United States of America v. Da’shawn Natori Domena

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1657
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Da’shawn Natori Domena
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: October 24, 2025
Filed: January 27, 2026
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Before LOKEN, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Da’Shawn Domena pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 400
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing fentanyl. This offense carries a
statutory minimum sentence of 120 months’ incarceration. See 21 U.S.C.

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§§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. The district court1 sentenced Domena to this mandatory
minimum after Domena—though otherwise safety-valve eligible—chose not to
make a safety-valve proffer. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Domena now appeals his
sentence, contending that the mandatory minimum sentence for his offense, as
applied to him, violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
A federal grand jury indicted Domena and eight others for their roles in a
fentanyl-distribution conspiracy. This conspiracy generally involved shipping
fentanyl pills from Phoenix, Arizona, to the Twin Cities, where the conspirators
distributed them. Domena’s co-conspirators flew from the Twin Cities to Phoenix,
where they bought multi-kilogram amounts of fentanyl pills. Domena’s
co-conspirators then placed the pills in stuffed animals to conceal them, packaged
those stuffed animals as birthday presents, lined the packages with dog treats (to
thwart drug-sniffing dogs from alerting to them), and shipped the packages back to
the Twin Cities. In January and February 2023, police intercepted six parcels
connected to the conspiracy. These parcels collectively contained approximately
280,000 fentanyl pills (weighing a total of approximately 30,851 grams). But the
conspirators successfully shipped other fentanyl packages from Phoenix to the Twin
Cities undetected.
In October 2023, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at
Domena’s apartment. They found fentanyl pills on Domena’s bathroom floor and
in his toilet bowl. They also located a bag of fentanyl pills in a shoebox in Domena’s
bedroom, as well as three cell phones, money orders, and money order receipts.
1 The Honorable Jeffrey M. Bryan, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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In his plea agreement, Domena admitted that “[b]eginning in August 2022 and
continuing through on or about December 14, 2023, [he] entered into an agreement
or understanding with his co-defendants to distribute 400 grams or more of a mixture
or substance containing fentanyl.” He also admitted that he “furthered the [fentanyl
distribution] conspiracy by coordinating the delivery of multiple packages
containing fentanyl pills, receiving those packages, and delivering them to other
co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Domena specifically
acknowledged receiving two such packages—one on or about December 20, 2022,
and the other on or about January 26, 2023. And he admitted that he knew these
packages contained fentanyl when he coordinated their delivery, received them, and
delivered them to his fellow conspirators.
After Domena entered his guilty plea, the United States Probation Office
prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The PSR found that Domena
was responsible for 30.8 kilograms of fentanyl. It also concluded that Domena was
a minor participant in the offense and that Domena was eligible for other
adjustments, such that Domena’s adjusted total offense level under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines was 26. The PSR further determined that Domena’s criminal
record fell into Criminal History Category I. The PSR thus calculated that—if no
statutory minimum applied—Domena’s imprisonment range under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines would have been 63-78 months. But because Domena’s
offense carries a 120-month statutory minimum imprisonment term, the PSR
concluded that Domena’s Guidelines term of imprisonment was 120 months.
Domena could potentially have avoided the mandatory minimum sentence if
he had made a safety-valve proffer—i.e., “truthfully provided to the Government all
information and evidence [he] ha[d] concerning the offense or offenses that were
part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f)(5). But Domena was not inclined to cooperate with the Government. In
a social media post dating from before Domena’s change-of-plea hearing (but from
after Domena had notified the district court of his intent to plead guilty), Domena
explained that he viewed the 120-month mandatory sentence for his offense as

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minimal and that he did not wish to cooperate with law enforcement, stating, “Ima
walk dis 10 down dis shit ain’t nun I rather die den talk to these crackas in private.”
And on December 6, 2024, after Domena had entered his guilty plea, Domena posted
a video on one of his social media accounts that contained the following text: “I took
my plea the case is over u is not finna be included in no charges of mine or any other
charges federally u is not that important.”
Domena filed a sentencing statement with the district court arguing that the
120-month mandatory minimum violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court
addressed this argument at Domena’s sentencing hearing. It concluded that
Domena’s plea agreement had waived such constitutional challenges. Nevertheless,
the district court went on to reject Domena’s Eighth Amendment argument on its
merits, reasoning that Eighth Circuit precedent foreclosed it.
Also at the sentencing hearing, the district court confirmed Domena’s
understanding of the safety-valve process and that Domena understood the
implications of his refusal to proffer—specifically, that if he declined to cooperate,
he would likely receive the mandatory minimum because the district court was not
receptive to his constitutional arguments. Domena reiterated his refusal. After
“adopt[ing] as the findings of th[e] Court the factual statements contained in the final
PSR as well as the calculation of the applicable Criminal History Category and
guidelines calculations,” the district court sentenced Domena to 120 months’
imprisonment, consistent with §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846.
On appeal, Domena renews his Eighth Amendment argument. He contends
that the district court erred in concluding that his plea agreement waived his right to
bring this constitutional challenge. He also argues that the district court erred in
rejecting his Eighth Amendment challenge on its merits. In Domena’s view, because
he had no prior criminal history, played a less significant role in the fentanyl
distribution conspiracy than some of his co-conspirators, was not tied to any
weapons or violent conduct, was motivated by financial distress, and struggled with
chemical dependence, the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence is grossly

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disproportionate to the crime he committed and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment as applied to him. The Government argues only that the 120-month
mandatory minimum is constitutional as applied in this case.
II.
Because the Government does not contend that Domena waived his right to
appeal the constitutionality of his sentence, we likewise assume that Domena
preserved his right to assert his Eighth Amendment challenge on appeal. Cf. United
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 534 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that an appellate
waiver “may have no bearing on an appeal if the government does not invoke its
terms”). We “review[] de novo an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence.”
United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. “The Supreme Court has understood this provision to ‘forbid[]
only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’” United
States v. Rivas, 39 F.4th 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
“[S]uccessful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are
exceedingly rare.” United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 837 (8th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). And our cases “effectively foreclose[]” Domena’s argument “that
his sentence is grossly disproportionate.” Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018. We have
regularly affirmed the constitutionality of mandatory sentences imposed for drug
offenses—up to and including mandatory life sentences. See id. (collecting cases);
see also United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir. 1997) (characterizing
disproportionality review as “quite narrow” and affirming mandatory life sentence
imposed pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii)); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672,
679-80 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We have held that mandatory minimum penalties for drug
offenses do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

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punishments. . . . Furthermore, [] a sentence that falls within the range prescribed
by statute has never been found to be an Eighth Amendment violation.”); United
States v. Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a challenge to a
120-month mandatory minimum sentence because “[i]t is clearly established that
mandatory minimum sentences are constitutional—even for sentences longer than
120 months”); United States v. Moore, 564 F. App’x 256, 257 (8th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished) (per curiam) (describing the constitutionality of mandatory minimum
drug sentences as “established by circuit precedent” and concluding that a
“mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months [was] not grossly disproportionate to
[the defendant’s] crime of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute cocaine base”). Here, we similarly conclude that this is not one of those
rare cases where a disproportionality challenge may succeed.
Domena committed a serious crime: “Possession, use, and distribution of
illegal drugs represent ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare
of our population.’” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). By his own
admission, Domena was involved in a conspiracy endeavoring to move a significant
volume of fentanyl into the Twin Cities. Domena admitted to receiving multiple
packages that he knew contained fentanyl and forwarding them on to others. And
Domena’s participation in this conspiracy lasted many months—evidently
terminating only after police raided his apartment and located additional fentanyl
pills. Though Domena now attempts to downplay the severity of his offense,
Domena’s sentence is simply not disproportionate to his criminal conduct. See, e.g.,
Prior, 107 F.3d at 659-60 (likening narcotics distribution to a “plague” and affirming
a mandatory life sentence for methamphetamine distribution, notwithstanding the
defendant’s contentions that he was an addict and thus less culpable than others).
We also note that Domena had the opportunity to potentially avoid the sentence he
now contends is cruel and unusual: Domena was otherwise safety-valve eligible but
made an eyes-wide-open decision to forego requesting safety-valve relief when he
refused to cooperate with the Government. Cf. id. at 660 (noting as an “aside” to an
Eighth Amendment analysis that the defendant “ha[d] been given the opportunity to

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attempt to reduce [his] sentence himself by providing substantial assistance to the
government, and he steadfastly refuse[d] to do so”).
While Domena acknowledges our mandatory-minimums authorities, he
argues that they no longer control because the Eighth Amendment “must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (citation
omitted), and standards of decency have evolved to the point where society now
would regard Domena’s 120-month sentence as cruel and unusual. But Domena
cites zero authority for this proposition—he fails to point to a single case holding
that a statutory mandatory minimum was unconstitutionally applied to a defendant
who conspired to distribute an indisputably dangerous drug like fentanyl. Domena’s
unsupported evolving-standards-of-decency argument does not persuade us. There
is nothing unconstitutionally excessive about Domena’s 120-month sentence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Domena’s sentence.
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