United States of America v. Alexander Wesley Ledvina

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2441
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Alexander Wesley Ledvina
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: September 19, 2025
Filed: February 6, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Alexander Wesley Ledvina appeals the district court’s decision denying his
motion to dismiss charges for being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm
and for making a false statement during the purchase of a firearm. In light of this
Court’s decisions in United States v. Perez, 145 F.4th 800 (8th Cir. 2025), and United
States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025), we vacate his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and remand for further proceedings to resolve Ledvina’s Second

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Amendment as-applied challenge. We affirm the district court’s decision on all
other issues.
I. BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Ledvina in a two-count indictment. Count One charged
him with unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(8). Count Two charged him with making a false statement
during the purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). The
indictment alleged that on August 11, 2022, Ledvina, an unlawful user of marijuana
and cocaine, knowingly possessed five firearms in and affecting commerce, and that
on July 29, 2022, he knowingly made false statements and representations—
specifically, that he was not an unlawful user of a controlled substance—in
connection with his acquisition of an Arsenal Bulgarian P-MO1, 9x18 mm caliber
pistol.
The district court rejected Ledvina’s claim that, as used in § 922(g)(3), the
terms “user” and “addict” are unconstitutionally vague. The court held in abeyance
Ledvina’s claim that § 924(a)(1)(A) was void on its face, finding Ledvina’s facial
challenge was an as-applied challenge in disguise. As to Ledvina’s post-Bruen1
facial challenge to § 922(g)(3), the district court concluded that the statute is a
constitutional restriction consistent with historical traditions. Finally, the court
reserved ruling on any as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3) until completion of the
presentation of evidence at trial.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts, a joint exhibit, and an
exhibit offered by the government. The evidence included Ledvina’s stipulation that
he purchased at least 14 firearms between April 2018 and February 2022. As of
August 11, 2022, Ledvina was in possession of at least five firearms. Ledvina
specifically admitted that on July 29, 2022, he purchased a pistol from a federally
1 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

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licensed firearms dealer in Marion, Iowa. At the time of the purchase, an employee
of the licensed firearms dealer smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from
Ledvina, a fact the employee reported to the authorities. Ledvina admitted that he
smelled like marijuana because he had smoked marijuana in July 2022. In
connection with the firearm purchase, Ledvina stated on ATF Form 4473 that he was
not an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant,
narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance. At the time Ledvina made this
representation, he knew that he had used controlled substances in March, April, May,
June, and July 2022. In further detail, Ledvina stipulated that between March and
July 2022, he used marijuana at least five to six times per week and continued to
consistently use marijuana the following month in August 2022. Ledvina
acknowledged that at no point during the timeframe at issue had he been prescribed
marijuana, THC, or cocaine by a licensed physician.
The evidence also showed that on August 11, 2022, while a search warrant
was being executed at Ledvina’s residence, he pulled into his driveway in his
vehicle. Investigators approached Ledvina and instructed him to show his hands.
Ledvina continued to look and reach toward the floorboard of the driver’s seat.
Ledvina eventually opened the car door and began to get out. As he got out, the
vehicle began rolling backwards. An investigator jumped in to put the vehicle in
park. During the vehicle search, investigators located a loaded pistol on the driver’s
side floorboard, a partially smoked marijuana roach in the storage area by the shifter,
and a plastic bag containing marijuana in the center console. Investigators also
obtained a urine sample from Ledvina, which confirmed the presence of
Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of cocaine), Ecgonine methyl ester (a metabolite of
cocaine), and 11-nor-9-carboxy-delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (a metabolite of
THC). Ledvina admitted that he used marijuana sometime between July 21, 2022,
and August 11, 2022, and that he used cocaine sometime between August 8, 2022,
and August 11, 2022.
After admission of the evidence, Ledvina moved for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing the government failed to prove he was an “unlawful user” or “addict.” The

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district court found the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Ledvina
was guilty on both counts. Regarding the possession count, the court found the
evidence established both the temporal requirement and the knowledge component
to satisfy the element of being an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance, and that
Ledvina knew he belonged to a category of persons barred from possessing a
firearm. The district court further found the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ledvina’s representation that he was not an unlawful user of
a controlled substance on ATF Form 4473 was false and Ledvina knew his
representation was false when he made it to the licensed firearms dealer, explaining:
“Even had defendant lacked a scintilla of knowledge that using marijuana was
unlawful prior to filling out that form, a plain reading of that question and warning
would have put him on notice that his use was unlawful, meaning he was an unlawful
user, and given him the knowledge that saying ‘no’ was false.” The form asked the
applicant to mark “Yes” or “No” to the following question, which was accompanied
by a warning:
e. Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant,
stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance?
Warning: The use or possession of marijuana remains unlawful under
Federal law regardless of whether it has been legalized or decriminalized for
medicinal or recreational purposes in the state where you reside.
As to the phrase “unlawful user of, or addicted to,” as framed in the question, the
district court provided several reasons why a reasonable person would not construe
“unlawful user” and “addicted to” as synonyms. First, the court noted people
commonly understand “or” to be disjunctive. Second, the court explained that the
Code of Federal Regulations defines “unlawful user” and “addicted to” separately.
Third, one applying a common sense reading of the terms would understand that a
person can be an unlawful user of drugs without being addicted to a drug. And
fourth, the district court found the commas, even if ungrammatical, show an attempt
to separate “addicted to” from “unlawful user.”

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The district court rejected Ledvina’s as-applied void for vagueness challenges
to the statutes, finding Ledvina stipulated to facts establishing that during the
relevant time period, he possessed firearms while he was an “unlawful user” of
marijuana and cocaine. The court found that Ledvina’s admitted use of controlled
substances and coded language in text messages showed that he knew he was using
controlled substances in a way that was unlawful and thus made him an “unlawful
user.” The court also pointed out that ATF Form 4473 informed Ledvina that this
was the case and thus Ledvina had sufficient notice that his conduct was proscribed
by § 924(a)(1)(A). The court sentenced Ledvina to concurrent imprisonment terms
of 51 months.
Ledvina appeals both convictions, raising facial and as-applied void for
vagueness challenges and arguments that § 922(g)(3) violates the Second
Amendment.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the denial of a motion to dismiss a charge de novo. United States
v. Turner, 842 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 2016).
1. Fifth Amendment
A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and violates the Fifth
Amendment due process clause if it “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the
conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). Section 922(g)(3) prohibits
firearm possession by any person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any
controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). A defendant who “was actively
engaged in the use of a controlled substance during the time he possessed firearms”
violates the statute. Perez, 145 F.4th at 804 (quoting United States v. Carnes, 22
F.4th 743, 749 (8th Cir. 2022)).

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Following a narrowing construction to require a temporal nexus between
firearm possession and regular drug use, this Court has rejected facial Fifth
Amendment void-for-vagueness challenges to § 922(g)(3). See, e.g., United States
v. Madden, 135 F.4th 629, 631 (8th Cir. 2025). Thus, Ledvina’s facial challenge is
foreclosed by precedent. See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the
decision of a prior panel.”). This Court has also rejected as-applied vagueness
challenges when a defendant admits that he frequently used marijuana and knew that
he was a marijuana user when he possessed a firearm. See United States v. Deng,
104 F.4th 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 2024).
Ledvina’s stipulation of facts and the exhibits admitted at trial foreclose his
as-applied challenge. Ledvina admitted that he “was using cocaine and marijuana
during the same time that he was in possession of the above-mentioned firearms.”
And “[b]etween at least March 2022 and July 2022, [Ledvina] used marijuana at
least five to six times per week.” Ledvina also admitted that in August 2022, he
“continued to consistently use marijuana.” Ledvina further admitted that “[i]n
March, April, May, June, July, and August of 2022, [he] was in possession of
firearms” and he “knew he was using controlled substances, including marijuana,
THC, and cocaine in March, April, May, June, July, and August 2022.” Lastly,
Ledvina admitted that between March 2022 and August 11, 2022, he did not have a
prescription from a licensed physician for marijuana, THC, or cocaine.
Ledvina’s argument that the government only established that he was a user
of controlled substances, not that he was an unlawful user is unavailing. The
stipulated facts establish frequent controlled substance use by Ledvina. They
establish Ledvina’s knowledge that he did not have a prescription for the drugs he
was using. In addition, the district court, reciting 10 examples in its decision, found
that the coded language used by Ledvina in text messages he sent to others
demonstrated an attempt to conceal his drug use and possession and showed
knowledge that the drugs Ledvina was using and possessing were unlawful. Ledvina
has not demonstrated that any of the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous.

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On this record, Ledvina cannot show § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to him.
Ledvina also contends § 924(a)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague, asserting in
his opening brief in a conclusory manner that the same analysis used in § 922(g)(3)
applies with equal force. Despite not developing his argument in any meaningful
way, Ledvina faults the government in his reply brief for ignoring his point that “if
‘unlawful user’ is unconstitutionally vague in one context, it is unconstitutionally
vague in both.”
Section 924(a)(1)(A) does not contain the words “unlawful user.” “[A]
conviction under § 924(a)(1)(A) requires only that a defendant knowingly make a
false statement with respect to information that the law requires a federally licensed
firearms dealer to keep.” United States v. Lehman, 8 F.4th 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2021).
The relevant conduct is knowingly making a false statement. Id. Ledvina has not
developed any meaningful argument showing how the statute “fails to give ordinary
people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 595.
As applied to the facts and circumstances in Ledvina’s case, a question on
ATF Form 4473 asked Ledvina whether he was “an unlawful user of, or addicted to,
marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled
substance.” Immediately below the question was an explicit warning notifying
Ledvina that “[t]he use or possession of marijuana remains unlawful under Federal
law regardless of whether it has been legalized or decriminalized for medicinal or
recreational purposes in the state where you reside.” Despite the warning and
Ledvina’s knowledge that he had used controlled substances in March, April, May,
June, and July 2022, Ledvina answered “no.” The stipulated facts establish Ledvina
knew he was a frequent controlled substance user, including marijuana, THC, and
cocaine in March, April, May, June, July, and August 2022; he had very recently
used marijuana when he completed ATF Form 4473 such that an employee of the
licensed firearms dealer smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from Ledvina and

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reported this fact to the authorities; and the plain language on ATF Form 4473
instructed Ledvina that the use or possession of marijuana was unlawful under
federal law. Text messages using coded language recovered from Ledvina’s phone
by law enforcement further establish that Ledvina knew his use and possession of
controlled substances was unlawful. On this record, Ledvina cannot show
§ 924(a)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
2. Second Amendment
Ledvina raises both a facial and as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
His facial challenge is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Grubb, 135
F.4th 604, 606 (8th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th
Cir. 2010)); United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 918 (8th Cir. 2024) (adding to
Seay’s analysis with a review of historical analogues). An as-applied challenge may
be available. See Perez, 145 F.4th at 804; Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1098. A court
reviewing an as-applied challenge is asked to declare a statute unconstitutional “on
the facts of a particular case.” Lehman, 8 F.4th at 457. In other words, unlike a
facial challenge, which challenges the law as written, an as-applied challenge
considers whether the “application to a particular person under particular
circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.” Id.
The district court’s ruling on Ledvina’s as-applied challenge predated this
Court’s decisions in Cooper and Perez. In Perez, this Court recognized that “certain
categories of active drug users—classified either by drug type or the frequency or
manner of a defendant’s use—may be disarmed consistent with the Second
Amendment if the government shows that any member of that ‘class’ either
‘demonstrate[s] disrespect for legal norms of society’ or would pose ‘an
unacceptable risk of danger if armed.’” 145 F.4th at 807 (quoting United States v.
Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 2024)). The Court in Cooper identified
at least two situations when § 922(g)(3) is consistent with the Second Amendment,
which are: when a defendant’s use of a controlled substance (1) made the defendant
act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous, or (2) would cause the

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defendant to induce terror, or pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others
with a firearm. 127 F.4th at 1096 (cleaned up). Without this guidance, the district
court did not consider these circumstances or whether Ledvina’s drug use placed
him in a category of people “‘presenting a special danger of misuse’ sufficient to
justify disarmament irrespective of any individualized showing of dangerousness.”
Perez, 145 F.4th at 808 (quoting Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1129).
Without more, drug use generally or marijuana use specifically does not
automatically extinguish a person’s Second Amendment right. Id. (citing Cooper,
127 F.4th at 1097, 1098 n. 3). Consistent with Cooper and Perez, we vacate
Ledvina’s § 922(g)(3) conviction and remand for the district court to reassess
Ledvina’s as-applied challenge in accordance with our recent precedents.
Ledvina has submitted a pro se brief. When a party is represented by counsel,
the Court typically does not accept pro se briefs. United States v. Robertson, 883
F.3d 1080, 1087 (8th Cir. 2018). We exercise our discretion to enforce our policy
against multiple filings and decline to consider additional claims or issues that
Ledvina raised in his pro se brief. Id.; see United States v. Miranda-Zarco, 836 F.3d
899, 901-02 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting this Court’s discretion to review pro se
supplemental briefs).
III. CONCLUSION
We vacate Ledvina’s conviction under § 922(g)(3) and remand to the district
court to reassess his Second Amendment as-applied challenge. We affirm the
district court’s decision on his other claims as well as his conviction under
§ 924(a)(1)(A).
STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Let me tell you a story. A man walks into a bar. Usually a joke would follow,
but this is no laughing matter. When the man bellies up to the bar for dinner, he

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orders his usual: a cheeseburger and a seltzer. Not any ordinary seltzer, mind you,
but one with THC, which he has ordered a handful of times before. Little does he
know that getting back into his vehicle, where he stores a locked, unloaded pistol,
will mean he is committing a federal crime, one punishable by up to 15 years in
prison. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), 924(a)(8); United States v. Carnes, 22 F.4th
743, 748 (8th Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Hiebert, 30 F.3d 1005, 1008–09
(8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a defendant constructively possessed a firearm
because he had “control or dominion over it . . . as it was found in the vehicle that
he was driving”).
The dissent seems to think that this man can—and maybe should—be
convicted. Or perhaps drinking a spiked THC beverage is not “relevantly similar”
to habitual drunkenness, which is just another way of stating an as-applied challenge.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024) (quoting N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 29 (2022)). What we do know is that the dissent’s
“categorical[]” approach is inconsistent with the Second Amendment and how
constitutional litigation typically works.2 Post, at 17; see United States v. Cooper,
2 So inconsistent, in fact, that not a single other circuit has adopted it. See
United States v. Harris, 144 F.4th 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2025) (remanding for the district
court to consider an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3) based on “how [the
defendant’s] drug use affected his mental state and riskiness”); United States v.
Daniels, 124 F.4th 967, 974–76 (5th Cir. 2025) (concluding that § 922(g)(3) was
unconstitutional as applied); United States v. VanOchten, 150 F.4th 552, 560 (6th
Cir. 2025) (explaining that courts should consider whether the defendant “poses a
clear risk to others if armed” when evaluating an as-applied challenge to
§ 922(g)(3)); United States v. Seiwert, 152 F.4th 854, 869 (7th Cir. 2025) (rejecting
an as-applied § 922(g)(3) challenge because the defendant “was persistently and
presently impaired during the periods alleged in the indictment”); see also United
States v. Harrison, 153 F.4th 998, 1034–35 (10th Cir. 2025) (remanding for the
district court to determine whether § 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to “non-
intoxicated marijuana users”); Fla. Comm’r of Agric. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 148 F.4th
1307, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2025) (concluding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that
§ 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional “as applied to medical marijuana users”). But see
United States v. Stennerson, 150 F.4th 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 2025) (leaving the as-
applied-challenge question “for another day”).

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127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025); United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906 (8th Cir.
2024); see also Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024) (explaining that
“courts usually handle constitutional claims case by case, not en masse” (emphasis
added)).
COLLOTON, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
There is nothing unlawful about appellant Ledvina’s conviction for possession
of a firearm as an unlawful user of drugs under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The majority
does not say that the conviction is invalid. Yet rather than decide the legal question
presented on appeal, the majority vacates the conviction and remands for further
proceedings that are unwarranted and unnecessary.
The state of the law in this circuit concerning § 922(g)(3) is untenable. In
appeal after appeal, the court refuses to decide whether the statute is constitutional
as applied to unlawful drug users. The court should decide the question presented
in this case and affirm the judgment.
Section 922(g)(3) forbids possession of a firearm by a person who is an
unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance. In the Act that included
§ 922(g), Congress “sought broadly to keep firearms away from the persons
Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.” Barrett v. United
States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976). Drug users and drug addicts—like convicted
felons and the mentally ill—constitute a group of persons whom Congress identified
as presenting a special danger of misuse of firearms.
To qualify as an unlawful user of controlled substance, a person must use
drugs habitually or regularly, and the drug use must be current not past. United
States v. Turnbull, 349 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 1099,
reinstated, 414 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A leading case cited in
Turnbull, for example, upheld a conviction where the defendant’s “drug use was
sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to his gun possession to put him

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on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs.” United States v. Purdy,
264 F.3d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Another formulation
cited by this court in Turnbull requires the government to establish “a pattern of use
and recency of use.” United States v. Jackson, 280 F.3d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 2002).
Ledvina argues that he enjoyed a constitutional right to possess firearms
despite his regular drug use. The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), that the Second Amendment confers an individual right
to keep and bear arms, but the right is not unlimited, and Congress may forbid
possession by certain categories of persons. Id. at 626; United States v. Jackson,
110 F.4th 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2708 (2025). New
York Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), reaffirmed Heller and “made
the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller more explicit.” Id. at 21, 26, 31.
Heller and Bruen explained that the Second Amendment allows regulation that is
consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Bruen, 597
U.S. at 17; Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court emphasized two
propositions that had been misunderstood by some judges of the courts of appeals.
First, a law regulating firearms need not “precisely match its historical precursors,”
and the government may show that a statute passes constitutional muster without
identifying an “historical twin.” Id. at 692, 701. The proper analysis considers
whether “the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin
our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692. Second, the Court made clear that Heller and
Bruen do not preclude categorical gun regulations, saying “we do not suggest that
the Second Amendment prohibits enactment of laws banning the possession of guns
by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of
misuse.” Id. at 698 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
Congress concluded that drug addicts and drug users present a special danger
of misuse, and the prohibition on the possession of guns by those persons is
consistent with the principles underlying the Nation’s regulatory tradition. A

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convincing array of historical analogues shows that habitual drunkards were subject
to confinement and surety bonds on a temporary basis while they were engaged in
the regular consumption of a mind-altering drug—alcohol. This court recently
acknowledged that it has not considered this important historical evidence, see
United States v. Perez, 145 F.4th 800, 806 n.4 (8th Cir. 2025), and it is high time to
recognize its force in establishing the constitutionality of § 922(g)(3).
In 1606, England banned drunkenness, declaring it “the roote and foundacion
of many other enormious Synnes, as Bloodshed Stabbinge Murder . . . and such
lyke.” 4 Jac. 1, c. 5 (1606). In 1679 and 1691, the New Hampshire and Virginia
governments adopted similar bans on drunkenness. Act of Mar. 16, 1679, 1 Laws of
New Hampshire 21 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., 1904); Act of Apr. 16, 1691, Act
XI, 3 Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All Laws of Virginia, from the First
Session of the Legislature 73 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823).
Eighteenth century American legislatures enacted laws classifying “common
drunkards” as vagrants and subjecting them to confinement in jails or workhouses.
See Act of Oct. 12, 1727, The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut from
May, 1726, to May, 1735, Inclusive 128 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., 1873); Act of June
29, 1700, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 378
(1869); Act of May 14, 1718, ch. 15, 2 Laws of New Hampshire 266 (Albert Stillman
Batchellor ed., 1913); Act of June 10, 1799, ch. 806, §§ 1, 3, Acts of the Twenty-
Third General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey 561-63 (1821). By the
nineteenth century, at least ten more States enacted similar statutes.3
3See Brief for the United States at 20 n.10, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-
1234 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2025) (citing Act of Dec. 15, 1865, No. 107, § 1, 1865-1866
Ala. Acts 116; Act to Establish a Penal Code, Tit. XVII, § 1014, Revised Statutes of
Arizona 753-754 (1887); § 647, 2 The Codes and Statutes of the State of California
1288 (Theodore H. Hittell ed., 1876); Act of Feb. 4, 1885, § 1, 1884-1885 Idaho
Terr. Gen. Laws 200; Act of Feb. 22, 1825, ch. 297, § 4, 1825 Me. Pub. Acts 1034;
Act of Feb. 22, 1881, § 1, 1881 Mont. Terr. Laws 81-82; Act of Mar. 7, 1873, ch.
114, § 1, 1873 Nev. Stat. 189-190; Act of June 2, 1871, No. 1209, § 2, 1871 Pa.
Laws 1301-1302; Act of Mar. 15, 1865, ch. 562, §§ 1-2, 1865 R.I. Acts & Resolves

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Some jurisdictions also treated habitual drunkards in the same manner as the
mentally ill. Several States provided for civil confinement of habitual drunkards “in
the same manner as in case of lunatics” until the drunkards presented “proof of a
permanent reformation,” which generally meant refraining from use of intoxicating
drinks for at least one year. Amos Dean, Principles of Medical Jurisprudence 590
(1850). An 1836 statute in Pennsylvania placed habitual drunkards “on precisely
the same footing” as lunatics, and removed their power to control their estates.
Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. 243, 244-45 (Pa. 1858). An 1873 Massachusetts Act
excepted common drunkards—along with lunatics, vagabonds, and those convicted
of infamous crimes—from service in the militia. An Act Concerning the Militia, ch.
313, § 1, 1873 Mass. Acts 760. In all, at least twenty-two States and the District of
Columbia provided that habitual drunks could be committed to asylums or placed in
the custody of guardians in the same manner as the mentally ill.4
197; Act of Feb. 18, 1876, § 378, The Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah 647
(1876)).
4See Brief for the United States at 21 n.12, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-
1234 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2025) (citing Act of Mar. 30, 1876, ch. 40, § 8, 19 Stat. 10
(District of Columbia); Ark. Rev. Stat., ch. 78, § 1, at 456 (William M. Ball & Sam
C. Roane eds., 1838); Act of Apr. 1, 1870, ch. 426, § 2, 1869-1870 Cal. Stat. 585-
586; Act of July 25, 1874, ch. 113, § 1, 1874 Conn. Pub. Acts 256; Ga. Code pt. 2,
tit. 2, ch. 3, Art. 2, § 1803, at 358 (R.H. Clark et al. eds., 1861); Act of Feb. 21, 1872,
§ 1, 1872 Ill. Laws 477; Act of May 1, 1890, ch. 42, § 1, 1890 Iowa Acts 67; Act of
Mar. 2, 1868, ch. 60, § 5, The General Statutes of the State of Kansas 553 (John M.
Price et al. eds., 1868); Act of Mar. 28, 1872, ch. 996, §§ 10-11, 1872 Ky. Acts, Vol.
2, at 523-524; Act of July 8, 1890, No. 100, § 1, 1890 La. Acts 116; Act of Mar. 5,
1860, ch. 386, §§ 6-7, 1860 Md. Laws; Act of June 18, 1885, ch. 339, §§ 1-3, 1885
Mass. Acts 790; Act of Apr. 12, 1827, § 1, 1827 Mich. Terr. Laws 489-90; Minn.
Terr. Rev. Stat. ch. 67, § 12, at 278 (1851); Act of Apr. 17, 1873, ch. 57, §§ 1, 3,
1873 Miss. Laws 61-62; Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 89, § 1, 1853 N.J. Acts 237; Act
of Feb. 7, 1856, ch. 38, § 1, 1855-1856 N.M. Terr. Laws 94; Act of Mar. 27, 1857,
ch. 184, § 9, 1857 N.Y. Laws, Vol. 1, at 431; Act of Jan. 5, 1871, § 1, 68 Ohio
General and Local Laws and Joint Resolutions 6 (1871); Act of Feb. 1, 1866, No.

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“[A]t the Founding, the consensus was that surety laws extended to all
‘common drunkards.’” United States v. Harris, 144 F.4th 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2025),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 30, 2025) (No. 25-372). Legislatures required
drunkards to post bond due to the risk of future misbehavior. E.g., An Act Against
Breaking the Peace, Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, in America 189
(1784); Act of Dec. 16, 1812, A Digest of the Laws of the Corporation of the City of
Washington to the First of June, 1823 141 (1823); A Digest of the Laws of Maryland
206 (Thomas Herty ed., 1799). If a habitual drunkard refused to “enter into security
for good behavior for a reasonable time,” he was committed to hard labor or
imprisonment. A Digest of the Laws of the Corporation of the City of Washington
to the First of June, 1823, at 141; see also James Parker, Conductor Generalis: Or,
the Office, Duty and Authority of Justices of the Peace, High-Sheriffs, Under-
Sheriffs, Coroners, Constables, Gaolers, Jury-Men, and Overseers of the Poor 422
(1764).
These historical analogues establish that Congress’s prohibition on gun
possession by drug addicts and regular drug users is consistent with the principles
underlying the Nation’s tradition. Both habitual drunkenness and unlawful drug use
under § 922(g)(3) involve the regular use of a mind-altering substance. Congress
concluded that drug addicts and regular drug users present a special risk of misusing
firearms.
The prohibition on gun possession, like the burden of the surety bonds that
applied to habitual drunkards, is of limited duration, because it ends when a drug
user breaks the habit. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699. The prohibition is relevantly
similar in mitigating the risk that habitual abusers of alcohol or drugs will misuse
firearms. Habitual drunkards historically were subject to even greater restrictions
than disarmament—jailing or civil commitment, which necessarily served to disarm
the subject. If those restrictions were a permissible response to habitual use of a
11, § 10, 1866 Pa. Laws 10; Act of Aug. 18, 1876, ch. 112, § 147, 1876 Tex. Gen.
Laws 188; Act of Mar. 17, 1870, ch. 131, § 1, 1870 Wis. Gen. Laws 197).

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mind-altering substance, then the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament is also
permissible. See id.; Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1127.
The problem in this circuit arises from two panel decisions that failed to
consider all of the relevant historical evidence. In United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th
906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 304 (2024), the court rejected a facial
challenge to § 922(g)(3). As one judge pointed out, id. at 918 (Gruender, J.,
concurring in the judgment), that holding was dictated by the court’s post-Heller
decision in United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010). A facial challenge
fails if the statute is constitutional in any of its applications; once that is established,
nothing more need be said. But the Veasley majority waxed on in dicta and asserted
that for intoxicated persons, the focus historically “was on the use of a firearm, not
its possession.” 98 F.4th at 911. The Veasley panel, however, did not address the
more substantial restrictions traditionally applicable to habitual drunkards.
In a follow-on case, a panel of this court asserted that Congress cannot
constitutionally prohibit drug users as a category from possessing firearms on the
ground that they are dangerous. United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 348 (2025). The Cooper opinion, like the Veasley dicta,
referred to a few laws governing persons at the moment of intoxication but again
neglected to consider the historical tradition of regulation applicable to habitual
drunkards. Instead, according to the Cooper opinion, courts are supposed to conduct
an “individualized assessment” and ask in each prosecution (1) whether using drugs
made a defendant “act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous,” or (2)
whether a defendant “induce[d] terror” or “pose[d] a credible threat to the physical
safety of others.” Id. at 1096 (internal quotation omitted).
This test is both ahistorical and impractical. The Due Process Clause requires
adequate notice to persons, including drug users, about what possession of firearms
is unlawful. But under the Cooper individualized-assessment approach, a drug user
will find out only retrospectively—after he is convicted of a crime—whether a judge
believes that he has “acted like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous” or

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whether a judge thinks that he “induced terror” or “posed a credible threat.”
Prosecutors will be hard pressed to prove the mens rea element of the offense when
the law fails to give clear notice about which regular drug users act unlawfully. See
Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 227 (2019). Law enforcement officers cannot
readily identify which violators of § 922(g)(3) may be arrested and prosecuted.
What does it mean to act like someone who is mentally ill? How much risk is
required before a drug user with a gun poses a credible threat or induces terror? The
Cooper test is indecipherable to a person of ordinary intelligence and tantamount to
rendering the statute unenforceable and void for vagueness. But there is no such
conundrum once the court recognizes that the Second Amendment allows Congress
to act categorically with respect to well-defined groups of persons who present a
special danger of misuse.
Having announced its new constitutional rule, the Cooper panel then declined
to apply it. 127 F.4th at 1098. The parties had developed the factual record in a
stipulated bench trial and jointly asked the court of appeals to resolve the as-applied
challenge. But the panel refused to do so, remanded to the district court, and placed
the case in an interlocutory posture that avoided further review. There was no sound
basis for the Cooper panel to avoid making a decision.
The consequence has been paralysis in the circuit. The panel in Perez, citing
the Cooper panel’s remand, felt bound to remand the Perez case without deciding
the as-applied challenge. 145 F.4th at 809. Now this panel, citing Cooper and Perez,
refuses to decide another as-applied challenge and remands again. Ante, at 9.
Whether § 922(g)(3) is constitutional as-applied in a particular case is a legal
question that this court has a duty to decide. The court should accept responsibility
for whatever rule it fashions and apply it. Or, as here, the court should consider the
historical analogues that it missed in Cooper, see Perez, 145 F.4th at 806 n.4, and
conclude that Congress permissibly prohibited the possession of firearms by drug
addicts and regular unlawful drug users—one of the “categories of persons thought
by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698.

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The continuing cycle of remands, and the uncertainty that it has engendered, ill
serves the rule of law in the circuit.
The record in this case is fully developed and shows that appellant Ledvina
smoked marijuana in March, April, May, June, and July 2022 while possessing
firearms in his residence. In August 2022, officers found Ledvina in his car with a
loaded pistol on the floorboard, a partially smoked cannabis roach in front of the
gear shift, and a plastic bag containing marijuana in the console. Toxicology results
from a urine sample showed that Ledvina had used cocaine and marijuana over the
past several days. In Ledvina’s residence, officers found a loaded pistol leaning
against a coffee table that held a small quantity of cannabis, a digital scale, and
rolling paper. They found thirteen grams of marijuana under a couch. In the
bedroom, officers found three more firearms next to a vanity that contained a large
digital scale and 137 grams of cannabis in glass jars. The district court found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Ledvina possessed firearms as an unlawful user of controlled
substances. At sentencing, a witness augmented the record by describing an incident
when Ledvina accidentally discharged a firearm inside his home while using
cocaine.
Yet the majority is unwilling to decide whether § 922(g)(3) is constitutional
as applied to Ledvina. The majority instead vacates the conviction and suggests the
possibility that Ledvina enjoyed a constitutional right to possess the firearms under
these circumstances. The court should decide the questions presented on this appeal
and affirm the judgment.
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