United States of America v. Samuel Peter McElmeel

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1558
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Samuel Peter McElmeel
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: December 18, 2025
Filed: March 9, 2026
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Samuel McElmeel was indicted on two counts of Interstate Transmission of a
Threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The district court1 later found McElmeel was not
1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendations of the
Honorable Stephen B. Jackson, Jr., Chief Magistrate Judge for the Southern District
of Iowa.

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competent to stand trial, and McElmeel appeals that finding. Because the district
court has since found McElmeel is competent, this appeal is moot.
I.
McElmeel was indicted on December 5, 2023. In July 2024, the district court
ordered him to undergo a mental health evaluation. After a competency hearing in
January 2025, and over McElmeel’s objections, the district court found McElmeel
incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to the custody of the Attorney
General for hospitalization and treatment for restoration of competency pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). McElmeel promptly appealed.
In October 2025, while this appeal was pending, the Warden at the Federal
Medical Center notified the district court that McElmeel’s forensic evaluation was
complete and attached a report from a forensic psychologist opining that McElmeel
was “presently able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him and to assist properly in his defense.”
After a second competency hearing in November 2025, the district court
found McElmeel competent and set the case for trial. Given the change in
circumstances, we ordered supplemental briefing on whether McElmeel’s appeal is
now moot. The Government argues the appeal is moot, while McElmeel maintains
it is not.
II.
“A case becomes moot . . . ‘when the issues presented are no longer live or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’ We have previously
held that a case becomes moot ‘when changed circumstances already provide the
requested relief and eliminate the need for court action.’” Prowse v. Payne, 984 F.3d
700, 702 (8th Cir. 2021) (first quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91
(2013); and then quoting Hillesheim v. Holiday Stationstores, Inc., 903 F.3d 786,

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791 (8th Cir. 2018)). Here, the district court’s order finding McElmeel competent
provided the requested relief and eliminated the need for further court action.
McElmeel argues otherwise, asserting that the district court’s initial
incompetency determination has the potential to harm his “legal interests and ability
at future proceedings,” which we understand to mean future competency
proceedings. But a defendant may be found not competent to stand trial only if, after
a hearing, “the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense[.]” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d) (emphasis added). McElmeel has not explained how a prior determination
of incompetency would upend this statutory mandate at a future proceeding. Indeed,
we have expressly said that “it is incumbent on the district court to base its
competency determination on the defendant’s current state of mind to the extent it
is ascertainable from the information available,” because “[a] defendant’s
competency is not static and may change over even a short period of time.” United
States v. Ghane, 593 F.3d 775, 779–80 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (first
citing United States v. Jimenez-Villasenor, 270 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir. 2001); and
then citing Lyons v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 2005)).
McElmeel relies heavily on United States v. Evans, 690 F.3d 940 (8th Cir.
2012), to support his assertion that he maintains a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome of this appeal. As McElmeel points out, “the burden of proof changes” after
an incompetency finding insofar as a defendant will ordinarily “only be allowed to
be discharged and to proceed to trial if the court finds ‘by a preponderance of the
evidence that’” the defendant’s competency is restored. Id. at 943 (first citing 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d); and then quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e)). But here, the district court
has already found McElmeel’s competency is restored—a determination that no one
challenges. McElmeel, unlike the defendant in Evans, is no longer subject to the
altered burden of proof in § 4241(e). See id. at 941–43.

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Finally, McElmeel argues that stigma, damage to his reputation, and a
“potential impact on [his] . . . right to bear arms” are collateral consequences that
qualify as legally cognizable interests. But these harms are speculative and
untethered to the asserted error in the district court’s finding that McElmeel was not
competent to stand trial. As to stigma and reputational damage, the documents
related to the court’s competency finding remain under seal, and McElmeel
identifies no harm that is both traceable to these records and redressable by this
Court. As to his right to possess a firearm, he does not explain how a prior
competency determination would impact—at some future time, under unknown
circumstances—that right. In this posture and on this record, we conclude that
McElmeel “lack[s] a legally cognizable interest in the outcome” of the issue
appealed. See Prowse, 984 F.3d at 702 (citing Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91).
III.
The appeal is dismissed.2
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2 After the supplemental briefs were submitted, McElmeel filed two motions
to proceed pro se, indicating an intent to repeat the arguments made by his counsel.
We deny the motions.

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