United States of America v. Kippie R. House

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2292
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Kippie R. House
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 24-2316
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Darryel L. Pennington
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeals from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: October 20, 2025
Filed: February 11, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Following a drive-by shooting, the mother-son duo of Kippie House and
Darryel Pennington each pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). Although Pennington believes the district court1
procedurally erred at sentencing and House thinks her 121-month sentence is too
long, we affirm.
While at a crowded park, House and her ex-boyfriend’s cousin became
involved in an argument that escalated quickly. After one threw a punch, they
exchanged gunfire. At that point, House left to get reinforcements. She grabbed her
son, who joined her on the ride back to the park, gun in hand.
Upon their arrival, he fired from the passenger-side window at the
ex-boyfriend, who was standing nearby. Pennington was then shot after multiple
people, including the ex-boyfriend, returned fire. Once he was, the mother-son duo
sped away to a hospital, where officers interviewed House and discovered guns in
her car.
Pennington’s complaint is with the finding at sentencing that he attempted to
commit first-degree murder, which triggered a cross-reference that resulted in a
higher offense level and a 120-month sentence. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.1(a)(1),
2K2.1(c)(1); United States v. Angel, 93 F.4th 1075, 1077–80 (8th Cir. 2024)
1 The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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(describing how the cross-reference works and reviewing whether the record
supported its application for clear error); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (defining the
elements of first-degree murder). For it to apply, the government had to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had the intent to kill and premeditated the
crime. See Angel, 93 F.4th at 1078–79.
Here, it proved both. First, he fired the gun at someone, his mother’s
ex-boyfriend, who had been the subject of a violent argument earlier in the day. See
id. at 1079 (“[S]hooting at a particular person . . . demonstrates a specific intent to
kill.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Second, during the drive to the park,
Pennington had time to think about what he would do with it once they arrived. See
id. (requiring a person “to be fully conscious of his intent[] and to have thought about
the killing” (citation omitted)). To overcome these facts, Pennington claims
self-defense, but a video shows he pointed the gun out the car window and fired
before the ex-boyfriend raised his weapon. See id. at 1080 (“Initiating an assault
where deadly force is used with the intent to kill is inconsistent with a self-defense
claim.” (citation omitted)). Under these circumstances, the record did not support
Pennington’s self-defense claim, let alone “definitely and firmly” show that the
district court “made a mistake.” Id. at 1078 (citation omitted).
Nor is House’s 121-month sentence substantively unreasonable. Rather than
trying to deescalate the situation, she made things worse by involving her son, who
ended up firing into a crowded park. In discussing these and other facts, the district
court sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of
judgment. See United States v. Clark, 998 F.3d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 2021).
We accordingly affirm the judgments of the district court.
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