United States of America v. Robert Walker

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3580
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Robert Walker
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: November 21, 2025
Filed: March 3, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Robert Walker of knowingly and intentionally distributing
50 or more grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

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(b)(1)(A). The district court1 sentenced him to a term of 125 months’ imprisonment
to be followed by five years of supervised release. Walker appeals, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In early March 2022, Nathan Robbins, a detective with the Jacksonville Police
Department, obtained information indicating Walker was a source of supply for
methamphetamine in central Arkansas. The confidential informant (“CI”) agreed to
participate in a controlled buy on March 28, 2022, near the Extended Stay on Kanis
Road. Law enforcement officers provided the CI with $1,200 to purchase four
ounces of methamphetamine from Walker. When Walker changed the meeting
location, law enforcement regrouped, equipped the CI with an audio/video recording
device, and drove the CI to the new meeting location on South University.
Once there, the CI exited the agent’s vehicle and got into the back seat of a
maroon car. Walker was seated in the driver’s seat of the maroon vehicle, and a
female was in the passenger’s seat. Detective Robbins, a few blocks away, listened
and watched a live stream of the encounter on his phone. Walker told the CI, “I
guarantee you, it’s 112, 112 average.” In Detective Robbins’s experience, Walker’s
statement meant that Walker had four ounces of methamphetamine, as each ounce
is 28 grams. The CI asked Walker if he was “going to charge me 12,” which
Detective Robbins understood meant $1,200, and then tried unsuccessfully to
negotiate a lower price.
Walker exited the vehicle to weigh the drugs. The CI then asked the female
passenger about an empty gun case on the back seat. When Walker returned to the
vehicle, the CI asked Walker if he ever got “a piece.” Walker responded, “I got one”
and they discussed a .38 pistol with a snub nose. Prior to leaving, the CI mentioned
possibly needing more methamphetamine the next day and said he would call that
1 The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

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night “about that other.” The CI returned to the agent’s vehicle where he removed
the recording equipment and gave the substance to the agents, which field tested
positive for methamphetamine. Subsequent laboratory tests calculated the purity of
the methamphetamine at 94% with a net weight of 113.44 grams.
Prior to trial and during trial, Walker objected to admission of the video
recording of the controlled buy on three grounds: (1) the recording could not be
authenticated; (2) it contained inadmissible hearsay; and (3) in the alternative, if
otherwise admissible, the relevance was substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice due to discussion of the gun. The district court overruled Walker’s
objections. Walker also unsuccessfully objected to admission of a transcript of the
recording prepared by the prosecution. The court gave a limiting instruction, telling
the jury that the transcript could be considered for the limited purpose of helping
them follow the conversation as they listened to the recording, but the evidence is
what they hear on the recording, not what they read.
The jury convicted Walker of distributing 50 or more grams of
methamphetamine. His conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10
years’ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The district court calculated
an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months. Walker’s counsel
requested a one-month downward variance to the statutory minimum. Speaking on
his own behalf, Walker urged the court to impose a sentence below the mandatory
minimum based on the sentencing entrapment doctrine. The district court declined
Walker’s request and sentenced him to a 125-month term of imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Walker contends the district court erred in admitting the video, the
accompanying transcript, and still photos taken from the recording, and committed
procedural error by not addressing his sentencing entrapment argument and failing
to adequately explain its reasons for the sentence.

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A. Evidentiary Challenges
Walker asserts the district court committed reversible error when it overruled
his objections to admission of the video of the controlled buy, claiming: (1) it did
not make explicit findings as to the recording’s authenticity; (2) it failed to conduct
the balancing test required by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) it
did not articulate which hearsay exception applied, even though Walker expressly
inquired about this issue.
“We review evidentiary rulings for clear abuse of discretion, ‘reversing only
when an improper evidentiary ruling affected the defendant’s substantial rights or
had more than a slight influence on the verdict.’” United States v. Anderson, 783
F.3d 727, 745 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Henley, 766 F.3d 893, 914
(8th Cir. 2014)).
1. Authentication of the Recording
The Federal Rules of Evidence require recordings to be authenticated. United
States v. Kimble, 54 F.4th 538, 547 (8th Cir. 2022). To authenticate an item of
evidence, the proponent must “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The proponent’s
burden is a “low bar,” requiring only that there is “a rational basis for that party’s
claim that the [evidence] is what it is asserted to be.” United States v. Lamm, 5 F.4th
942, 946-47 (8th Cir. 2021).
In determining whether the proponent has laid a proper foundation for
admission, this Court has applied a non-exhaustive list of factors, including:
“whether a party has established that (1) the device was capable of recording, (2) the
operator of the recording device was competent, (3) the recording is authentic and
correct, (4) the recording has not been changed, (5) the recording has been preserved,
(6) any speakers in the recording are identified, and (7) the conversation was
voluntary.” Kimble, 54 F.4th at 547 (citing United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d

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101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974)). A trial court may admit a recording “even if not every
factor is explicitly and completely met,” if the totality of the circumstances satisfies
the court that the recording is reliable. Id.
Applying these factors, this Court has explained that video recordings are
properly authenticated when an officer testifies that, among other things, the video
is authentic and correct, the video has not been altered, and the recording has been
preserved. Id. at 547-48. Similarly, a transcript of a recording may be properly
authenticated by an officer’s testimony as to the transcript’s accuracy and
identification of the speakers in the video. United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835,
849-50 (8th Cir. 2002). Here, Detective Robbins testified that he was nearby with
other officers during the controlled buy. While Detective Robbins was not the
officer who equipped the CI with the recording device, he testified that he watched
on his government phone a live feed of the events that unfolded between the CI and
Walker and the video recording accurately depicted those events. Detective Robbins
further testified that at the conclusion of the controlled buy, he accessed the video
recording from the online cloud storage where the recording was saved and
downloaded it to a portable storage medium. Finally, Detective Robbins testified
that he helped prepare and edit the transcript and the transcript offered by the
prosecution accurately reflected what was said by who during the controlled buy.
Walker’s arguments that Detective Robbins’s testimony was insufficient are
unpersuasive. While Walker contends no evidence supports Detective Robbins’s
testimony that he watched the video feed in real time as the controlled buy took
place, he offers nothing to disprove Robbins’s testimony other than his own
unsupported speculation. Cf. Kaplan v. Mayo Clinic, 653 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir.
2011) (stating unsupported speculation is insufficient to demonstrate improper
authentication). Walker also contends the video is flawed because there are gaps in
the recording, but this Court has explained that gaps in a recording affect the weight
of the evidence, not its admissibility. United States v. Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048, 1056
(8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).

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Once the proponent satisfies the threshold requirements, questions of
authenticity become fact questions for the jury. Kaplan, 653 F.3d at 726. The district
court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it found the video recording was
adequately authenticated.
2. Rule 403 Balancing Test
Walker asserts the district court did not adequately consider his concerns
regarding the prejudicial effect of the video, the transcript, and the “highly
prejudicial” effect of the discussion regarding the gun. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, in relevant part, permits a court to “exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]”
Fed. R. Evid. 403. To fall within the exclusionary scope of Rule 403, evidence must
be unfairly prejudicial, not merely prejudicial in that it tends to implicate the
defendant in the crime charged. United States v. Ridings, 75 F.4th 902, 906 (8th
Cir. 2023). In other words, evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it “tends to suggest
decision on an improper basis.” Id.
Here, Walker was charged with distributing more than 50 grams of
methamphetamine on March 28, 2022. A recording capturing Walker’s sale of
methamphetamine on March 28, 2022, is unquestionably probative of the charge.
The prosecution gave notice of its intent to offer the recording, arguing the colloquy
regarding the gun was relevant intrinsic evidence of the crime charged and the gun
discussion could not be excised without also removing discussion of the drug
transaction itself.
This Court has frequently recognized that “a firearm is a tool of the trade for
drug dealers.” United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 920 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned
up). In Donnell, the defendant—charged in a drug trafficking conspiracy—
challenged the admission of wiretap recordings capturing conversations about
firearms but no mention of drugs. In concluding the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the recordings, the Court explained the conversations “bear

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out the relationship between drugs and firearms” and were supportive of the
prosecution’s claim that the defendant acted as an enforcer in the organization and
were probative of the defendant’s awareness of potential law enforcement
involvement. Id.
The record shows the district court decided it was not going to exclude the
discussion about the gun and asked counsel “to meet and see if we can work up an
instruction on it.” The jury was instructed that Walker was “on trial only for the
crime charged and not for anything else.” At trial, when the video was about to be
played for the jury, defense counsel requested a sidebar and asked for an instruction
to “reinforce the idea they [the jurors] won’t be persuaded or distracted by the gun.”
The prosecutor opined that “no comment on the gun is better than any instruction on
the gun.” The district court agreed with the prosecutor, ruling, “I think you are right.
I overrule your objection, save your exception.”
The district court heard from both sides on the potentially prejudicial nature
of allowing the discussion about the gun. The court considered whether to give the
jury a limiting instruction but ultimately determined that no instruction was better
than drawing additional attention to the discussion about the gun. “While this may
not amount to a lengthy analysis, the district court’s mere failure to make a record
of its Rule 403 weighing is not reversible error.” United States v. McCourt, 468
F.3d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). The record shows the district court
considered Walker’s concerns and overruled his objections. The general rule when
applying Rule 403 is the balance should be struck in favor of admission and this
Court is to “give great deference to the trial judge who saw and heard the evidence.”
United States v. Augustine, 663 F.3d 367, 373 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). We
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in admitting the entire recording.
3. Hearsay Objection
Finally, Walker contends the district court admitted the recording and
accompanying transcript without articulating which hearsay exception applied to the

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evidence. Hearsay is a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying
at the current trial or hearing, which a party offers “to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “Statements providing context for
other admissible statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their
truth.” United States v. Ralston, 973 F.3d 896, 913 (8th Cir. 2020). Even if an out-
of-court statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted, such a statement is
not hearsay if the statement is “offered against an opposing party and . . . was made
by the party in an individual or representative capacity.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
During the pretrial conference, the prosecution argued Walker’s statements in
the video were admissible as statements of a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)
and the CI’s statements provided context and were not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted. Although it would have been helpful for the district court to
explicitly state its reasons for overruling Walker’s objections, the record establishes
Walker’s statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) and the CI’s statements
were offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. Walker has
failed to show an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
B. Sentencing Challenges
Walker contends he satisfied his burden of showing sentencing entrapment
and made nonfrivolous arguments to support his claim. He further contends the
district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for his sentence.
1. Sentencing Entrapment
The existence of sentencing entrapment is a factual finding we review for clear
error. United States v. Warren, 788 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2015). Sentencing
entrapment occurs when law enforcement conduct leads a person who is otherwise
indisposed to deal a larger quantity or different type of controlled substance to sell
the larger quantity or different substance resulting in a longer sentence. United
States v. Martin, 583 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009). The burden of proof rests on

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the person claiming sentencing entrapment to “prove by a preponderance of
evidence that he lacked the predisposition to sell a larger quantity or different type
of drug.” Id.
Walker did not offer any evidence at trial or at the sentencing hearing to show
he was indisposed to sell four ounces of methamphetamine. Instead, he contends an
indisposition can be inferred because his prior drug convictions involved small
quantities of controlled substances and he would not have sold a larger quantity but
for the CI’s request. Walker’s argument is insufficient to satisfy his burden of
showing he was indisposed to sell the quantity of methamphetamine for which he
was convicted.
To the contrary, Walker sold 113 grams (four ounces) of methamphetamine
to the CI. When the CI inquired about purchasing additional methamphetamine the
next day, Walker told the CI that he obtains methamphetamine “11, 12, 13 at a time,
like just under a pound at a time.” Detective Robbins testified that he understood
this statement to mean that Walker obtained methamphetamine in quantities of just
under a pound at a time. Given the evidence, the district court did not clearly err
when it declined to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum due to
sentencing entrapment.
2. Adequacy of the Explanation for the Sentence
Walker did not object to the adequacy of the district court’s explanation for
his sentence at the sentencing hearing, so we review his challenge for plain error.
United States v. White, 863 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2017). A district court
adequately explains its sentence if it articulates a reasoned basis for the sentence.
United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 619 (8th Cir. 2021). In determining whether
the explanation is adequate, we look at the entire sentencing record. United States
v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008).

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Walker focuses on the district court’s failure to directly address his sentencing
entrapment argument and his related request for a sentence below the mandatory
minimum. But “not every . . . argument advanced by a defendant requires a specific
rejoinder by the judge.” United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2008).
This is especially true here, where Walker did not present evidence in support of his
argument and the evidence in the record undermines his argument. We presume the
district court considered Walker’s arguments but for other reasons concluded a
sentence within the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was appropriate and no
further explanation was required. See United States v. Banks, 960 F.3d 982, 985
(8th Cir. 2020). Having carefully reviewed the record, we find the district court did
not plainly err when it imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 125 months.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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