United States of America v. Michael Sylvara

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3384
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Michael Sylvara
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: November 20, 2025
Filed: April 8, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A jury found Michael Sylvara guilty of social security fraud and making false
declarations before the court, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623(a). He moved to dismiss his indictment or for a new trial before sentencing,

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arguing the government suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court1 denied his motion, and we affirm.
As relevant here, the Social Security Administration (SSA) provides two types
of benefits. Social Security Disability Insurance Program (SSDI) benefits replace
lost income for those who become disabled after paying into the SSA system, and
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) benefits provide “the bare minimum,
poverty level funds to survive” for “those people that haven’t paid into the [SSA]
system or haven’t done enough work credits to qualify for” SSDI.
Sylvara’s father applied for both types of benefits in 2015, and the SSA
approved his applications in November 2016. The SSA specifically determined
Sylvara’s father was entitled to (1) $11,573 in SSI benefits for the period between
his applications and when he became eligible for SSDI, (2) $8,739 in SSDI benefits
for the period between when he became eligible and approval of his applications,
and (3) between $1,500 and $1,700 in monthly SSDI benefits going forward.
Sylvara was appointed as his father’s representative payee, and he set up an account
with Academy Bank to receive his father’s benefits. The SSA deposited the past due
SSDI and SSI benefits into this account on January 4, 2017, and February 22, 2017,
respectively.
In 2019, the SSA received a tip that Sylvara had misused his father’s benefits
for himself. It opened an investigation, and Sylvara was ultimately indicted for
converting his father’s SSDI benefits, in violation of § 408(a)(5). When Sylvara’s
case was first tried, the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, so the district court
declared a mistrial. The government then sought and obtained a superseding
indictment, again charging Sylvara with converting his father’s SSDI benefits, and
adding counts for theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and
for making false declarations before the court during the first trial, in violation of
1 The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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§ 1623(a). After his second trial, the jury found Sylvara guilty of converting his
father’s SSDI benefits and making false declarations but not guilty of theft of
government property.
The evidence presented at Sylvara’s trials largely overlapped. Relevant here,
the government asked the district court to admit evidence Sylvara had converted his
father’s SSI benefits, although he was not charged with this, to show his “knowledge,
intent, common scheme, and absence of mistake or accident.” The district court
decided this evidence was admissible, and the government’s witnesses testified
Sylvara made eight large withdrawals from the Academy Bank account, totaling
almost $17,000, between January 9, 2017, and March 28, 2017. The witnesses also
described the SSA’s investigation and how the SSA evaluated what amounts Sylvara
used for his father versus for himself. Specifically, Dan Krahn, a Special Agent for
the SSA’s Inspector General’s Office, testified that the SSA determined Sylvara
converted over $42,000 of his father’s SSDI benefits by subtracting the funds
Sylvara spent on his father from the total amount of benefits the SSA paid. Notably,
Krahn explained the SSA “gave [Sylvara] credit” for all the funds he claimed to have
spent on his father, even when he could not document an expense.
To support his argument that he had not willfully converted his father’s
benefits, Sylvara testified his father agreed to use his two lump sum payments to
repay Sylvara for providing food and shelter while his applications were pending
and to use his monthly SSDI benefits to pay Sylvara prospectively for care. The
SSA’s regulations allow beneficiaries to use their SSI benefits to reimburse someone
for care they provided while the beneficiary’s applications were pending, but they
do not allow beneficiaries to use their SSDI benefits to pay for prospective care.
Before sentencing, the Probation Office filed a Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR), recommending the district court increase Sylvara’s base offense level
by six because he converted more than $40,000 but less than $95,000 of his father’s
benefits. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D) (U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n 2024). Sylvara objected, arguing the enhancement did not

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apply because the government’s evidence did not show he converted more than
$40,000. The government filed a sentencing memorandum in support of the
Probation Office’s recommendation, and it attached an exhibit from the SSA
detailing how it calculated that Sylvara converted approximately $42,000 of his
father’s SSDI benefits.
The government did not provide the exhibit to Sylvara before his trials, and
the exhibit clearly states the SSA determined he did not convert his father’s SSI
benefits. So Sylvara moved to dismiss his superseding indictment or for a new trial,
arguing the government’s failure to disclose the exhibit violated his right to a fair
trial under Brady. The district court, however, concluded the exhibit was immaterial
to the result of Sylvara’s trials and denied his motion. Sylvara appeals.
We review the district court’s decision to deny Sylvara’s motion for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Holmes, 137 F.4th 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2025); United
States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000). But we review legal
questions, including “allegations of Brady violations[,] de novo,” Holmes, 137 F.4th
at 741, and “[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an
error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). This means the
district court abused its discretion if its conclusion that the government did not
violate Sylvara’s rights under Brady was wrong, because this was its basis for
denying his motion.
“[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady,
373 U.S. at 87. Put more plainly, “[t]o establish a claim under Brady, [Sylvara] must
establish that the government (1) suppressed evidence; (2) that was favorable to him;
and (3) material to the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Smart, 60 F.4th 1084,
1095 (8th Cir. 2023). We address each of these elements in turn.

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First, as Sylvara notes, when the government responded to his motion to
dismiss his indictment or for a new trial, it “concede[d] the [exhibit] was
suppressed.” However, it now contends Sylvara could have gathered the same
information contained in the exhibit from other evidence the government produced
before trial. Because this argument was made for the first time on appeal, after the
government conceded this issue below, we will not consider it. See United States v.
Rees, 447 F.3d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Because [the appellant] not only failed
to raise his . . . argument, but in fact expressly conceded [it] before the district court,
we will not address it.”). As a result, we find the government suppressed the exhibit.
Second, “[e]vidence is favorable if it is directly exculpatory or useful for
impeachment purposes.” United States v. Corey, 36 F.4th 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2022).
The “burden of demonstrating that the evidence was of a favorable nature is . . . a
very slight one,” as the defendant only needs to show it may be “potentially useful.”
Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (holding Brady’s favorability element was satisfied because
“the suppressed evidence” was “advantageous to Banks”). Sylvara argues the
exhibit favored him because it “undermined the implication that [he] converted the
SSI back payment” and “provided important context for the government’s evidence
about cash withdrawals . . . .” We agree.
The exhibit states the SSA determined Sylvara did not convert his father’s SSI
benefits. So at the very least, Sylvara could have used it to impeach the government
witnesses’ testimony implying he converted these funds and to account for roughly

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$11,000 of the approximately $17,000 in cash they testified he withdrew between
January 9, 2017, and March 28, 2017. Consequently, the exhibit favored Sylvara.2
Third, “the materiality standard . . . is met when ‘the favorable evidence could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict.’” Banks, 540 U.S. at 698 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). In making this assessment, “[w]e must examine the trial
record, evaluate the withheld evidence in the context of the entire record, and
determine in light of that examination whether there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324–25 (2017) (cleaned up).
Sylvara argues the exhibit was material because it (1) showed he did not
convert his father’s SSI benefits; (2) undercut the government’s narrative regarding
the cash withdrawals; (3) supported his testimony that his father agreed to use the
SSI and SSDI benefits to pay Sylvara for food, shelter, and care; and (4) discredited
Krahn’s testimony. We disagree.
Most importantly, while the exhibit would have helped Sylvara show that he
did not convert his father’s SSI benefits, it very clearly concluded Sylvara converted
$42,369 of his father’s SSDI benefits, the exact amount the government contended
Sylvara converted in total. Put differently, the exhibit would have helped Sylvara
clarify which benefits he converted, but it would not have reduced the total amount
he converted from his father. Similarly, while the exhibit accounted for some of the
cash Sylvara withdrew, the government’s evidence showed he made the first
2 The district court was skeptical regarding whether the exhibit favored Sylvara
because it “succinctly lays out the SSA’s calculation . . . for its determination that
[Sylvara] converted $42,369 of his father’s SSDI benefits.” But this goes to whether
the exhibit was material, not to whether it favored Sylvara. See Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 282 & n.21 (1999) (“We reject respondent’s contention that these
documents do not fall under Brady because they were inculpatory. Our cases make
clear that Brady’s disclosure requirements extend to materials that, whatever their
other characteristics, may be used to impeach a witness.” (cleaned up)).

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withdrawal on January 9, 2017, over a month before his father received SSI benefits
on February 22, 2017, and he withdrew almost $6,000 more than the total amount
his father received in SSI benefits by March 28, 2017. So some of the cash Sylvara
withdrew must have come from his father’s SSDI benefits, and the exhibit would
not have explained this.
Additionally, assuming the exhibit would have supported Sylvara’s testimony
that his father agreed to use his SSI benefits to repay Sylvara for providing food and
shelter while his applications were pending, it would have been cumulative of other
evidence on this point. For instance, the government showed beneficiaries can agree
to use their SSI benefits for this purpose and that Sylvara and his father had such an
agreement. What’s more, assuming for the sake of argument Sylvara could show
the jury did not believe his father agreed to use his SSI benefits to repay Sylvara and
the exhibit would have changed its mind, we see no reason to believe the jury would
have then concluded Sylvara’s father also agreed to use his monthly SSDI benefits
to pay Sylvara for prospective care. Rather, the jury could have readily concluded
one agreement existed and the other did not, especially since SSDI benefits cannot
be used to pay for prospective care. Further still, even if Sylvara had proven his
father agreed to use his SSDI benefits to pay Sylvara for care, this would not
undermine the government’s evidence showing Sylvara used his father’s SSDI
benefits to pay Sylvara’s own car insurance premium, utility bills, student loans, and
realtor fees.
Lastly, while we agree Sylvara could have used the exhibit to impeach Krahn,
we do not believe there is any reasonable probability this would have caused the jury
to reach a different result. During the trial, Sylvara effectively impeached Krahn’s
testimony that the SSA gave Sylvara “full credit” for all the expenses he claimed,
regardless of whether they were documented, by pointing out the SSA only credited
roughly $28,000 of the $62,000 in expenses Sylvara claimed to have incurred for his
father. The jury found Sylvara guilty despite this, and he has not convinced us things
would have turned out differently if he had used the exhibit to further undermine
Krahn’s testimony.

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In sum, given all the testimony and evidence the government introduced, we
cannot say there is a reasonable probability that the result of Sylvara’s trial would
have been different if the exhibit had been disclosed. See Turner, 582 U.S. at 324–
25. As a result, Sylvara has not demonstrated the exhibit was material, and we affirm
the district court’s judgment.
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