United States of America v. Jerome Warrior

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-3055
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jerome Warrior
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
____________
Submitted: January 12, 2026
Filed: May 6, 2026
[Unpublished]
____________
Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Eligibility is no guarantee of a reduced sentence. Here, the district court1
acted within its discretion by relying on Jerome Warrior’s extensive criminal and
disciplinary history in denying one.
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.

-- 1 of 3 --

-2-
When an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines “changed the calculation
of criminal[-]history scores,” Warrior asked the district court to shorten the 168-
month sentence he was serving. United States v. Shamburger, 144 F.4th 1088, 1089
(8th Cir. 2025). He passed the first hurdle by proving his eligibility. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). The retroactive
amendment reduced the criminal-history points awarded for committing a federal
crime while serving another sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), which decreased the
advisory range from 135–168 months to 121–151 months in prison.
At the next step, however, the district court concluded that he did not deserve
a lower sentence. It used its “discretion” to decide that the statutory sentencing
factors did not support one “under the particular circumstances of the case.” Dillon,
560 U.S. at 827; see United States v. Darden, 910 F.3d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 2018);
see also United States v. Chachanko, 162 F.4th 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2025) (explaining
that a court may “exercise its discretion” and decline to reduce a sentence).
For starters, he had an “utterly abysmal” prison record that included 17
disciplinary infractions, ranging from fighting to possessing a dangerous weapon.
And the crime that sent him there was just as violent. He had been “part of a
group . . . that beat [an unarmed man] to death.” His actions included bringing the
victim “to the ground” and kicking him “3–4 times in the face with his boot.” See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Darden, 910 F.3d at 1067 (explaining that courts “must
consider . . . the nature and circumstances and seriousness of the offense” when
deciding whether to reduce a sentence (citation omitted)).
Those were relevant circumstances to consider. See Darden, 910 F.3d at
1067; United States v. Boyd, 835 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 2016) (approving
consideration of “post-sentencing misconduct”). Balanced against mitigating
factors like Warrior’s prison-education efforts, the district court thought that he was
too dangerous for an earlier release. In reaching this conclusion, it sufficiently
considered the statutory sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3582(c)(2),

-- 2 of 3 --

-3-
and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See
United States v. Denton, 821 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 2016).
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________

-- 3 of 3 --