United States of America v. Paul Antonio Deon Parrow, also known as Paul Antonio Deon Parrow, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1215
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Paul Antonio Deon Parrow, also known as Paul Antonio Deon Parrow, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: December 18, 2025
Filed: April 15, 2026
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
A jury found Paul Parrow guilty of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). The district court
imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of 300 months. Parrow appeals,
challenging an evidentiary ruling and the denial of his motion for a mistrial. For the
reasons that follow, we vacate Parrow’s conviction for possession with intent to

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distribute and remand for a new trial. We affirm the district court’s judgment in all
other respects.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2022, law enforcement performed a traffic stop involving N.G. She
had methamphetamine on her person and told law enforcement that she received the
drugs from Parrow, who is also known as “Tone.” N.G. agreed to act as a
confidential informant.
While being recorded by law enforcement, N.G. made four controlled buys
from Parrow. During the first controlled buy, she purchased crack cocaine and
marijuana. N.G. purchased methamphetamine from Parrow in the other three
controlled buys.
Law enforcement conducted surveillance of Parrow and identified a house on
Esplanade Avenue that he was leasing. On November 3, 2022, police executed a
search warrant for the Esplanade Avenue house and recovered methamphetamine
and fentanyl from a safe. Police also recovered drug packaging material, digital
scales, a kilo press, and items containing drug residue.
Following Parrow’s indictment, the district court entered a discovery order
that required the government to provide the defense with copies of all relevant law
enforcement reports, witness statements, and memoranda of witness interviews
prepared by law enforcement. Among other things, the government disclosed notes
of an interview with D.B. and notes of an interview with someone identified only as
a “concerned citizen.” Unbeknownst to the defense, the concerned citizen was D.B.
In July 2024, the case went to trial. The jury heard from several witnesses
including Parrow’s co-conspirators and customers. One of Parrow’s dealers testified
that he initially received one to two ounces of methamphetamine but eventually built
up to receiving between three quarters of a pound and one pound of

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methamphetamine during his resupply meetings with Parrow. He then sold the
methamphetamine to a co-conspirator in a quarter pound and half pound quantities
and also enlisted his girlfriend to sell methamphetamine to her customers. The
evidence showed he paid Parrow in cash and through Cash App. Documentary
evidence of the Cash App transactions were submitted as an exhibit to the jury. He
also testified that he typically saw Parrow with at least one pound of
methamphetamine when he received his distribution and, on one occasion, saw
Parrow with two pounds of methamphetamine.
Two more Parrow dealers also testified. One stated that she sold
methamphetamine and heroin in one to two gram quantities for Parrow to four or
five customers. Another dealer testified that she sold heroin for Parrow and
witnessed him selling heroin. The most heroin she saw in Parrow’s possession at
one time was five grams.
Three more customers testified about buying heroin or fentanyl from Parrow.
One of them purchased at least 0.25 grams of fentanyl on an almost daily basis for a
year. She also occasionally purchased heroin from Parrow.
Towards the end of its case, the government called D.B. as a witness. She
testified about frequently seeing Parrow in possession of a firearm, which was
testimony consistent with the previously disclosed notes of her interview with police.
However, D.B. also testified about Parrow’s drug trafficking, which was not
described in the notes of her interview with police.
During the recess following D.B.’s testimony, defense counsel notified the
district court that any statements by her to law enforcement about witnessing Parrow
engaged in drug trafficking had not been provided to him. The government
responded that the person identified as “concerned citizen” in the notes of another
police interview was D.B. but did not know if any other document provided to
defense counsel notified him that D.B. was the concerned citizen.

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After the trial recessed for the day, the government investigated the matter
and, the following morning, admitted it had not identified D.B. as the concerned
citizen. The district court found the government had not acted in bad faith in failing
to notify the defense of this connection. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial as a
sanction for the government failing to link D.B. to the concerned citizen interview
notes. The district court denied the motion and instead sanctioned the government
by striking all testimony from D.B. that was not previously disclosed.
The defense called Clemmie Kirk as a witness. Kirk was one of the owners
of the house on Esplanade Avenue where Parrow resided. Kirk had two prior felony
convictions for intent to deliver marijuana. After Parrow’s indictment, Kirk was
convicted of intent to deliver marijuana and fentanyl. Defense counsel
unsuccessfully sought to use these convictions as reverse Rule 404(b) evidence to
establish Kirk’s opportunity and knowledge regarding storing methamphetamine
and fentanyl in a safe inside a bench at the house.
Defense counsel then introduced the convictions under Rule 609(a). The jury
heard only the name, date, and disposition of the convictions. The district court
instructed the jury that it could consider the convictions only for the purpose of
whether to believe Kirk’s testimony and how much weight to give his testimony.
The jury found Parrow guilty of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance, Count 1, and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance,
Count 2. The jury also found that Counts 1 and 2 involved more than fifty grams of
methamphetamine and more than forty grams of fentanyl. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Kirk’s Prior Convictions
We review a district court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Copp, 1 F.4th 573, 576 (8th Cir. 2021). We will not reverse an

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evidentiary ruling if the error was harmless. United States v. Love, 521 F.3d 1007,
1009 (8th Cir. 2008). An evidentiary ruling is harmless when, “after reviewing the
entire record, this court determines that the substantial rights of the defendant were
unaffected, and that the error did not influence or had only a slight influence on the
verdict.” United States v. Garrett, 103 F.4th 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2024) (citations
omitted). Stated another way, an error is harmless “where it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty without
the error.” United States v. Lozier, 122 F.4th 717, 724 (8th Cir. 2024) (citations
omitted).
1. Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance
While the jury heard about Kirk’s convictions, Parrow could not use them to
explicitly argue that Kirk had the opportunity to keep drugs in the safe at the
Esplanade Avenue house. At best, had the jury concluded Kirk owned those drugs,
it would have had only a slight influence on the verdict on the conspiracy count.
Three of Parrow’s drug dealers and five of his customers testified about his drug
trafficking activities. There was overwhelming evidence of Parrow’s guilt.
Excluding the drugs recovered from the safe, the jury would also be able to
conclude that the conspiracy involved more than fifty grams of methamphetamine
and more than forty grams of fentanyl. Witness testimony established that Parrow
distributed at least a half pound of methamphetamine every other day. Law
enforcement testimony provided corroboration. One customer testified that she
purchased from Parrow at least 0.25 grams of fentanyl on an almost daily basis for
a year. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on the
methamphetamine and fentanyl quantities for the conspiracy count.
It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found
Parrow guilty on Count 1 despite the alleged error. Lozier, 122 F.4th at 724. The
district court’s reverse 404(b) ruling was harmless as to Count 1.

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2. Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance
The exclusion of the convictions as reverse 404(b) evidence on Count 2
presents a different question. An essential element of the offense is Parrow’s
knowing possession of the methamphetamine and fentanyl in the safe at the
Esplanade Avenue house. The only evidence presented to the jury on this element
was the recovery of the drugs from the safe, that Parrow was leasing the property,
and testimony from the girlfriend of one of Parrow’s dealers that it was one of the
three locations where her boyfriend received methamphetamine from Parrow.
Nobody testified to seeing Parrow store drugs in the safe or to him talking about
storing drugs in a safe at the house.
The three convictions establish that Kirk, one of the owners of the house, sold
drugs. One of the convictions involved Kirk selling drugs from the Esplanade
Avenue house. This evidence may have cast reasonable doubt on the jury’s decision
on whether Parrow knowingly possessed the methamphetamine and fentanyl.
Lozier, 122 F.4th at 724. This evidentiary error cannot be considered harmless. See
Garrett, 103 F.4th at 496 (if the error had more than a slight influence on the verdict,
it is not harmless).
We now turn to whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding
the prior convictions under Rule 404(b). Courts “construe Rule 404(b) broadly as a
rule of inclusion . . . .” United States v. Thomas, 791 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Hawkins, 548 F.3d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 2008)). The same
factors used to analyze 404(b) evidence offered by the government against the
defendant apply to reverse 404(b) evidence. United States v. Harry, 930 F.3d 1000,
1007 (8th Cir. 2019).
First, the proponent must establish a non-propensity purpose for the
conviction, which may include motive, opportunity, and knowledge. Thomas, 791
F.3d at 894. After demonstrating a non-propensity purpose, the prior conviction is
admissible if it “is relevant, is similar in kind and not too remote in time, is

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sufficiently supported by the evidence, and the potential prejudice does not
substantially outweigh the probative value.” Id. The government did not contest
that Kirk’s convictions are sufficiently supported by the evidence.
One non-propensity purpose asserted by Parrow was opportunity. Kirk owned
and had access to the Esplanade Avenue house and sold drugs from it. The
convictions illustrate Kirk’s opportunity to store drugs at the house.
Next, the convictions are relevant to an element of the possession charge –
who possessed the drugs recovered from the safe? The district court concluded the
relevance was “marginal” because the name, date, and disposition of the conviction
was admitted under Rule 609 and possession can be either exclusive or joint,
meaning both Kirk and Parrow could possess the drugs in the safe.
The admission of the convictions under Rule 609 meant they were restricted
in two ways. First, the district court instructed the jury that it could consider the
convictions only for the purpose of whether to believe Kirk’s testimony and how
much weight to give his testimony. Second, the jury did not hear any of the details
of the convictions, which included Kirk’s sale of drugs from the Esplanade Avenue
house. The jury could not consider the convictions for the purpose of determining
whether Kirk had the opportunity to store drugs in the safe.
In the joint possession case relied on by the district court, when law
enforcement executed the search warrant, they found the defendant sleeping on top
of marijuana in a room where crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and a large brick of
marijuana were all in plain sight. United States v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 1038, 1041
(8th Cir. 2010). In this case, the drugs were locked in a safe, which was concealed
within a bench. The government presented no evidence of Parrow storing drugs in
or retrieving drugs from the safe. Evidence that another drug dealer had access to
the house and sold drugs out of that house is relevant to the possession charge. See
United States v. Hayward, 124 F.4th 1113, 1119 (8th Cir. 2025) (prior bad act is
relevant when it is evidence of an essential element of the crime).

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Regarding the similarity factor, the district court found Kirk sold different
drugs, and the government asserts the drugs are different because Kirk sold fentanyl
in pill form while the fentanyl recovered from the safe was in powder form. This
Court has approved the admission of a prior conviction for cocaine possession in a
trial on methamphetamine possession “given that both substances are illegal.”
United States v. Benitez, 531 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). The Court has also
approved testimony about a controlled buy for fentanyl in a prosecution for heroin
distribution. Hayward, 124 F.4th at 1119. Kirk’s convictions for intent to distribute
marijuana and fentanyl meet the similarity requirement. Id.; Benitez, 531 F.3d at
716.
The government asserts Kirk’s convictions are too remote in time, and the
district court held Kirk’s 2024 conviction inadmissible because it occurred after the
search of the Esplanade Avenue house. “There is no absolute rule regarding the
number of years that can separate offenses.” United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d
791, 810 (8th Cir. 2006). But a thirteen-year gap between the prior bad act and the
charged offense has been considered “the typical outer limit for remoteness.” Harry,
930 F.3d at 1008. Law enforcement searched the house in November 2022. Kirk’s
convictions were from 2019, 2022, and 2024. Because the convictions were less
than thirteen years from the date of the search, they are not too remote. Id.
Under Rule 404(b), there is no bar on the admission of bad acts solely because
they occurred after the indictment and prior to trial. United States v. Thomas, 593
F.3d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In Thomas, the government
charged the defendant with conduct that occurred in 2004 and was allowed to present
evidence at trial of an investigation that occurred in 2008. Id. To deny the admission
of a conviction solely because it occurred after the indictment is an abuse of
discretion. See Cheeks v. Belmar, 162 F.4th 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2025) (citations
omitted) (applying an incorrect legal standard is an abuse of discretion).
Finally, a district court may exclude a conviction if the potential prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. The district court found

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that the risks of confusing the issues and misleading the jury substantially
outweighed the probative value. Yet, this Court has routinely affirmed the admission
of convictions and other bad acts against defendants. Hayward, 124 F.4th at 1119;
Thomas, 593 F.3d at 758; Benitez, 531 F.3d at 716; Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 810.
Furthermore, any potential confusion or misleading may be remedied by a limiting
instruction. See Hayward, 124 F.4th at 1120 (unfair prejudice remedied by limiting
instruction); Thomas, 593 F.3d at 759 (same).
The government asserts that admitting the convictions under Rule 404(b)
would result in a mini trial over the “extent of Kirk’s guilt for other acts.” When
404(b) evidence is admitted against a defendant, it does not turn into a mini trial over
the extent of the defendant’s guilt for the prior bad acts. Parrow sought to introduce
only three controlled substances convictions with the additional factual detail that
one of them involved sales out of the Esplanade Avenue house. Cf. United States v.
Battle, 774 F.3d 504, 514 (8th Cir. 2014) (legitimate mini trial concern because
defendant sought to elicit testimony on “detailed fact patterns” for a “long string of
offenses” to establish modus operandi). An appropriate limiting instruction would
explain that the jury could consider the convictions for the purpose of determining
whether Kirk had the opportunity to store the drugs in the safe. It would then be for
the jury to consider all the evidence, including the credibility of Kirk’s testimony, in
determining whether Parrow knowingly possessed the drugs.
The district court abused its discretion by incorrectly applying this Court’s
precedent on Rule 404(b) evidence. Because there was scant evidence establishing
Parrow’s knowing possession of the drugs in the safe, we cannot conclude this error
was harmless. Parrow’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance is vacated.
B. Discovery Sanction
A district court’s chosen discovery sanction is also reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Amaya, 750 F.3d 721, 727 (8th Cir. 2014). When

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determining whether the district court abused its discretion in its choice of discovery
sanction, we consider: “1) the reason, or reasons, for the delay in production of the
evidence, including whether the government acted in bad faith; 2) whether the
defendant was prejudiced; and 3) whether a lesser sanction would secure future
compliance by the government.” United States v. Sims, 776 F.3d 583, 585-86 (8th
Cir. 2015). The lesser sanction factor is inapplicable here because Parrow is seeking
a greater sanction.
The district court found that there was no bad faith in the failure to link D.B.
to the “concerned citizen” moniker in the police report. During the trial, prior to
calling her as a witness, a law enforcement officer testified that D.B. was the
concerned citizen, which the district court found “helpful” but insufficient to provide
notice to the defense.
As to the prejudice factor, the district court instructed the jury to disregard all
of D.B.’s testimony other than her testimony related to Parrow’s possession of a
firearm. With her testimony about Parrow’s drug trafficking struck, there was little
to no prejudice to Parrow regarding the failure to link D.B. to the concerned citizen
report. Furthermore, as previously described, other witnesses provided
overwhelming evidence of Parrow’s guilt on Count 1.
Parrow likens his case to United States v. Curry, 328 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2003),
in which the court granted a mistrial due to the government’s failure to disclose
impeachment evidence and the government’s improper and prejudicial comments
during closing argument. The significance of the impeachment evidence was that it
related to the only witness who could testify as to one of the essential elements of
the crime—the victim’s capacity to consent. Curry, 328 F.3d at 973. Unlike the
conduct in Curry, at Parrow’s trial, there were no improper and prejudicial comments
during closing argument, and D.B.’s excluded testimony was duplicative of other
witnesses’ testimony on the essential elements of Count 1.

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The government did not act in bad faith in failing to link D.B. to the concerned
citizen report, and there was little to no prejudice in letting her testify and then
striking that part of her testimony. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
testimony unrelated to Parrow’s possession of a firearm as a discovery sanction to
secure future compliance by the government.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the conviction on Count 2 and remand
for a new trial. We affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects.
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