Darran Farmer v. FilmTec Corporation; Dupont De Nemours, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3367
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Darran Farmer
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
FilmTec Corporation; Dupont De Nemours, Inc.
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: October 22, 2025
Filed: January 6, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After Darran Farmer was fired from his job at FilmTec Corporation, he sued
for employment discrimination and retaliation based on his disability and race. The
district court1 granted summary judgment to FilmTec and its parent company,
Dupont De Nemours, Inc. (collectively FilmTec), on all claims and entered judgment
on September 20, 2024. This triggered the 30-day time limit for Farmer to file a
notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A).
Rather than filing an immediate appeal, Farmer sent a letter to the district court
requesting permission to file a motion for reconsideration under District of
Minnesota Local Rule 7.1(j) on October 17, 2024, 28 days after the district court
entered judgment.2 The district court denied the request on November 19, 2024, 60
days after it granted summary judgment, finding that there were no extraordinary
circumstances that warranted granting permission to file a motion for
reconsideration. That same day, Farmer filed his notice of appeal. FilmTec
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely.
I.
First, we address the motion to dismiss. Judgment was entered in the district
court on September 20, 2024, and Farmer filed his notice of appeal on November
19, 2024. The parties dispute whether Farmer’s request to file a motion to
reconsider—denied on November 19—extended the time to file an appeal. See Fed.
1 The Honorable Katherine M. Menendez, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.
2 “Except with the court’s prior permission, a party must not file a motion to
reconsider. A party must show compelling circumstances to obtain such permission.
A party who seeks permission to file a motion to reconsider must first file and serve
a letter of no more than two pages requesting such permission. A party who opposes
such a request may file and serve a letter of no more than two pages in response.
This rule authorizes the parties to file those letters by ECF.” D. Minn. R. 7.1(j).

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R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (extending the time to file a notice of appeal if a party files a
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59). If
it does, Farmer’s appeal is timely. Otherwise, it is not.
Farmer contends his appeal is timely, relying on DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d
999 (8th Cir. 1999). In DuBose, we held that the appellant’s motion for leave to file
a motion to reconsider under the same District of Minnesota local rule at issue here
“was the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend the judgment under
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59(e). Therefore, the time to appeal began to run
on . . . the date of the order disposing of this motion.” Id. at 1002 (citation omitted).
Farmer argues that his case presents the same procedural circumstances, and thus his
appeal is timely.
FilmTec disagrees, arguing that another of our cases, Nordgren v. Hennepin
Cnty., 96 F.4th 1072 (8th Cir. 2024), controls. Almost one month after judgment
was entered against her, Nordgren filed a motion that she captioned as a Rule 59(e)
motion. Id. at 1075. The district court found the motion was, in substance, a motion
to reconsider, and denied it. Id. Nordgren filed a notice of appeal two weeks later.
Id. We held that the appeal was untimely. Id. at 1077. We first concluded that the
district court “did not err in characterizing Nordgren’s motion as one for
reconsideration of its order dismissing her claims.” Id. And because “[a] motion to
reconsider is not recognized as one that will extend the period for filing a notice of
appeal” under the Federal Rules, we dismissed the appeal. Id. Applying this
rationale, FilmTec asserts, Farmer’s appeal is untimely.
“[W]hen faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest opinion must be
followed ‘as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the
conflict.’” Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting T.L.
ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2006)). Because the
Nordgren panel did not distinguish, or even cite, DuBose, and because the two cases
involve the same Minnesota local rule, we consider the two opinions to be in conflict.
Following the earlier opinion, DuBose, Farmer’s letter submitted under Local Rule

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7.1(j) was the functional equivalent of a Rule 59(e) motion and thus extended the
time to file a notice of appeal. Farmer’s appeal is timely.
II.
We turn now to the merits. In resolving FilmTec’s motion for summary
judgment, the district court issued an opinion that thoroughly addressed each of
Farmer’s claims. After reviewing the record, as well as the arguments the parties
raise on appeal, we conclude that Farmer has failed to raise any meritorious grounds
for reversal. See Mehner v. Furniture Design Studios, Inc., 143 F.4th 941, 948 (8th
Cir. 2025) (“Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(quoting Morrow v. United States, 47 F.4th 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2022))). For the
reasons stated by the district court in its well-analyzed opinion, we affirm. See 8th
Cir. R. 47B.
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