United States of America v. Johnnie Lewis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2677
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Johnnie Lewis
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: November 17, 2025
Filed: February 6, 2026
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
Johnnie Lewis pled guilty to possessing child pornography as a prior offender
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). As part of Lewis’s sentence, the district
court imposed a lifetime term of supervised release with a special condition
preventing Lewis from possessing or using “computers,” as defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(1). Lewis appeals this special condition, and we vacate it and remand.

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As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree on whether we should review the
district court’s imposition of the special condition for abuse of discretion or plain
error. We need not resolve this dispute, however, because even under the more
stringent plain error standard, the special condition must be vacated. “Plain error
occurs if the district court deviates from a legal rule, the error is clear under current
law, and the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Ristine,
335 F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Crose, 284 F.3d 911,
912 (8th Cir. 2002)).
“A district court has broad discretion to order special conditions of supervised
release . . . .” United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (delimiting courts’ authority to impose special conditions on
supervised release). But we have repeatedly emphasized that any condition imposed
must be “reasonably related to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)”; “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary
for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)”; and be “consistent with any pertinent policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Bender, 566 F.3d at 751
(quoting United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 2005)); accord United
States v. Wallette, 686 F.3d 476, 483 (8th Cir. 2012). Lewis argues the district court
plainly erred by imposing the special condition because it “poses a greater
deprivation of liberty than § 3583(d)(2) warrants.” We agree.
District courts may fashion special conditions “to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct,” “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and
“provide the defendant with . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). “When crafting a special condition . . . , the district
court must make an individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances
underlying a case and make sufficient findings . . . to ensure that the special condition
satisfies the statutory requirements.” United States v. Powell, 71 F.4th 1135, 1137
(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Scanlan, 65 F.4th 406, 410 (8th Cir. 2023)).
Put differently, our precedent clearly requires district courts to make factual findings

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demonstrating that a special condition is reasonably necessary to serve the
appropriate statutory purposes. This did not happen here.
For instance, the special condition states that Lewis “must not possess and/or
use computers (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)) or other electronic
communications or data storage devices or media without approval of the probation
office.” Section 1030(e)(1) defines “computer” as including any “electronic,
magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device
performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, . . . includ[ing] any data storage
facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction
with such device,” except for “an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand
held calculator, or other similar device.”
We noted — fifteen years ago — that this definition is “exceedingly broad,”
capturing “coffeemakers, microwave ovens, watches, telephones, children’s toys,
MP3 players, refrigerators, heating and air-conditioning units, radios, alarm clocks,
televisions, and DVD players, in addition to more traditional computers like laptops
or desktop computers.” United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1577–78 (2010)). Since then, technology has advanced and
become ever more engrained in every aspect of life, and the sweep of this already
broad definition has, as a result, only expanded. Consequently, cases where district
courts could make factual findings supporting conditions as broad as the one at issue
will be few and far between, and there are no such findings in the record here. “Thus,
we conclude the special condition results in a deprivation of liberty that is greater
than reasonably necessary.” Powell, 71 F.4th at 1139. And because we have
characterized “the use of a computer as a basic liberty interest,” id. (citing United
States v. Cramer, 962 F.3d 375, 383 (8th Cir. 2020)), the district court plainly erred
by imposing the special condition on this record.
In its brief, the government contends that Lewis’s past use of computers with
an internet connection to access, download, and share child pornography supports

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the special condition and that the resulting deprivation of liberty is not greater than
reasonably necessary because Lewis may possess and use computers with prior
approval from the probation office. We disagree. First, while Lewis’s prior conduct
may justify restricting his access to computers he could use to browse the internet,
it does not support the broad condition the district court imposed here. See, e.g.,
United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We are confident that
the district court can impose a more narrowly-tailored restriction . . . .”); United
States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 856 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding a “special condition
barring Internet access unless approved by the probation office is sufficiently
tailored . . .”). Second, as Lewis points out, we have previously decided that a special
condition nearly identical to the one at issue resulted in a greater deprivation of
liberty than reasonably necessary, even though it allowed the defendant to “possess
and/or use computers” if he obtained “prior approval of the U.S. Probation Officer.”
Powell, 71 F.4th at 1138–39.
For these reasons, we vacate the special condition preventing Lewis from
possessing and using “computers,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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