United States of America v. Patrick Newcomer

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1088
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Patrick Newcomer
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 25-1089
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Patrick Newcomer
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: November 18, 2025
Filed: January 16, 2026
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
While on supervised release for two separate federal convictions, Patrick J.
Newcomer was convicted for new state crimes. The district court1 revoked that
supervised release and, as relevant, imposed 12 months of supervised release for
each conviction, to run consecutively. Newcomer argues that the latest supervised
release can run only concurrently. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this
court affirms the revocation sentence.
I.
On September 12, 2019, Newcomer burglarized a Post Office, stealing
packages and envelopes, causing a loss of $3,507.62, and impacting 56 victims.
On September 26, 2019, searching his residence, officers found a firearm,
which he, a felon, could not possess. Newcomer was federally charged for the two
separate crimes.
The district court sentenced Newcomer to 30 months in prison on each count,
to be served concurrently. The court imposed two concurrent 36-month terms of
supervised release, including a mandatory prohibition against committing new
crimes.
Once out of prison, Newcomer did not succeed on his terms of supervised
release. In 2024, he was found guilty in state court of two more counts of burglary
and of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.
1 The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska.

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The district court revoked his supervised release. Concerned with his
recidivism, it imposed 24 months’ imprisonment for each of the two federal
convictions, to run concurrently to each other and consecutively after the state
convictions. The court imposed 12 months of supervised release for each federal
conviction—to run consecutively.
Newcomer argues that terms of supervised release must run concurrently.
II.
“In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1999, Congress
eliminated most forms of parole in favor of supervised release . . . .” Johnson v.
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000). “Supervised release is a form of
postconfinement monitoring that permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty
by allowing him to serve part of his sentence outside of prison, subject to conditions
on his behavior.” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 192 (2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted), quoting Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 523 (2019).
If a defendant violates the conditions of supervised release, the district court may
impose “both [a term of] imprisonment and a further term of supervised release” if
it does not exceed “the term authorized . . . for the offense of conviction, minus the
aggregate amount of any revocation terms of imprisonment.” United States v.
Palmer, 380 F.3d 395, 398–99 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc). See also United States v.
Dailey, 113 F.4th 850, 857 (8th Cir. 2024). This court reviews de novo the legality
of Newcomer’s revocation sentence, a matter that turns on the interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 3583. See Palmer, 380 F.3d at 396.
III.
Newcomer argues that the consecutive terms of supervised release are
unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e).

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The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is
released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any Federal,
State, or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for
another offense to which the person is subject or becomes subject
during the term of supervised release. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (emphasis added).
Newcomer believes that § 3624(e) governs this case. It does not. It prohibits
consecutive terms of supervised release at the original imposition of supervised
release. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2000); United States v.
Gullickson, 982 F.2d 1231, 1235–36 (8th Cir. 1993). It does not govern sentencing
for revocations of supervised release. See United States v. Cotroneo, 89 F.3d 510,
513 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Section 3624(e) thus by its terms governs the trial court’s initial
imposition of terms of supervised release, not its subsequent sentencing discretion
upon revocation of that supervised release.”).
The supervised release imposed here, in a revocation hearing, is not “for
another offense.” “In the context of a revocation hearing, the ‘offense’ is the
underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release
conditions.” Esteras, 606 U.S. at 193–94. See id. at 194 (“The opening provision
of Title 18’s sentencing chapter clearly uses ‘offense’ to refer to a criminal
conviction.”); Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter,
575 U.S. 650, 658 (2015) (“The term ‘offense’ is most commonly used to refer to
crimes.”). The offenses underlying the revocation here are the two original, federal
convictions. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) is inapplicable here.
18 U.S.C. § 3583 “governs the imposition of original terms of supervised
release, revocation of supervised release, and postrevocation sentencing.” United
States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 2012). Section 3583(e)(3) states, as
relevant:

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The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the
defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of
supervised release without credit for time previously served on
postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised
release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated a condition of supervised release . . . .
Section 3583(h) states:
When a term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is
required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a
requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release
after imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release
shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for
the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less
any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of
supervised release.
“We read 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3) and (h) to mean what they plainly say.
Upon revocation, a defendant may be sentenced to both imprisonment and a further
term of supervised release.” Palmer, 380 F.3d at 398. “Under § 3583(h), the district
court was empowered to impose a new term of supervised release . . . .” Id. at 399.
Congress did not state that the terms of postrevocation supervised release must run
concurrently. Instead, it limited only the total duration of the supervised release,
leaving the imposition of postrevocation supervised release to the discretion of the
district courts. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(b), (h).
This aligns with Congress’s purpose: “Congress intended supervised release
to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills
rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.” Johnson, 529 U.S.
at 59. Newcomer’s recidivism drove the district court to impose the two consecutive
terms of supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the district court stated:

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My concern here is not only the serious nature of what’s set forth in the
state charges that you’ve pled guilty to now, but that it’s repetitive. It’s
the same kind of -- same kind of things that you’ve been doing and --
in the past and that you’ve been charged with in the past and most
concerning is it was while you were on supervised release from this
court.
. . . .
You will serve a period of supervised release on each of these matters
-- or each of these cases of 12 months. And I think that ought to be
consecutive. I don’t think 12 months, given what’s going on here, 12
months total at the federal level is appropriate, so 12 months on each
case, to be served consecutively, that supervision, and that is subject to
the -- the same terms and conditions that you were under originally
when your sentence was -- was given.
The district court intended the sentence to prevent further recidivism by Newcomer,
better assisting his transition into his community. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 196
(“[W]hen a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes
sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation) . . . .”).
The district court properly imposed the two consecutive terms of supervised
release.
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The judgment is affirmed.
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