical restrictions following the
FMLA leave that prevented her from fulfilling the job requirement of 24-hour shifts.

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The CEO’s testimony made clear that when he said Siebrecht was unreliable, he was
only referring to her restriction on 24-hour shifts:
Q: Okay. So let’s finish up the conversation in which Ms. Pingel asked
you should [Siebrecht] be terminated, you said yes, she’s unreliable.
We have the 24-hour shift restriction, we can’t meet that, it’s unfair,
causes a burden on others in the department. Am I accurately
summarizing what you’re relaying to her?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did you relay any other reasons why you felt Ms. Siebrecht should
be terminated in that same conversation with Ms. Pingel?
A: Not that I recall.
R. Doc. 70-3, at 196, 122:7–17. The CEO did not reference FMLA leave in
connection with Siebrecht’s unreliability. Considering the CEO’s testimony in the
context of his entire deposition makes clear that his comments about Siebrecht’s
unreliability were unrelated to his comments about “blocks of situations.”
2. Pretext
Even if we were to find that Siebrecht established a prima facie FMLA
retaliation claim, she did not carry her burden to show that Mercy’s reason for
terminating her employment was pretext for discrimination. The district court
concluded that Siebrecht’s inability to perform the essential functions of her job with
her restricted schedule constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Mercy
to terminate her employment. Siebrecht argues that this reason was pretextual.
Pretext may be demonstrated in two ways. Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447
F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006). The first way is to show “that the employer’s
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Wallace v. DTG
Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2006)). “Under this method, the
employee must rebut the employer’s ‘underlying factual claims’ by establishing that

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the employer’s explanation has no basis in fact.” Id. (quoting Wallace, 442 F.3d at
1120). The second way is to prove pretext directly by persuading the court that an
employer’s action was more likely motivated by a prohibited reason. Id. “Pretext
may be shown with evidence that the employer’s reason for the termination has
changed substantially over time.” Loeb v. Best Buy Co., 537 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir.
2008).
Siebrecht argues that Mercy used her inability to perform the essential
functions of her job as a pretext for terminating her employment. She asserts that
Mercy previously gave a different reason for terminating her employment, namely,
the expiration of her employment contract. However, providing more than one
reason for terminating an employee’s employment contract is insufficient to
establish pretext. See id. at 874 (noting that some of the reasons the employer gave
for terminating plaintiff’s employment were, in fact, consistent). Having multiple
reasons for termination may be indicative of pretext particularly if the reasons are
contradictory. Inability to perform work functions and contract lapsing are not
necessarily conflicting reasons.
Mercy could have terminated Siebrecht’s employment for her inability to
perform the essential functions of her job and because her employment contract
expired. “Unlike the ADA, the FMLA does not mandate that employers reinstate
employees who are unable to perform the essential functions of their positions.”
Battle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 864 (8th Cir. 2006). “[T]he FMLA
omits any requirement that employers seek to reasonably accommodate employees
who cannot perform the essential functions of their respective positions.” Id. at 864–
65. Thus, under the FMLA, Mercy could terminate her employment for her inability
to perform the essential functions of her job.
Further, Siebrecht’s employment contract expressly stated that if the parties
did not agree to extend the contract, it would terminate after either 30 days’ written
notice or at the end of the TRP. Here, the parties did not extend Siebrecht’s contract,

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so Mercy gave her 30 days’ written notice that her contract would be terminated at
the end of the TRP.
Siebrecht argues that Mercy’s decision to terminate her employment after her
TRP expired created an inference of pretext because Mercy did not terminate another
APP’s employment after their TRP expired. However, “[t]he burden is on the
plaintiff to prove [she] was similarly situated in all relevant respects to a more
favorably treated employee.” Ricks v. Riverwood Int’l Corp., 38 F.3d 1016, 1019
(8th Cir. 1994). Further, “the employees used for comparison must have dealt with
the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the
same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Edwards v.
Hiland Roberts Dairy, Co., 860 F.3d 1121, 1126 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation modified).
Here, Siebrecht has not met her burden of establishing that the other APP who
signed a new contract after their TRP expired was similarly situated to her in all
relevant respects. Notably, Siebrecht has not established that the other APP made no
counteroffer to Mercy’s proposed contract extension or allowed her TRP to expire.
On the contrary, it appears that the other APP verbally accepted Mercy’s proposed
contract extension before their TRP expired. These are distinguishing circumstances
that make the other APP an inapposite comparator.
Siebrecht has not met her burden to present evidence that creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Mercy’s reason for terminating her employment
was pretext for discrimination.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________

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