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25-1338•United States of America v. Christian Lorenzo Witt
25-1338Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitMay 29, 2026
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2683
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Christian Lorenzo Witt
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: November 17, 2025
Filed: May 26, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Christian Witt pled guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). He appeals the district
court’s1 denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm.
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota.
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-2-
On March 18, 2023, a detective with the Rapid City Police Department
(RCPD) was patrolling near the Surfwood Apartments in Rapid City, South Dakota.
The detective observed a red Chevrolet Impala back out of a parking spot, exit the
lot onto a public roadway, and then reenter through another entrance. As the vehicle
passed the detective, the detective observed a large spiderweb-shaped crack across
its windshield. South Dakota law prohibits operating a vehicle with glass that is
cracked “to the extent that it significantly impairs the vision of the motor vehicle
operator.” S.D. Codified Laws § 32-15-2.3. So the detective initiated a traffic stop.
Witt was the only person in the vehicle and, during the stop, he informed the
detective that he had outstanding warrants. The detective requested backup. After
additional RCPD officers arrived and confirmed the existence of outstanding arrest
warrants, they arrested Witt and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, which
revealed drug paraphernalia and a loaded firearm. A grand jury later indicted Witt
for being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.
Before trial, Witt moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the stop,
arguing the detective lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate the
stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation (R&R) finding the detective had probable cause based on his
testimony that the windshield crack impaired Witt’s vision and recommending
Witt’s motion be denied. Witt objected to the R&R, arguing the magistrate judge
wrongly concluded the detective had “probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
initiate the stop . . . .” The district court overruled Witt’s objection, adopted the
R&R, and denied the motion to suppress. Witt then entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He now appeals.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v.
Forjan, 66 F.4th 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Cox, 992 F.3d
706, 709 (8th Cir. 2021)). “We may affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress on any ground the record supports.” United States v. Betts, 88 F.4th 769,
772 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 414
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-3-
(8th Cir. 2017)). The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure and “must be
supported by ‘at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity has
occurred or is occurring.’” Forjan, 66 F.4th at 746 (quoting Cox, 992 F.3d at 709).
“[A] traffic violation — however minor — creates probable cause to stop the driver
of a vehicle.” Id. (quoting Cox, 992 F.3d at 709).
Witt argues the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable
cause because the detective testified he believed the cracked windshield
“obstructed,” “impair[ed],” or “imped[ed]” Witt’s vision, not that it “significantly
impair[ed]” his vision, as the statute requires. However, we need not parse the
detective’s testimony. There are multiple photos of the cracked windshield in the
record. The photos show the crack originated between the center and passenger side
of Witt’s windshield and spiderwebbed across the entire windshield. Considering
these photos, we are satisfied the crack significantly impaired Witt’s vision, as it
would have interfered with both his ability to observe traffic and pedestrians
approaching his vehicle from the passenger side and his ability to safely turn.
Consequently, the stop was supported by probable cause. At the very least, the
detective’s belief that Witt’s windshield did not comply with § 32-15-2.3 was
objectively reasonable. See United States v. Singleton, 135 F.4th 1129, 1133 (8th
Cir. 2025) (“An officer’s objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation has
occurred is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop even if the
officer is mistaken about the law.”).
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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