United States of America v. Tell Logan Cadotte

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2625
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Tell Logan Cadotte
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: November 17, 2025
Filed: February 12, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Tell Cadotte pled guilty to receiving child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Cadotte’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver.
The district court1 sentenced Cadotte to 240 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.

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years of supervised release. Cadotte now appeals, arguing that the appeal waiver is
unenforceable and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the
appeal.
We review issues related to plea agreements de novo. United States v.
Lovelace, 565 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2009). “[V]alid waivers of appellate rights
are generally enforceable.” United States v. Blue Coat, 340 F.3d 539, 541 (8th Cir.
2003). “An appeal waiver requires dismissal of an appeal if [1] the plea agreement
and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, [2] if the appeal falls within
the scope of the waiver, and [3] if dismissal of the appeal would not result in a
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
Cadotte concedes that his sentence falls within the scope of the waiver, so the only
relevant inquiries are whether he knowingly and voluntarily signed the plea
agreement and whether enforcing the appeal waiver would lead to a miscarriage of
justice.
First, Cadotte voluntarily and knowingly entered into the plea agreement.
While Cadotte now contends that he was not sufficiently informed of the
agreement’s terms, his testimony at the change-of-plea hearing expressly contradicts
this argument. At the change-of-plea hearing, Cadotte testified that he had read and
understood the terms of the agreement; that he had discussed it with his counsel; that
he had some college-level education and was not undergoing treatment for any
mental illness; and that he was not under duress or under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. Cadotte also confirmed that he knew what crime he was pleading guilty to,
that this crime carried a maximum penalty of 240 months’ imprisonment, and that
he was waiving his right to appeal on any issue within the scope of the appeal waiver.
Thus, we conclude that Cadotte knowingly and voluntarily entered into the
agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Sisco, 576 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea
agreement when he confirmed that he had read the agreement and discussed it with

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his attorney, was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and was not being
coerced).
Enforcing the waiver would also not lead to a miscarriage of justice. While
we may find a miscarriage of justice in certain atypical circumstances, such as when
the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, “this exception is a narrow one and
will not be allowed to swallow the general rule that waivers of appellate rights are
valid.” Andis, 333 F.3d at 891. Furthermore, “an allegation that the sentencing
judge misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines or abused his or her discretion is not
subject to appeal in the face of a valid appeal waiver.” Id. at 892. Cadotte offers no
viable reason for why the miscarriage of justice exception applies, as his only
argument is that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively
unreasonable sentence. See id.; United States v. Boroughf, 649 F.3d 887, 890 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“[A]pplying the appeal waiver to dismiss [the defendant’s] appeal of the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence would not result in a miscarriage of
justice.”). Thus, “[Cadotte’s] allegation . . . is not subject to appeal.” Andis, 333
F.3d at 892.
Accordingly, because the appeal waiver is enforceable, we dismiss the appeal.
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