United States of America v. Antonio Clarence Robertson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-2338
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Antonio Clarence Robertson
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
____________
Submitted: February 13, 2026
Filed: April 8, 2026
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Antonio Clarence Robertson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). He
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s1 denial of his motion to suppress. The
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the

-- 1 of 6 --

-2-
court sentenced him to 48 months in prison. He appeals the denial of his motion to
suppress. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
On December 21, 2023, Sergeant Michael Merritt and Officer Green of the
Cedar Rapids Police Department were patrolling near the parking lot of several
businesses, including Jim’s Foods. The officers saw a man walk from a house
known for narcotics-dealing toward Jim’s Foods “interacting with vehicles parked
at the north side of the building.” The man entered the back seat of a Chevy Cruz
parked close to Jim’s Foods. Robertson was in the front seat.
The officers entered the lot and pulled up behind the Chevy. It started to exit
the lot, but then quickly parked in front of Jim’s Foods. The man exited the Chevy
and made a hand-to-hand transaction with another man before entering Jim’s Foods.
Believing that the Chevy may be involved in criminal activity, the officers continued
to surveil it. They watched it leave the parking spot at Jim’s Foods and drive to the
“main entrance and exit.” Exiting the lot, the Chevy did “not come to a complete
stop prior to approaching the sidewalk or entering the roadway, so it just kind of
rolls right out into the roadway.” The officers initiated a traffic stop for a violation
of Iowa Code Section 321.353, which prohibits exiting from a “private driveway”
onto a public roadway without stopping.
With the driver’s permission, the officers searched the Chevy. In Robertson’s
seat, they found a pill bottle with prescription pills. Robertson had a bag of the same
pills in his pocket. Later, officers found marijuana concealed on him. He was
charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.
Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.

-- 2 of 6 --

-3-
II.
Robertson argues Sergeant Merritt did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
the Chevy. Reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Woods, 829 F.3d 675, 678–79 (8th Cir. 2016). “The district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress will be upheld unless it is not supported by substantial
evidence, is based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or is clearly
mistaken in light of the entire record.” Id. at 679.
“A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
and therefore must be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” United
States v. Givens, 763 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2014). Probable cause exists for a
traffic stop if the officer has an objectively “reasonable basis for believing that the
driver has breached a traffic law.” United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 872, 876 (8th
Cir. 2013). The district court did not err in finding the officers had an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that the driver of the Chevy breached Iowa Code
§ 321.353.
Iowa Code § 321.353 states:
1. The driver of a vehicle emerging from a private roadway, alley,
driveway, or building shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to
driving on the sidewalk area and thereafter the driver shall proceed into
the sidewalk area only when the driver can do so without danger to
pedestrian traffic and the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any
vehicular traffic on the street into which the driver’s vehicle is entering.
2. The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a
private road or driveway shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to
driving on said highway and shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
approaching on said highway.
Iowa Code § 321.1(54) defines “private road” or “driveway” as:

-- 3 of 6 --

-4-
[E]very way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel
by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the
owner but not by other persons.
Iowa Code § 321.1(78) defines “street” or “highway” as:
[T]he entire width between property lines of every way or place of
whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public,
as a matter of right, for the purposes of vehicular traffic.
It is undisputed that the Chevy did not stop before driving into the sidewalk
as it was leaving the Jim’s Foods parking lot and entering 6th Street SW. Robertson
contends the parking lot was “open to the use of the public” rather than a private
road, alley, or driveway as required under Iowa Code § 321.353. Specifically, he
argues: “The lot in question was not a private lane or driveway because it was
available for public use as a traffic lane while traveling from one street to another.”
This argument is inconsistent both with the evidence at the suppression hearing and
the applicable Iowa law.
There is no evidence in the record that the Jim’s Foods parking lot was
“available for public use as a traffic lane while traveling from one street to another.”
To the contrary, the district court found credible Sergeant Merritt’s testimony that
the “parking lot is reserved for the private businesses, so people that are frequenting
those businesses.” The private business owners could tow vehicles from their lot,
remove trespassers from their lot, and block access to their lot for maintenance
(which they performed). People driving on 6th Street SW could not “drive into that
parking lot to attempt to bypass traffic or anything.”
Robertson’s argument is also inconsistent with Iowa law. In State v. Sims¸
173 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 1969), the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether a drive-
in restaurant’s parking lot was a public highway. Sims was convicted of carrying a
loaded gun on a public highway. Id. at 128. The gun was found in a car parked in

-- 4 of 6 --

-5-
the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. Id. The state argued the parking lot was a
public highway under Iowa Code § 321.1(48). Id. At the time, Iowa Code
§ 321.1(48) defined “street” or “highway” as it is currently defined: “the entire
width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any
part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for the purposes of
vehicular traffic.” Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court held:
[A] parking lot for a drive-in restaurant is not a public highway.
The public has no right to use a drive-in parking lot for vehicular traffic.
It is privately owned. There is implied permission for the public to use
the lot to do business with the proprietor. Such a parking lot is a private
road or driveway as defined in section 321.1(49) as “every way or place
in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and
those having express or implied permission from the owner but not by
other persons.”
Id.
In State v. Brown, 870 N.W.2d 687, 2015 WL 4468841 (Iowa Ct. App. July
22, 2015) (unpublished) (Table), the Iowa Court of Appeals cited Sims in granting a
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. In Brown, the defendant argued that
officers lacked probable cause to search her vehicle because having an open
container of alcohol in an automobile in a private parking lot did not violate Iowa
Code § 321.284(1). Id. at *1. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress, holding that “because the parking lot was open to the public at the time
Brown was seen there, the parking lot was included in the definition of ‘public street
or highway.’” Id. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed:
In its ruling on Brown’s motion to suppress, the district court held that
the parking lot in question had sufficient public use to come within the
definition of “public street or highway.” We disagree.

-- 5 of 6 --

-6-
Our supreme court considered a similar situation in State v. Sims, 173
N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 1969). In Sims, the defendant was in an
automobile in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant when a police
officer noticed the defendant had a gun in the vehicle. 173 N.W.2d at
128. The defendant was charged with a violation of Iowa Code section
110.23 (1966), which prohibited persons from “hav[ing] or carry[ing]
any gun in or on any vehicle on any public highway.” Id. The court
considered the definition of public highway as provided by the Iowa
Code, the same definition applicable here, and held the parking lot of a
private restaurant is not a public highway. Id. The court found:
The public has no right to use a drive-in parking lot for vehicular
traffic. It is privately owned. There is implied permission for the
public to use the lot to do business with the proprietor. Such a
parking lot is a private road or driveway as defined in section
321.1[(54)] as “every way or place in private ownership and used
for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or
implied permission from the owner but not by other persons.”
Id. at *2–3.
Here, as in Sims and Brown, while the public may have had “implied
permission from the owner to park in the lot,” the lot was not “open to the use of the
public, as a matter of right, for the purposes of vehicular traffic.” The court properly
determined: “[p]rivate maintenance of the lot and exclusion of traffic by a private
owner are not consistent with the public’s right to use the parking lot as a highway.”
The court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________

-- 6 of 6 --