Matthew Achey; Jessica Achey v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; Ohio Security Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1979
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Matthew Achey; Jessica Achey
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; Ohio Security Insurance Company
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
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Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: February 5, 2026
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
A storm blew through Vernon County, Missouri in December 2021, damaging
two of three hoop barns on Matthew and Jessica Achey’s farm. Their insurer paid
for the damage to the Acheys’ 44’ x 160’ barn but denied coverage for the other 44’
x 208’ barn. The Acheys sued the Ohio Security Insurance Company and Liberty

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Mutual Insurance Company for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay.1 The
district court2 granted the insurers’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the
policy was unambiguous and only covered the 44’ x 160’ barn. We affirm.
In February 2021 the Acheys’ insurance broker, Specialty Risk Insurance,
emailed the insurers, requesting a quote for adding three barns to the Acheys’ policy,
measuring 44’ x 160’, 44’ x 208’, and 44’ x 320’. No quote was provided, and when
the Acheys’ policy was renewed in July, the insurers issued a new annual policy
covering a residence designated as “Location 0001” and a farm designated as
“Location 0002” with no outbuildings covered. That August, Specialty Risk emailed
the insurers requesting that a barn measuring 44’ x 160’ be “add[ed] to location #2,”
retroactive to July 27, 2021. The email specified that the barn would be “Used for
Hay/Machinery” and requested $150,000 in coverage. The insurers issued an
endorsement to the policy effective at the requested date with the language “ADDED
HAY/MACHINERY BARN AT LOC #2 - $150,000,” as well as a new policy
declarations page titled “SUMMARY OF FARM PROPERTY – BARNS,
OUTBUILDINGS AND OTHER FARM STRUCTURES” listing a
“Hay/Machinery Barn” at “Loc #” “0002” with the “Bldg #” “ST0001.”
Over the next year, further modifications were made to the policy, including
adding two more buildings at “Loc #” “0002,” the “ST0002” “Well House w/ Well
System” and the “ST0003” “5 Ton Grain Bin.” In January 2022 coverage for the
“Hay/Machinery Barn” was increased to $350,000. New declaration pages were
issued after each policy change. The only barn identified in any of them remained
the “ST0001” “Hay/Machinery Barn.”
1 The parties dispute which company issued the check and authorized the
Acheys’ policy in the first place, but the Acheys’ claims fail no matter which insurer
did what. We will refer to Liberty Mutual and Ohio Security together as the insurers,
without assuming or deciding which is responsible.
2 The Honorable Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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We review a grant of summary judgment interpreting an insurance policy de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court and applying state law to
determine coverage issues. BITCO Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 89 F.4th 643, 645 (8th
Cir. 2023); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). Under Missouri law, clear and
unambiguous language “must be construed as written.” Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Am.
Guar. & Liab. Ins., 531 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Mo. banc 2017). Ambiguous language—
language whose meaning is “duplicit[ous], indistinct[], or uncertain[],” or
“reasonably open to different constructions”—is “resolved in favor of the insured.”
Swadley v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 513 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Mo. banc 2017) (citation
omitted).
The Acheys argue that the insurance policy was ambiguous, relying on six
declaration pages in the policy providing insurance for the “Hay/Machinery Barn”—
three for $350,000 and three for $150,000. They contend that none of the declaration
pages cancel, annul, or revise any of the others, making the coverage scope indistinct
and the total coverage available duplicitous or uncertain. And construing these
declarations in their favor, they say, requires both the 44’ x 160’ and the 44’ x 208’
barn to be covered by the policy.
The number of barns insured is not ambiguous. Every declaration identifies
one barn, consistently identified by building number “ST0001,” listed at the same
location, “Loc #” “0002,” with the same description, “Hay/Machinery Barn.”
See Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009)
(“Courts should not interpret policy provisions in isolation but rather evaluate
policies as a whole.”). Though the policy period listed is the same—July 25, 2021
to July 25, 2022—the operative endorsement periods are not. The $150,000 limit
was in effect at the time of the December 2021 windstorm, not the $350,000 limit
reflected in later declarations. Cf. Henslee v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 292 S.W.3d
476, 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting retroactive application of an endorsement
where the injury predated the endorsement’s effective date, despite falling within the

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listed policy period). Even if we credited the Acheys claim that all six declaration
pages were part of the original contract—which record evidence contradicts—the
amount of coverage is immaterial to how many barns are covered. See Burger v.
Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 822 F.3d 445, 450 (8th Cir. 2016) (under Missouri law,
“disputes about the amount [covered] simply do not ‘inject ambiguity into the
meaning of what is [] covered’” (citation omitted)).
That leaves only the question of which barn was insured. The record permits
one answer: the 44’ x 160’ barn. At the time of the storm, the policy provided
$150,000 in coverage for a single “Hay/Machinery” barn at “Loc #2”—the same
description used and the same coverage requested by Specialty Risk in its August
2021 email about adding the 44’ x 160’ barn to the Acheys’ policy. But the Acheys
argue that the district court’s reliance on this email only proves that the policy was
ambiguous, and so, must be construed against the insurers. See AB Realty One, LLC
v. Miken Techs., Inc., 466 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“Only when the
language is ambiguous and not clear will we resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve
a contractual ambiguity.”).
We acknowledge that the policy contains some latent ambiguity. Royal Banks
of Mo. v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. banc 1991) (“A ‘latent ambiguity’
arises where a writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but some collateral
matter makes the meaning uncertain.”); STL Riverview Plaza LLC v. Metro. St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 681 S.W.3d 290, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 2023) (“[A] latent ambiguity arises
when the particular words of a document apply equally well to two different
objects.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). But “[n]ot every ambiguity in
an insurance policy is resolved favorably to the insured.” Brazil v. Auto-Owners Ins.
Co., 3 F.4th 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). Where ambiguity is disclosed
by extrinsic evidence it may be resolved by extrinsic evidence. McLallen v. Tillman,
386 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:43 (4th
ed.). But cf. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 512 (Mo. banc 2010) (rejecting use of
extrinsic evidence to resolve patent ambiguity—ambiguity on the face of the

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contract—in an insurance policy). Specialty Risk’s email leaves no genuine dispute
that the policy insured the 44’ x 160’ barn.
Because the insurers had no obligation under the policy to cover damage to
the 44’ x 208’ barn, the Acheys’ breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law.
See Bowden v. Am. Mod. Home Ins. Co., 658 S.W.3d 86, 91 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022)
(breach of contract claim elements). So does their derivative claim for vexatious
refusal to pay. Aziz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2017) (“There
can be no recovery for vexatious refusal where there is no judgment for the plaintiff
on the insurance policy.” (citing State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Walsh, 540
S.W.2d 137, 141–42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976))).
Affirmed.
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