United States v. Christopher Weigert

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3345
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Judith Etelvina Cancinos Guinac
lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
v.
Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States1
lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
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No. 25-1336
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Judith Etelvina Cancinos Guinac
lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner
v.
Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States
lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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1Todd Blanche is automatically substituted as respondent in place of Pamela
Bondi pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).

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Submitted: April 24, 2026
Filed: April 29, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated matters, Guatemalan citizen Judith Etelvina Cancinos
Guinac petitions for review of an October 2024 order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to reopen and reissue a prior decision based on
ineffective assistance of counsel (Appeal No. 24-3345); and a January 2025 order of
the BIA denying a motion to reopen and remand to the immigration judge (IJ) for
administrative closure (Appeal No. 25-1336).
Upon careful consideration, we find no basis to grant the petitions for review.
See Quecheluno v. Garland, 9 F.4th 585, 588 (8th Cir. 2021) (denial of motion to
reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion). We conclude that the BIA’s refusal in
October 2024 to equitably toll the time limit for reopening and reissuing a 2003
decision was not an abuse of discretion. See Valencia v. Holder, 657 F.3d 745, 748
(8th Cir. 2011) (movant seeking to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel
must, inter alia, establish she exercised due diligence); see also Pafe v. Holder, 615
F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (equitable tolling is “sparingly invoked”
for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in the immigration context). We reject
Cancinos Guinac’s assertions that the BIA engaged in improper factfinding in
resolving the motion to reopen and reissue, as the BIA was entitled to determine
whether she was diligent in bringing the motion. See Mwangi v. Barr, 934 F.3d 818,
821 (8th Cir. 2019) (BIA has discretion to equitably toll deadline for filing motion to
reopen if movant shows he exercised due diligence). Having determined she was not
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diligent in bringing the motion, the BIA did not need to consider the merits of her
ineffective-assistance claim. See Salat v. Garland, 32 F.4th 684, 689 (8th Cir. 2022)
(noting that “courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach”) (quoting INS v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam)). Finally, as we have determined
that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to equitably toll the motion to
reopen and reissue, we also conclude Cancinos Guinac cannot show that the failure
to consider the motion on the merits resulted in a due process violation. See
Becerril-Sanchez v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1099, 1113 (8th Cir. 2025) (no due process
violation in denying motion to reopen where petitioner does not identify procedural
error and cannot establish prejudice).
We also find no error in the BIA’s decision in January 2025 to deny Cancinos
Guinac’s motion to reopen and remand for administrative closure. The BIA correctly
construed the post-removal-order motion as one seeking reopening, rather than for
administrative closure, see Quecheluno, 9 F.4th at 587 n.2 (noting administrative
closure “is a docket management tool . . . used to temporarily pause removal
proceedings”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Estrada-Mederos v. Mukasey, 300
Fed. Appx. 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished memorandum) (holding
“administrative closure is not available after entry of a final order of removal”); and
correctly determined that the motion was untimely and numerically barred, see 8
U.S.C.§ 1229a(c)(7). Contrary to her assertions, our decision in Quecheluno does not
dictate a different outcome. In any event, the record shows that the BIA considered
the factors set forth in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), and
concluded that administrative closure was not warranted; accordingly, Cancinos
Guinac’s claim that the BIA violated her due process rights by failing to adequately
consider the Avetisyan factors necessarily fails, see Becerril-Sanchez, 127 F.4th at
1113. To the extent Cancinos Guinac intended to challenge the BIA’s decision not
to sua sponte reopen proceedings, the decision is not reviewable. See Yusuf v.
Garland, 8 F.4th 738, 742 (8th Cir. 2021) (this court lacks jurisdiction to review
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discretionary grant or denial of motion to reopen, but may review colorable
constitutional claim); cf. Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam) (arguments cloaking abuse of discretion in constitutional garb are
insufficient to justify judicial review).
The petitions for review are denied. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
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