United States of America v. Gabriel Aguirre, also known as El Padrino, also known as Moyo Moyo

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2081
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Gabriel Aguirre, also known as El Padrino, also known as Moyo Moyo
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: September 15, 2025
Filed: March 23, 2026
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Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Gabriel Aguirre pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),
and 846. In determining the advisory guidelines sentencing range, the Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a three-level increase because Aguirre was
a manager or supervisor of a conspiracy to import methamphetamine from Mexico
into the United States, USSG § 3B1.1(b), and a two-level increase because he

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committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a
livelihood, § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E). At sentencing, relying on the agreed plea facts and
parts of the PSR to which Aguirre had not objected, the district court1 overruled his
objections to these enhancements, agreeing with the government they are broadly
construed and apply to Aguirre’s conduct in this case. The court determined an
advisory guidelines range of 292 to 365 months imprisonment and sentenced Aguirre
to 300 months. Aguirre appeals, arguing the district court clearly erred in imposing
the enhancements and abused its discretion in imposing a substantively unreasonable
sentence. See United States v. Denson, 967 F.3d 699, 706-09 (8th Cir. 2020)
(standards of review). We affirm.
I. Background
The following fact summary is based on portions of the PSR to which Aguirre
did not object, or on portions that recited agreed plea facts. Law enforcement
identified a drug trafficking operation based in Mexico and operating in central
Arkansas that was responsible for importing large quantities of methamphetamine
into the United States. In 2017, Aguirre was identified as a U.S.-based leader
responsible for coordinating the delivery of methamphetamine to the organization’s
distributors and customers in Arkansas and elsewhere in the United States. The
conspirators collected proceeds from sales in the United States and sent the money
to Aguirre in Mexico by electronic transfer in varying amounts and using multiple
names to conceal their conduct. Co-defendant Javier Colin-Flores admitted he
worked with Aguirre to distribute hundreds of kilograms of methamphetamine in
Little Rock and elsewhere in the United States.
1The Honorable D.P. Marshall, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
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On October 8, 2017, law enforcement intercepted communications between
Aguirre, who lived in Mexico, and Colin-Flores discussing delivery of a
methamphetamine shipment to Little Rock. The plan was that Colin-Flores would
send a female courier to Texas to pick up the shipment and drive it back to Little
Rock on October 9. Aguirre said he would be ready and asked Colin-Flores to send
money “down there.” Colin-Flores said he would send “at least 20.” On October 10,
officers intercepted communications between Colin-Flores and drug courier Leyla
Acevedo. Acevedo said she had picked up “12.” Colin-Flores instructed her to pick
up “five more” and return to Little Rock. Colin-Flores then communicated with
Aguirre, who said he would not give her “five more.” Colin-Flores said they were for
someone else; he would send Aguirre more money -- “about ten” -- and would call
Aguirre when the methamphetamine arrived in Little Rock.
The drugs never arrived, as law enforcement stopped Acevedo’s vehicle and
seized 18 kilograms of methamphetamine. Colin-Flores later admitted that he and
Aguirre arranged this shipment, that he gave Aguirre contact information for the
courier, and that Aguirre contacted Acevedo directly. Phone records seized from
Acevedo during her arrest included multiple calls between Acevedo and the number
Aguirre used that day, which Colin-Flores confirmed. The PSR held Aguirre
accountable for 15-45 kilograms of methamphetamine. It also reported that he
appeared to have no other income or assets but claimed to have worked picking fruit
and other items when not incarcerated.
The district court overruled Aguirre’s objections to the manager/supervisor and
criminal livelihood enhancements, noting that both guidelines provisions are “very
broad,” and imposed a 25-year sentence. Aguirre appeals the enhancement rulings
and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
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II. The Sentence Enhancements
When an appeal challenges a sentencing enhancement, we review the district
court’s findings regarding the enhancement for clear error. United States v. Brown
Bull, 138 F.4th 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). “[A]s long as the
determination is plausible in light of the record as a whole, clear error does not exist.”
United States v. Farrington, 499 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted),
cert denied, 552 U.S. 1213 (2008). Sentencing judges “are required to find sentence-
enhancing facts only by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sorensen,
148 F.4th 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted).
A. Manager or Supervisor. USSG § 3B1.1(b) provides for a three-level
increase if the defendant was a manager or supervisor and the criminal activity
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. “We construe the
terms ‘manager’ and ‘supervisor’ broadly.” United States v. Reyes-Ramirez,
916 F.3d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The three-level enhancement
may apply “even if the management activity was limited to a single transaction.”
United States v. Munoz, 134 F.4th 539, 545 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert
denied, 146 S. Ct. 231 (2025). In determining if it applies, the court looks to factors
such as “the exercise of decision-making authority, the nature of participation in the
commission of the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree
of control and authority exercised over others.” United States v. Ellis, 129 F.4th
1075, 1080 (8th Cir.) (cleaned up), cert denied, 146 S. Ct. 252 (2025).
At sentencing, Aguirre’s attorney argued:
We do not deny that he took money in exchange for arranging meth to
be delivered. That makes him a criminal, your Honor, which is why he
pled guilty. It does not make him a leader of an organization . . . .
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The district court responded:
Mr. Aguirre is not a leader, but I do believe he qualifies at least
as a manager. Probably as a supervisor, given his involvement in
coordinating the details of the deliveries. . . . I understand your
argument . . . it is a way to look at the facts. I just don’t believe that the
applicable precedent supports that look at the facts.
We agree. Aguirre coordinated the importation of hundreds of kilograms of
methamphetamine into the United States for over five years. Like the defendant in
Reyes-Ramirez, he was the “key link” between the conspiracy’s source of supply in
Mexico and its distributors in Arkansas. 916 F.3d at 1148 (quotation omitted). In the
early October 2017 transaction, he and Colin-Flores coordinated an 18-kilogram
shipment of methamphetamine from Mexico into Little Rock. Evidence that a
participant “supervised the conspiracy’s deliveries and payments [in one city] . . . may
warrant enhancement.” United States v. Moreno, 679 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir.
2012) (cleaned up). Aguirre communicated directly with courier Acevedo, exercising
his authority when he refused her request to supply additional methamphetamine until
Colin-Flores assured Aguirre the request was on behalf of the organization and
Aguirre would be paid.
Aguirre nonetheless argues the record does not contain sufficient evidence he
was a manager or supervisor, relying on United States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513 (8th
Cir. 2014), cert denied, 580 U.S. 1191 (2017). But in Adejumo, a multi-defendant
fraud, identity theft, and money laundering case, we concluded there was insufficient
evidence that one defendant had “directed or procured the aid of” at least one other
participant, as “we have always required.” Id. at 532-33. Here, there is undisputed
evidence that Aguirre, serving as the key link in importing vast quantities of
methamphetamine into the United States over a long period of time, managed and
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supervised at least minor participants such as courier Acevedo. The district court did
not clearly error in applying the three-level role enhancement under § 3B1.1(b).2
B. Criminal Conduct Engaged in as a Livelihood. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E)
calls for a two-level enhancement if the defendant receives an aggravating role
adjustment under § 3B1.1 and “committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal
conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” For the enhancement to apply, the evidence
must establish that, in a 12-month period, (1) the defendant received an income from
the criminal activity that was 2,000 times the hourly federal minimum wage, and (2)
the criminal activity was the defendant’s primary occupation. United States v. Ford,
987 F.3d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 2021); see USSG § 4B1.3 comment. (n.2), defining
“Engaged in as a livelihood.”
In overruling Aguirre’s objection, the district court found that “the information
[in the record] as a whole indicates to me that moving this methamphetamine was his
main business and livelihood. Yes he is an addict and was supplying his own habit,
but I think this was his occupation as well.”
On appeal, Aguirre argues the government did not meet its burden of proof
because no evidence in the record shows that his illicit income surpassed the
applicable threshold. In the district court, Aguirre argued he should not receive the
enhancement because he was a mere user and was not getting rich off the drug trade,
not that the government did not meet its burden in satisfying the first prong of the
governing test in Ford. Because he did not raise this issue below, our review is
limited to plain error. United States v. Soto, 62 F.4th 430, 434 (8th Cir. 2023). To
succeed on plain error review, Aguirre must show: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that
affects his substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
2Because we conclude Aguirre is manager or supervisor, he is ineligible for
safety-valve relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4).
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public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550
(8th Cir.) (en banc) (cleaned up), cert denied, 546 U.S. 909 (2005).
At the time of Aguirre’s offense, the hourly minimum wage was $7.25. See
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). “Accordingly, the government needed to show that
[Aguirre] derived more than $14,500 in income from his drug activity to prove the
enhancement applied.” United States v. Berry, 930 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 2019).
In determining whether the government met this burden, the district court is
“entitled to draw reasonable inferences” from the record. United States v. McArthur,
11 F.4th 655, 663 (8th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we have routinely upheld the
enhancement in cases where circumstantial evidence established a reasonable
inference that the defendant’s illegal earnings satisfy the threshold. In Berry, we held
there was no clear error when the district court found that the defendant “wired
$22,000 for drugs in a single year, that he had no significant legitimate employment,
and that evidence suggested he had other large amounts of cash on hand.” 930 F.3d
at 1000. Similarly, in Denson, we affirmed the district court’s findings that the
enhancement applied in part because the total street value of the drugs seized from
the defendant and used in his numerous transactions surpassed $100,000. 967 F.3d
at 707.
Here, Aguirre did not dispute that he moved hundreds of kilograms of
methamphetamine into the United States over the course of five years. The record
supports the common knowledge of those involved in drug trafficking cases --
methamphetamine trafficking is a lucrative business. For example, in the attempted
transaction in which courier Acevedo was to bring a shipment to Little Rock in
October 2017, Aguirre and Colin-Flores discussed sending “20" and “about ten” to
Aguirre in Mexico, obviously meaning between $20,000 and $30,000, before law
enforcement seized 18 kilograms of methamphetamine in Acevedo’s vehicle on its
way to Little Rock. The district court could reasonably infer that Aguirre was paid
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more than $14,500 a year for coordinating the deliveries of hundreds of kilograms of
this costly contraband into the United States over the course of five years. There was
no plain error in finding that the government’s evidence satisfied this minimum
income requirement, and no error in finding that this criminal activity was Aguirre’s
livelihood, as he had little if any other apparent source of income during these years.
The court did not commit plain error in imposing the two-level enhancement.
III. Substantive Reasonableness
Aguirre argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because 300
months imprisonment is significantly higher than the guidelines range. This
argument assumes we will agree with his appeal of the sentence enhancements
because, if they are properly applied, as we have now concluded, the 300-month
sentence is within the applicable guidelines range of 292-365 months.
“We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Rexrode, 149 F.4th 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2025) (quotation
omitted). At sentencing, the district court heard about Aguirre’s background, listened
to his allocution that emphasized remorse, and extensively explored the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. The court acknowledged that Aguirre’s upbringing and
background weighed in favor of a lesser sentence but ultimately determined that
moving a high volume of drugs into the United States for a significant period of time
warranted a sentence of 25 years. The court carefully explained its reasons for the
sentence it imposed:
“I believe him to be a manager, and a key one, a volume
distributor, as it were, who has the ability to get his hands on lots of
drugs and move them into the United States. And so the sentence has
to be a serious one both to punish and deter . . . . At the same time, I’m
required to and I’m doing my best to . . . fairly account for your
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upbringing and your difficult circumstances . . . . [M]y mind comes to
rest on a sentence . . . [of] 25 years.”
We conclude this is not the “unusual case when we reverse a district court
sentence -- whether within, above, or below the applicable guidelines range -- as
substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted). The court weighed the relevant sentencing
factors, carefully balancing the aggravating circumstances of the offense conduct and
mitigating factors that suggested a lower sentence near the bottom of the guidelines
range. “Simply because the district court weighed relevant factors more heavily than
[Aguirre] would prefer does not mean the district court abused its discretion.” United
States v. Maluoth, 121 F.4th 1158, 1165 (8th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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